Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Jean Rosenfield appealed a district court's order that granted a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant-Appellee HSBC Bank, USA (HSBC). Plaintiff brought claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages against HSBC for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), contending her lender failed to make required disclosures in a residential loan refinancing agreement executed by the parties, and that because of this, she was entitled to a rescission of her loan agreement. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing her claims and by holding that she failed to timely exercise her right of rescission within the applicable three-year time bar specified by TILA. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court and affirmed its judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant Anne George wanted to corral her horse on her property with a fence. The United States Forest Service held an easement across Plaintiff's land. Plaintiff offered to leave a gate across the road unlocked, but the Service rejected this option, arguing that the public needs unfettered access to the adjacent Gila National Forest. The parties' wrangling dragged on for years but led nowhere until Plaintiff filed suit to quiet title in 2009. In the end, the Tenth Circuit ruled against her. "Whatever legal entitlement she might have had to build a fence across the Forest Service's road she lost years ago thanks to an even less permeable barrier to entry: the statute of limitations." Plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest to the land granted the government an easement for access to the forest, and each time Plaintiff attempted to fence her property, the government promptly removed it. That, she argued, was inadequate for the government to assert its claim to the easement as being fence-free. Under the plain terms of the Quiet Title Act, the statute of limitations began to run whenever a plaintiff or her predecessor-in-interest knew or should have known of the government’s claim: "[o]ne can be on notice of a claim even if that claim lacks any legal merit. . . . [o]ur precedent does not allow plaintiffs to wait until the adverse claims of the title asserted by them and the United States crystallize into well-defined and open disagreements before commencing a quiet-title action."

Defendant Baker Hughes Inteq, Inc. appealed the district court's order that denied its motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff EEC, Inc. and Baker contracted for Baker to provide drilling equipment for use in EEC's horizontal oil and natural gas well in Oklahoma. The equipment was lost in the well. EEC filed suit in Oklahoma state court alleging that Baker’s negligence damaged its well. Baker removed the case to federal court, invoked diversity jurisdiction, and filed counterclaims for the value of its equipment. Baker also sought to compel arbitration. Baker prepared and EEC signed numerous documents containing arbitration clauses which were ultimately ruled as unenforceable by the district court. The court also denied Baker’s motion to reconsider. Further, the court enjoined Baker from proceeding with arbitration, and stayed further district court proceedings pending appeal of its orders. Upon review of the arbitration clauses at issue in this case, the Tenth Circuit found disagreed that because there were differences in the multiple clauses they were rendered unenforceable. The Court reversed the district court's judgment denying Baker's motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case with directions to order the parties to pursue arbitration.

Plaintiff-Appellant Allen Russell appealed a district court's order that denied his "Motion to Vacate the Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4)(6) (FRCP), and Motion for Appointment of Counsel Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(d), and, or, Alternatively, Second Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint." Plaintiff filed his pro se civil rights complaint against "a plethora" of business, attorney and judicial defendants arising out of the foreclosure of real property he held in Colorado. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that his claims were repetitive of claims previously asserted in two cases that had been resolved against him. Finding that Plaintiff did not raise a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on law or facts in support of the issues he raised on appeal, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Plaintiff's case.

Plaintiff Commonwealth Property Advocates, LLC, acquired title to three pieces of real property in Utah from three defaulting borrowers. Plaintiff then filed three suits in diversity against various Defendants which held interests in the property, seeking to prevent foreclosure. Plaintiff argued Defendants had no authority to foreclose because the notes in each case had been securitized and sold on the open market. Because the security followed the debt, Plaintiff argued once Defendants sold the security they could not foreclose absent authorization from every investor who had purchased an interest in the securitized note. Defendants in all three cases filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the district court granted those motions. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff's diversity jurisdiction claims had no legal basis under Utah law, and as such, the district court properly dismissed all three complaints.

After the district court reduced Defendant Lindsey Springer's tax assessment to judgment and ordered foreclosure on certain real property, persons who held a mortgage on the property and who had participated in the litigation moved for an award of attorney's fees and expenses against Mr. Springer. The magistrate judge recommended granting the motion in part and awarding to the Cross-Claimants $10,576.56 of the $35,416 requested in fees and expenses. Defendant objected but the district court affirmed. The Tenth Circuit declined to address three of the five issues Defendant raised on appeal as they were precluded by res judicata. However, the Court found one remaining issue persuasive: Defendant contended that the Cross-Claimants waited too long under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to seek their fee award. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Cross-Claimants indeed filed their request too late, and the district court abused its discretion in granting even a partial fee award. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and the case was remanded for the district court to deny Cross-Claimants' award for attorney's fees and costs.

In 1999, Christopher Sullivan learned through a business acquaintance, Robert Weaver, acquired all interests in a particular oil and gas lease. The then-current operators of the wells on the lease, QEP Energy, made regular payments to Mr. Sullivan for several years. In early 2006 QEP determined that the total payments to Mr. Sullivan by all operators on the lease exceeded his interest in the leases. QEP therefore ceased further payments and sought reimbursement of the overpayment from Mr. Sullivan. He disputed the claim, asserting that QEP owed him additional payments. QEP brought this action in Utah state court, seeking a declaration of the amounts due Mr. Sullivan. It also sought recovery from Mr. Sullivan for the alleged overpayment. Both parties filed motions for partial summary judgment on their claims for declaratory relief. The district court held that the terms of Mr. Sullivan's interest (from when he acquired the original interest in the lease) unambiguously described he should have only received a three percent production-payment. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of QEP, and dismissed Mr. Sullivan's claims with prejudice. Mr. Sullivan appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's analysis of the leases in question and affirmed its decision in favor of QEP.

This appeal arose from a suit filed by the United States that asked the district court to reduce certain of Defendant-Appellant Jack Wilson’s tax liabilities to judgment, to set aside a fraudulent transfer of real property from Wilson to Defendant Joey Lee Dobbs-Wilson, and to enforce the government’s new liens, as well as one preexisting tax lien, against the real property by ordering a sale. Wilson appealed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the United States. Wilson argued in his response to the government’s motion for summary judgment and in his cross-motion for summary judgment that Ms. Dobbs-Wilson was not his nominee when he transferred the property to her in 1998 and, as a result, a 1997 lien became invalid when the government mistakenly released it in 2003, after he no longer owned the property. Assuming the validity of Wilson's argument, and after supplemental briefing on the matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Wilson failed to demonstrate any injury to him that the Court could redress. Having determined that the Court lacked jurisdiction over his appeal, the case was dismissed.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Ark Initiative, Alex Forsythe, and Paul Smith appealed a district court's judgment in favor of the Defendants-Appellees, the U.S. Forest Service and its Chief. The district court upheld the Defendants' acceptance of a 2003 Master Development Plan (MDP), as well as a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis, and decisions concerning a 2006 Snowmass Ski Improvements Project. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants violated NEPA by approving the project without examining certain cumulative effects-- namely, effects on water resources, endangered fish, forest habitats, and "other resources." Defendants countered that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their claims, and that the NEPA does not require a federal agency to examine the cumulative effects of its proposed action with those of an unrelated proposal where the proposed action will not affect the resource concerns pressed by the Plaintiffs. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and affirmed the district court's judgment.

In January 2009, Defendant-Appellant Robert Blechman and a codefendant, Itsik (Issac) Yass, were tried together in the District of Kansas on charges of mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and aggravated identity theft. Evidence introduced at trial showed that Yass operated a business that he used to temporarily halt home foreclosures by "attaching" foreclosure properties to fraudulent bankruptcy cases in order to take advantage of the Bankruptcy Codeâs automatic stay provision. After a two-week trial, the jury found Blechman and Yass guilty of all of the counts charged against them. The district court granted Blechman's motion for judgment of acquittal on the identity theft counts and ultimately sentenced Blechman to a total of eighteen months' imprisonment on the remaining counts. Blechman appealed, challenging the district courtâs admission of an America Online (AOL) record that connected him to an e-mail address and three PACER records revealing that he accessed fraudulent bankruptcy cases in Tennessee that were similar to the Kansas bankruptcies identified in the indictment. Blechman argued that these records contained double hearsay and that the district court erroneously admitted them under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in admitting the challenged AOL and PACER records under Rule 803(6). Nevertheless, because the Court concluded that the error was harmless, it affirmed Blechman's convictions.