Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants F. Jeffrey Miller and Hallie Irvin were charged in an eleven-count indictment with a variety of crimes stemming from an alleged conspiracy to defraud mortgage lenders in connection with the subprime housing market. After a month-long jury trial, Miller and Irvin were each convicted on several of the charges and sentenced. They appealed their convictions, citing numerous evidentiary and legal errors. Miller also challenged his sentence. Miller was a builder and developer involved in residential construction in Kansas, Missouri, and other states. With many competing developers marketing their homes to well-qualified buyers, Miller chose to focus his business on buyers with low income and poor credit. The marketing of Millerâs homes was handled by Stephen Vanatta, who would refer potential buyers to a mortgage broker named James Sparks for financing. Because a prior felony conviction for passing a bad check prohibited Vanatta from maintaining a checking account, his portion of commissions were paid by checks issued to his wife, appellant Irvin. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found the district court erred on three of the eleven charges against Defendant Miller, but affirmed the district court in all other aspects. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Tenth Circuit considered whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) properly exercised its discretion to reject a gift of property by a member of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma to the tribe. The Court noted that this appeal also raised a novel jurisdictional question regarding its review of administrative decisions following a remand from district court. James Smith wanted to transfer to the tribe a portion of his property interest in the Maria Christiana Reserve No. 35 (southwest of Kansas City) where the tribe had plans to develop gaming facilities. Federal law and restrictions on Smithâs fee interest required the BIA to approve any transfer. Citing concerns regarding fractional land interests in the Reserve as well as the long-range best interests of Reserve landowners, the BIA denied Smithâs application to transfer the land. The Tribe challenged that decision. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held the BIA properly exercised its discretion in denying the application. With regard to the jurisdictional question raised, the Court concluded that the government has not abandoned its right to challenge the district courtâs remand order, even though the government substantially prevailed in the district courtâs final judgment. The Court found the district court erred in its remand order reversing the BIAâs denial of Smithâs application. Therefore the Court vacated the district courtâs final judgment and its order reversing the BIA, and remanded the case for further consideration of Smithâs application consistent with this opinion.

In one of Plaintiff Leprino Foods Company's warehouses, flavoring compounds derived from nearby-stored fruit products contaminated a large quantity of cheese. Leprino's "all-risk" insurance policy with Defendant Factory Mutual Insurance Company excluded contamination unless with was caused by "other physical damage." When Factory Mutual refused coverage on the basis of the contamination exclusion, Leprino sued. A jury determined that the contamination was caused by other physical damage and therefore was covered by the Factory Mutual insurance policy. On appeal, Factory Mutual contended the verdict was not supported by the evidence presented at trial. Specifically, Factory mutual argued that: (1) expert testimony was not presented to prove causation; (2) the jury instructions pertaining to Leprino's cold-storage guidelines were given in error; and (3) Leprino's damages should have been reduced by its settlement with the warehouse. Upon review of the trial record and applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit found that Leprino presented sufficient evidence with regard to expert testimony to prove causation. The Court did not find jury instructions to be erroneous. The Court did agree that Leprino's damages should be reduced by the amount of the settlement received from the warehouse. The Court therefore affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's decisions and remanded the case for recalculation of damages.

The issue central to this case stemmed from a contract dispute between two landowners and the City of Casper Wyoming as to whether the landowners were obligated to reimburse the City for certain street improvements. When the landowners did not comply with the City's demand for payment, the City recorded deficiency notices in the local property records on their lots. The landowners sued the City, claiming the notices violated their rights to due process and equal protection. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the ground that the landowners had not shown the existence of a protected property interest and that the deficiency notices did not constitute a deprivation of any right. Upon review by the Tenth Circuit, the Court concluded that the landowners demonstrated a disputed issue of fact as to whether the City harmed their property interests. The Court remanded the case for consideration of whether that deprivation violated the Due Process Clause. However, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the equal protection claim.

In this case the Court was asked to determine who won an eminent domain action in which the winner should have been awarded attorney's fees. Despite winning the judgment, Appellees were denied attorney's fees. Technically Appellees were not the "prevailing party" at trial, and thus not entitled to fees. At issue in the case was the value of mineral rights to land the Government sought to take by eminent domain. Competing experts disputed the valuation, eventually resting on a number with the district court's help. Appellees sought fees but were denied. They brought their case to the Tenth Circuit to challenge the district court's decision. Relying on it's own precedent, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court had to use the highest valuation "attested to at trial." In this case, Appellants "won" the battle of the experts even though Appellees "won" the judgment. Appellants' expert had the highest valuation of the mineral rights, and because the amount of the judgment was far less than his highest valuation, Appellants were the "prevailiang party." The Court accordingly affirmed the district court's decision denying Appellees attorney's fees.