Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging, inter alia, that Liberty, a management company, was a "debt collector" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and was civilly liable for violating several of the FDCPA's provisions. The exemption at issue on appeal, section 1692a(6)(F)(i), provided that the Act did not apply to persons or entities "collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed... another to the extent such activity is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation." The court held that this exemption applied to Liberty, which collected unpaid assessments on behalf of a homeowners association, as long as the collection of such assessments was not central to the management of the company's fiduciary obligations. Accordingly, Liberty was not a debt collector under the Act and its actions did not violate state law. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Liberty. View "Harris, et al v. Liberty Community Mgmnt." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute related to the purchase of a lot in the Bahamas. The court held that the district court erred when it determined that the appraisal fraud claims were within the scope of the lot purchase contract's forum-selection clause. The court also held that the district court erred in applying equitable estoppel to allow the nonsignatories to the lot purchase contract to invoke the lot purchase contract's Bahamian forum-selection clause. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment granting the motion to dismiss for improper venue and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bahamas Sales Assoc., LLC v. Byers" on Justia Law

Beneva and Iberiabank became parties to the sublease at issue through a series of assignments. At issue was whether the sublease transferred by the FDIC to Iberiabank after it took over the assets of a failed bank was enforceable despite a clause purporting to terminate the sublease on sale or transfer of the failed bank. Because the court found that the FDIC acted within its power to enforce contracts under 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(13)(A) and that the termination clause was unenforceable against Iberiabank as the FDIC's transferee, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Iberiabank. View "Iberiabank v. Beneva 41-I, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

The United States obtained a judgment for restitution of more than $85 million against Lawrence Duran for crimes that he committed in a conspiracy to defraud Medicare. After the United States obtained a writ of execution against an apartment that, according to property records, was owned jointly by Lawrence and his former wife, Carmen Duran, she moved to dissolve or stay the writ on the ground that she had acquired sole title to the property as part of their divorce settlement several months before his prosecution. The district court denied the motion without prejudice on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction. Because the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 28 U.S.C. 3203(a), provided that the United States could levy only property in which a judgment debtor had a substantial nonexempt interest, the district court erred in refusing to adjudicate Carmen's motion. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Duran" on Justia Law

This diversity action asked whether the property damage alleged in a California class action lawsuit brought by purchasers of homes built by Morrison was caused by an "occurrence" and therefore covered under the terms of Morrison's CGL policy with Gerling. Central to the case are questions of Georgia law, among them whether property damage can constitute an "occurrence" under a CGL policy where its effects are not felt on "other property." As this question is determinative of the case, and the single Supreme Court of Georgia case touching upon the matter failed to answer it, the court certified these questions for resolution. View "HDI-Gerling America Ins. v. Taylor Morrison Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Leon County appealed the dismissal of its complaint against the FHFA, it's acting director, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Leon County argued that by directing Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks to refrain from purchasing mortgages encumbered with certain first-priority lien obligations, some of which were held by Leon County, the FHFA engaged in rulemaking without providing notice and comment pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 12 U.S.C. 4526(b). The court agreed with the district court that, under the specific facts in this case, the FHFA's directive not to purchase Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) encumbered mortgages was within the FHFA's broad powers as conservator. Accordingly, because 12 U.S.C. 4617(f) provided that "no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FHFA] as a conservator or receiver," the district court held that section 4617(f) barred Leon County's claims. View "Leon County Florida, et al v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's amendment to an existing criminal forfeiture order to include two Thailand condominiums defendant owns. The court held that the condos were subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 853(a)(1) and (d). The court held that even if the statute of limitations, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1621 were applicable in this instance, the statute of limitations would be tolled because the condos were not located in the United States. Further, defendant's laches argument failed because the United States was generally not subject to the defense of laches when it enforced its rights. In any event, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(e)(1) permitted the district court to amend a criminal forfeiture order "at any time" on motion by the government. The court also held that defendant's due process rights were not violated. Finally, defendant's Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty argument lacked merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order amending the 1999 forfeiture order to include defendant's condos. View "United States v. Duboc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of themselves and others who purchased houses from a builder, Ryland, in the Newport subdivision of Vista Lakes, a residential development in Orlando, Florida. The Newport subdivision was adjacent to land known as "Pinecastle." Pinecastle was used as a bombing range during World War II and remained laden with, among other things, unexploded bombs. When plaintiffs bought houses from Ryland, they were unaware of Pinecastle. Later, after Pinecastle's existence became public, plaintiffs' houses lost considerable market value and plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to compensate for the loss. Counts 1, 3, and 4 sought compensation for the loss of value plaintiffs' houses sustained due to their close proximity to Pinecastle. Count 2 sought recovery of 1.5 percent of the purchase price of every home Ryland sold in the Newport subdivision. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 with prejudice and Count 3 without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count 4, pursuant to Rule 56.

IWC appealed the district court's judgment as a matter of law in favor of IDH. Hawaiian, a Florida condominium, contracted with IDH for roof repair. While IDH was conducting the repairs, a large stone veneer wall fell, causing damage to the condominium. Hawaiian's insurer, ICW, sued IDH for negligence. IDH alleged that the wall fell because it was structurally unsound. During trial, at the close of ICW's case, the district court granted IDH's motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that no reasonable jury could find that IDH was negligent because ICW failed to present any evidence on the standard of care in the roofing industry. Without reaching the issue of whether roofers were "professionals" under Florida law, the court held that ICW was required to put forth some evidence of the standard of care in the roofing industry in order to meet its burden. Because ICW failed to do so, judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. Further, the specificity requirement in Rule 50(a)(2) did not bar the granting of judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs defaulted on a loan that they had secured by giving the lender a mortgage on their property. A law firm representing the lender sent plaintiffs a letter and documents demanding payment of the debt and threatening to foreclose on the property if they did not pay it. Plaintiffs then filed a putative class action lawsuit against the law firm alleging that the communication violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held, however, that the complaint contained enough factual content to allow inference that the law firm was a "debt collector" because it regularly attempted to collect debts. The complaint also alleged that the law firm was "engaged in the business of collecting debts owed to others incurred for personal, family[,] or household purposes" and that in the year before the complaint was filed, the firm had sent more than 500 people "dunning notice[s]" containing "the same or substantially similar language" to that found in the letter and documents attached to the complaint in this case. Further, the complaint alleged enough to constitute regular debt collection within the meaning of 1692a(6). Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.