Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The city filed a complaint in admiralty against defendant, a vessel, claiming that defendant committed the maritime tort of trespass because it remained at the city marina after the city explicitly revoked its consent, and seeking to foreclose its maritime lien for necessaries (unpaid dockage provided to defendant by the city). Claimant, owner of the vessel, appealed from the district court's entry of an order of summary judgment and an order of final judgment for the city in an in rem proceeding against defendant. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that it had federal admiralty jurisdiction over defendant where defendant was a "vessel" for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction; the district court's factual findings regarding the amount claimant owed under the city's maritime lien for necessaries were not clearly erroneous; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the city on claimant's affirmative defense of retaliation; the district court correctly concluded that the city was not estopped from bringing its action in admiralty against defendant; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply collateral estoppel because the issues at stake were significantly different from those in dispute in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the district court's orders were affirmed.

Count One of the multi-count indictment in this case charged Robert and Patrick Singletary, and others, with conspiring between 1997 and September 16, 2004, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, to commit three offenses: (1) to defraud a federally insured bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1344; (2) to make false representations with respect to material facts to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001; and (3) to defraud purchasers of residential property and mortgage lenders, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343. The Singletarys eventually pled guilty to Count One to the extent that it alleged a conspiracy to commit the section 1343 offense in addition to the section 1001 offense. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution in the sum of $1 million. The court held that the district court failed to determine by a preponderance of the evidence which of the 56 mortgages the loan officers handled was obtained through a false "gift" letter, a false "credit explanation" letter, or a false employment verification form; and where fraud was found, to determine the extent of the actual loss HUD could have incurred due to the mortgage's foreclosure. Accordingly, the court vacated the restitution provisions and remanded for further proceedings.

The Georgia Parties, Gwinnett County, Georgia, and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) appealed from a grant of summary judgment in this consolidated suit arising from more than 20 years of litigation between the parties. All of the underlying cases related to the Corps' authority to operate the Buford Dam and Lake Lanier, the reservoir it created, for local water supply. On appeal, the parties raised several jurisdictional matters and asserted a number of substantive claims. The court held that the district court erred in finding that it had jurisdiction to hear certain parties because the Corps had not taken final agency action. The court also held that the district court and the Corps erred in concluding that water supply was not an authorized purpose of the Buford Project under the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), Pub. L. No. 79-525, 60 Stat. 634. The court also held that the district court erred in finding that the 1956 Act expired after 50 years. The court also provided certain instructions to the Corps on remand and the Corps shall have one year to make a final determination of its authority to operate the Buford Project under the RHA and the Water Supply Act, 43 U.S.C. 390b(a).

Plaintiffs sued defendants alleging claims under the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c),(d), and under various state laws based on allegations that defendants defrauded individuals throughout the United States by devising an investment scheme through which investors could purchase real estate interests in luxury vacation properties in the Dominican Republic. At issue was whether the district court properly severed the 232 plaintiffs, and their claims, and instructed each plaintiff to file his or her complaint in a separate action. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the severance order was not final and the collateral order doctrine did not apply to an interlocutory order severing claims.

This case involved a residential construction scheme, which required the investor, the mortgage broker, the builder, and the bank providing the builder with the funds to construct the house to enter into certain independent contractual arrangements. Petitioners, investors whose builders went under and left them with unfinished houses or vacant lots, sought a writ of mandamus asking the court to order the district court to require respondent, the bank's executive vice-president for mortgage lending, to make a restitution in an amount equivalent to one point of their construction loans. The court held that the cause of petitioners' loss was not respondent, but the fact that the builders became insolvent and were unable or unwilling to complete their work. Therefore, the writ of mandamus was denied where petitioners assumed the risk that the builder might walk off the job; that if it did, the bank would declare the construction loan in default; and that, as the bank's borrower, they would be liable for the draws the builders had received plus interest.

Hollywood Mobile Estates Limited ("Hollywood") filed a complaint in district court against the Seminole Tribe of Florida ("Tribe") where the Tribe and the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") approved a lease assignment between Hollywood and the Tribe. At issue was whether Hollywood alleged an injury fairly traceable to the Secretary or redressable by the district court in a complaint that alleged that the Tribe had threatened to repossess tribal property in violation of the lease. Also at issue was whether the interests of Hollywood were within the zone of interests protected by the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. 415, and its accompanying regulations. The court held that Hollywood lacked constitutional standing to maintain its complaint and therefore, vacated in part the judgment entered by the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also held that Hollywood lacked prudential standing to sue the Secretary and therefore, affirmed the denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint as futile.

Defendants appealed a judgment finding that a contract between plaintiffs and one of the defendants for the construction and purchase of a condominium was voidable where defendants failed to establish two escrow accounts for certain monetary deposits made by plaintiffs under the Florida Condominium Act ("Act"). At issue was whether the Act required the establishment of two separate escrow accounts and whether the Act authorized a private cause of action against an escrow agent. The court held that the district court did not err in finding the contract voidable for failure to maintain a separate accounting under the Act, regardless of whether the Act required one account or two. The court also held that the Act did not authorize a private cause of action against an escrow agent where the statute clearly set forth the rights of developers regarding the treatment of deposits made by condominium buyers and provided no remedy against the escrow agent.