Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals
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In 2002, the developer of a timeshare real estate venture (Developer) and Ernesto Brito and Marigloria Del Valle (together, Appellees) entered into a purchase agreement pursuant to which the Developer transferred a “period of ownership” of seven days to a unit of the timeshare regime to Appellees. In 2009, the Developer filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and listed Appellees as secured creditors in its bankruptcy schedules. Appellees filed a proof of claim asserting a security interest over the real property. Appellant-bank, the holder of a mortgage over the timeshare property, filed an adversary proceeding against Appellees seeking a declaratory judgment that Appellees did not possess a valid lien over the timeshare property. Appellant moved for summary judgment, contending that Appellees did not have a real property interest because the applicable formalities of the Puerto Rico Timeshare and Vacation Club Act had not been satisfied. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that Appellees held property rights in the real property. View "Scotiabank de P.R. v. Burgos" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, property owners, filed an action against Defendant, a bank, alleging eleven counts of state law violations for Defendant’s decision to deny Plaintiffs’ application for a loan modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program and to foreclose on Plaintiffs’ home. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, holding that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, rescission, negligence, and promissory estoppel. View "MacKenzie v. Flagstar Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

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Appellant obtained a loan from a Bank for a home equity line of credit secured by a second mortgage on her home in Rowley, Massachusetts. Appellant later sold her home but did not notify the Bank of the sale. Appellant later took advantage of a mistake made on the part of the Bank and obtained $124,200, the exact limit on the home equity line. After Appellant failed to pay back the $124,200 drawn from the home equity account, the Bank commenced foreclosure proceedings on the Rowley property. The new owners were insured by Old Republic National Title Insurance Company, which paid the debt, took an assignment of all of the Bank's rights against Appellant, and sued Appellant in state court. A default judgment was entered against Appellant. Thereafter, Appellant filed for bankruptcy. Old Republic sought a determination that its pre-petition judgment was excepted from discharge as a debt. The bankruptcy court determined that Appellant's debt was not dischargeable in bankruptcy because it was for money Appellant obtained by false pretenses and because it was a debt arising from willful and malicious injury. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court was correct to find the debt to be non-dischargeable. View "Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Levasseur" on Justia Law

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The City of Springfield enacted two local ordinances that imposed new legal duties on (1) property owners to maintain property during the foreclosure process and provide a $10,000 cash bond per foreclosure to the City, and (2) mortgagees to attempt a settlement through negotiations before foreclosing. In dispute was the definition of "owner" in the first ordinance, which included mortgagees who were not in possession and had begun the foreclosure process. The ordinance imposed the duties on the mortgagees whether the mortgagors were still in possession. Six banks sued in state court, seeking to have the ordinances invalidated as inconsistent with and preempted by comprehensive state laws governing foreclosure and property maintenance and as inconsistent with state and federal constitutional guarantees. The case was removed to federal district court, which concluded that the ordinances were valid. The banks appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals certified dispositive state law questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court because the outcome of the case depended on unresolved questions of Massachusetts law and raised significant policy concerns better suited for resolution by that state court. View "Easthampton Savings Bank v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

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Cadlerocks Centennial Drive, LLC entered into a loan secured by a mortgage on its property. Daniel Cadle executed a personal guaranty on the loan. The original lender subsequently assigned the mortgage and related documents to Wells Fargo Bank as trustee for registered holders ("Trust"). ORIX Capital Markets, LLC was the special servicer of the Trust and began servicing the loan. Cadlerocks later defaulted on its loan, after which the Trust commenced foreclosure proceedings. ORIX then filed this lawsuit against Cadlerocks and Cadle, alleging breaches of the various agreements related to the loan. Among those documents was an indemnity agreement, under which Cadle and Cadlerocks agreed to indemnify the original lender and its assignees for liabilities "sought from or asserted against" the indemnitees connected with the presence of hazardous material on or around the property. ORIX conducted environmental tests on the property, and the district court held that ORIX was entitled to recover the majority of the costs associated with the environmental testing under the indemnity agreement. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the part of the district court's order awarding costs associated with environmental testing, holding that the cost of the tests that ORIX conducted fell outside the scope of the indemnity agreement. Remanded. View "ORIX Capital Markets, LLC v. Cadlerocks Centennial Drive, LLC" on Justia Law

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Robert Smith, a schizophrenic trash collector, was induced into acting as a straw buyer for two overvalued residential properties in Massachusetts. Smith sued various entities and individuals involved in the transactions. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict largely favorable to Smith on his claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court doubled and trebled certain damages pursuant to the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Two defendants, a real estate brokerage firm (Century 21) and a mortgage broker (NEMCO), appealed. Smith cross-appealed the dismissal of several of his claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the damage award against Century 21 and remanded for a new trial on damages; (2) reversed the judgment against NEMCO on Smith's common-law claims; (3) vacated the judgment against NEMCO on Smith's Chapter 93A claim and remanded for a determination on the merits; (4) vacated the judgment in favor of another defendant and remanded; and (5) reversed the dismissal of Smith's Chapter 93A claim against yet another defendant and remanded for a determination of the claim on the merits. View "Smith v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff faced foreclosure on her home mortgage after having fallen behind on her payments. The notice of foreclosure that Plaintiff received did not come from her lending institution but from a bank that had purchased her mortgage through a series of assignments facilitated by the Mortgage Electronic Recording System (MERS). Plaintiff brought this complaint against the receiving institution that sought foreclosure, (1) contending that MERS could not validly assign her mortgage, and therefore asserting that the receiving institution had no legal interest upon which to foreclose; and (2) bringing state law claims for fraud and unfair business practices. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claims did not present legally cognizable claims for relief. View "Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff refinanced his home mortgage and entered into a refinancing loan and mortgage agreement with IndyMac Bank, which assigned the mortgage to OneWest Bank. The mortgage was serviced by IndyMac Mortgage Services (all three services are referred to as "OneWest"). After Plaintiff fell behind on his payments, Harmon Law Offices, counsel to OneWest, informed Plaintiff that his home would be foreclosed. Fannie Mae purchased Plaintiff's house at a subsequent foreclosure sale. Eleven days later, Harmon served Plaintiff with an eviction notice. Plaintiff sued OneWest, Fannie Mae, and Harmon, asserting negligence and negligent misrepresentation and seeking an injunction against the pending eviction, an order nullifying the foreclosure, and monetary damages. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the economic loss doctrine barred Plaintiff's tort claims and that the tort claims failed because Defendants had not breached any duties owed to Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's claims. View "Schaefer v. IndyMac Mort. Servs." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued the servicer of his loan (Bank) in a putative class action, asserting that the Bank's requirement that he maintain flood insurance coverage in an amount sufficient to cover the replacement value of his home breached the terms of his mortgage contract. The mortgage was insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Specifically, Defendant contended that the Bank, under a covenant of the mortgage contract, could not require more than the federally mandated minimum flood insurance. The covenant was a standard uniform covenant prescribed by the FHA pursuant to federal law. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed by an equally divided en banc First Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract, as (1) the Bank's reading of the contract was correct and Plaintiff's was incorrect; (2) Plaintiff could not avoid dismissal on the grounds that his specific understanding or the actions of the parties created an ambiguity; and (3) the United States' position articulated in its amicus brief, which stated that Plaintiff's interpretation of the contract was incorrect, reinforced the Court's conclusion. View "Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff borrowed money from Countrywide Financial and secured the loan with a mortgage on real property. The recorded mortgage was assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), which also held the note on Plaintiff's property. When Plaintiff was unable to make payments on the mortgage, BONY instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff filed suit to enjoin the foreclosure, arguing that (1) the description of his property in the mortgage did not satisfy New Hampshire's statute of frauds, and (2) Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property to the copy of the mortgage was an act of fraud that should bar BONY from foreclosing. The district court rejected both of Plaintiff's arguments. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the description of the property, in light of the surrounding circumstances, was not so imprecise as to be unenforceable under the New Hampshire statute of frauds; and (2) because the description of the property attached to the mortgage was correct, Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property was not fraudulent. View "French v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law