Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Back Bay has operated a health club in Boston since 1995, renting space under a lease that is renewable through 2025. In 2004, a developer purchased the building and obtained a zoning variance to convert the building into mixed-use condominium units. Back Bay appealed the variance in 2005. It agreed to drop its objections to the project in exchange for the developer’s promise to sell it "Commercial Unit B," the space the health club occupies. Under its construction mortgage and related loan agreement, the developer was required to obtain the Bank's written consent for a sale of any condominium unit; those agreements specified a minimum sales price for retail units higher than the price stated in the Letter Agreement with Back Bay. Back Bay had at least constructive notice of the written consent requirement, as contained in the publicly recorded mortgage. The developer subsequently lost title to the property, by foreclosure, to a subsidiary of the Bank. The district court rejected a specific performance action by Back Bay. The First Circuit affirmed. View "Back Bay Spas, Inc. v. 441 Stuart Mktg., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2008 Ziegler Holdings purchased the right to civil possession of a beachfront residence in Vieques, Puerto Rico, from plaintiffs and agreed to make monthly payments over four years, culminating in a balloon payment; maintain insurance on the Property; and indemnify plaintiffs for attorneys' fees of $5,000 in the event of an enforcement action. In 2010, Ziegler stopped making monthly payments, asserting that plaintiffs had misrepresented the property. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the sale was void, return of the possessory interest, and $5,000 in attorneys' fees. Ziegler failed to timely submit its pretrial memorandum, frustrated plaintiffs’ efforts to have the parties meet and confer regarding discovery, and did not disclose materials described in a court order. Following several court dates and warnings, the district court entered default judgment against Ziegler. The First Circuit affirmed the default judgment, but vacated in part because the court had entered judgment beyond what plaintiffs were entitled to. The court remanded for entry of a revised judgment limited to declaratory relief, possession of the Property, and attorneys' fees. View "Hooper-Haas v. Ziegler Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Green Mountain owns cellular phone towers and leases space to federally licensed providers of wireless telecommunications services, who mount antennae on the towers to service their cellular networks. Green Mountain entered into an agreement with an agency of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to lease land in Milton, an unzoned triangular section, approximately 2,700 square feet, formed by the intersection of I-93 and the southbound on-ramp. Applications to the Town Zoning Board of Appeals and the Milton Conservation Commission were denied. Green Mountain challenged the decisions as not supported by "substantial evidence," as required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(iii); as constituting an "effective prohibition" on provision of wireless services in the area in violation of the TCA; and as violating Massachusetts state law. The district court granted summary judgment upholding the denials. The First Circuit affirmed with respect to the substantial evidence claims, but vacated in part. The district court did not adequately address evidence supporting the effective prohibition claim. View "Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard" on Justia Law

In 2004, Edlow agreed to purchase three residential condominium units in RBW's luxury development, consisting of a Residential Unit, a Commercial Unit, and a Hotel Unit. It was anticipated that the Regent Hotel would operate the Hotel and that residential occupants would have privileged access to hotel amenities. According to marketing materials the Regent Boston was to offer a spa, meeting space, a signature restaurant by a Michelin chef, 24-hour concierge service, and an executive business center. When construction fell behind, RBW exercised its rights to extend closing dates several times. RBW representatives assured Edlow that "all promised amenities would be available." Edlow affirmed his commitment to purchase two units, but was released from obligation to buy one. The closing for the first unit took place in May 2008. In June, RBW informed Edlow that Regent was pulling out. In July, RBW informed him that the replacement hotel would not offer property management and concierge services discussed in original marketing materials. Despite these notices, Edlow executed a new agreement. Days later, Edlow demanded return of deposits on the remaining unit. Edlow sued, alleging contract, tort and statutory claims. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. View "Edlow v. RBW, LLC" on Justia Law

Fernandes injured his back when he stepped into a hole in the floor of a tire "shed," an old shipping container, which was on property leased by AGAR to Fernandes's employer, Penske Truck Leasing. He sued AGAR on the theory that it owed him a duty of care to maintain and repair the tire shed under the lease. The district court granted summary judgment to AGAR under Massachusetts law. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that, under the lease, Agar had no duty to repair or maintain the shed. View "Fernandes v. Agar Supply Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Taxpayers bought and renovated a $1,050,000 row house in the South End of Boston, subject to historic preservation restrictions. In 2003, they learned about a tax incentive program for historic preservation, promoted by National Architectural Trust, which advised them that the Trust could help them qualify for a deduction of 10 to 15 percent of fair market value. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 170(h), creates an incentive for donation of property interests to nonprofit organizations and government entities for "conservation purposes," including preservation of "historically important" land or structures. Taxpayers made a $1,000 deposit, executed a Preservation Restriction Agreement, and sent another $15,840. On their 2003 return they claimed a cash contribution of $16,870 to the Trust and a noncash contribution of $220,800 for the easement donation (spread to 2004 return). In 2009, the IRS sent "Notice of Deficiency" and calculated that they owed an additional $39,081.25 for 2003 and an additional $36,340.00 for 2004, plus underpayment penalties. The Tax Court disallowed any deduction for the easement, but held that they were entitled to deduct their $16,840 cash contribution on their 2004 return. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, rejecting the reasoning for disallowing the deduction for the easement. View "Kaufman v. Shulman" on Justia Law

The EPA initiated efforts to remediate contamination at the Rhode Island Centredale Manor Superfund Site under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675 and issued a unilateral administrative order to compel entities, including NE Container and Emhart to remove hazardous substances that had been disposed of at the Site as part of the former operations of several companies. Emhart sued NE Container and its insurers, which had provided general commercial liability policies to NE Container during different time periods from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s. Travelers agreed to contribute to NE Container's defense pursuant to a reservation of rights, while PWIC took the position that it had no duty to defend. Travelers has incurred significant defense costs and filed this suit, seeking contribution from PWIC. The district court ruled that PWIC was not contractually obligated to defend NE Container in the Emhart action, observing that the alleged property damage occurred before the commencement of the PWIC policy period between 1982 and 1985. The First Circuit vacated. The district court mistakenly focused solely on the timing of the insured's alleged polluting activities, rather than also considering the potential timing of property damage caused by those activities.

In 1998, the city purchased a house, built before 1978, to provide storage. The seller provided a lead paint inspection report, based on a 1996 inspection, indicating the presence of lead-based paint. When the city sold the house in 2003, it provided a blank, pre-printed, standard lead-based paint disclosure form, which the buyer and his agent signed. The agent informed the buyer that the city would complete the form later. The city never completed the form nor did it turn over the 1996 report. The buyer moved into the home with his family. In 2008, tests taken at his son's two-year physical revealed an elevated blood lead level. The state of New Hampshire performed an inspection, which revealed lead-based paint hazards. In 2010, more than six years after the purchase, the buyer sued under 42 U.S.C. 4852d, which requires disclosure of lead-based paint hazards in sales of homes built before 1978. He alleged that he had received an estimate of approximately $126,000 to perform abatement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city based on a three-year limitations period. The First Circuit affirmed. The claim accrued when the city failed to disclose.

Plaintiff owned land near lots intended for development. The Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority planned to condemn most of plaintiff's land, in aid of the development. Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the condemnation proceeding was rejected; he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the developer, PRHTA, and PRHTA employees, alleging conspiracy to deprive him of his property without just compensation or due process and torts claims under commonwealth law. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants and awarded $92,149 in attorney fees. The First Circuit vacated the fee award. Puerto Rican law provides process to get compensation for property takings by the government. Plaintiff did not take advantage of that process. Those were the only facts that needed to be shown for the dismissal, so the award was not justified.

A three-mile public recreational trail runs through 32 acres owned by the state and is used, in part, to access the state-managed Scarborough Marsh Wildlife Management Area. In 1961 Maine purchased the land with federal funds under the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. 669-669k for the approved purpose of “waterfowl habitat, waterfowl management, and access to waterfowl hunting.” The state subsequently granted easements for sanitary pipelines and a town road and to private parties for access to adjoining property. An easement granted in 2005 allowed construction of a road over 766 feet of previously-restricted trail for access to a planned subdivision. Objectors sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging violations of the Wildlife Restoration Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321, and state law. The district court dismissed federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the federal agency’s decision to not enforce the funding provisions of the WRA is within its discretion. The federal government did not grant the easements, so NEPA did not apply.