Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Livecchi appealed from an amended judgment of the district court following partial summary judgment in favor of the government's equity-skimming claim (Livecchi I), and a subsequent bench trial rejecting Levecchi's counterclaim for recoupment and granting the government's application for double damages and prejudgment interest (Levecchi II). The court concluded that Livecchi's interpretation of the equity-skimming statute was inconsistent with the statute's clear purpose; the government's authority to foreclose on a HUD-insured mortgage could not preclude the government from subsequently recovering assets or rental income retained in violation of a related regulatory agreement; as for the limitations period, Levecchi failed to establish that HUD had any knowledge of his equity skimming prior to August 21, 2000, the date HUD first acquired Levecchi's financial records; and therefore, the court affirmed the amended judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Livecchi" on Justia Law

In this criminal fraud case, defendant appealed from the district court's order denying his motion to release $3.7 million in assets that were frozen in a parallel civil enforcement action. Defendant and his wife had purchased a house in her name using funds unrelated to the alleged fraud. Pursuant to the divorce settlement, defendant received title to the house and gave his wife a $12.5 million distribution award, at least $6 million of which was directly traceable to defendant's alleged fraud. The court held that the district court properly applied the tracing analysis from United States v. Banco-Cafetero. The court rejected defendant's claim that the district court made two related erroneous evidentiary rulings at the Monsanto hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a tenant-stockholder of a cooperative housing corporation, appealed from the tax court's denial of her petition for a redetermination of a deficiency determination by the Commissioner. The tax court granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, ruling that petitioner held no property interest in the cooperative's grounds sufficient to entitle her to the claimed deduction. The court concluded that petitioner had a sufficient interest in "property" within the meaning of 165(c)(3), and the Commissioner's arguments in support of the tax court's ruling were without merit. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alphonso v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant. The primary issue one appeal was whether an act performed on adjacent property that caused damage to plaintiff's property could constitute "vandalism" under plaintiff's property insurance. The subsidiary question was whether "malicious damage" could be found to result from an act not directed specifically at the insured property. The court held that certification of the malice issue to the New York Court of Appeals was warranted and certified the question. View "Georgitsi Realty, LLC v. Penn-Star Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Olin brought suit against its insurers, including American Home, regarding environmental contamination at Olin sites in the United States. On appeal, Olin challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of American Home. At issue was whether the $30.3 million attachment point for American Home's excess policies for the years 1966-69 and 1969-72 could be reached by the alleged property damage at Olin's Morgan Hill, California, manufacturing site. The court held that the plain language of Olin's policies with American Home required American Home to indemnify Olin for that damage. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to avail themselves under terms of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSA), 15 U.S.C. 1701-20, by bringing suit for revocation of a purchase agreement they executed with defendants for a luxury condominium unit in New York City. Plaintiffs asserted that the agreement failed to comport with ILSA's disclosure requirements. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the purchase agreement was revocable because it did not contain "a description of the lot which makes such lot clearly identifiable and which is in a form acceptable for recording" under section 1703(d)(1) of ILSA. The court held that section 1703(d)(1) required the description and not the agreement itself be "in a form acceptable for recording" and that the description at issue in this case satisfied ILSA's requirements. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions that the district court enter judgment for defendants. View "Bacolitsas v. 86th & 3rd Owner, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his action against the Museum for its acquisition, possession, display, and retention of a painting that had been confiscated by the Russian Bolshevik regime from plaintiff's great-grandfather in 1918. On appeal, plaintiff contended principally that the district court erred in holding that the painting was taken pursuant to a valid act of state despite factual allegations in his Amended Complaint to the contrary. The court found that it was clear that the Amended Complaint, on its face, showed that plaintiff's action was barred by the act of state doctrine. The court considered all of plaintiff's arguments and concluded that they were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Konowaloff v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order denying plaintiff's application for a turnover order pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b). The court certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the appropriateness of such an order where the assets were in the direct possession not of the garnishee, but rather in the garnishee's subsidiary. View "Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v. Millard" on Justia Law

Taylor, an attorney who allegedly suffers from clinical depression, lived in a private community managed by HPHA. Graser was president of HPHA’s board. For years, Taylor’s glass-enclosed patio, visible from the main thoroughfare, was described as a “pigsty.” Taylor generally declined offers to help with cleanup. While she was away, Cramp, noticed that Taylor’s garage door was open. Taylor gave him permission to retrieve her opener and close the door. Cramp, Graser, and another closed her garage door and cleaned up Taylor’s patio, consolidating items in Taylor’s garage. Taylor filed a police report complaining of trespass and burglary and filed a complaint against HPHA with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR). DHR issued a Determination that there was no evidence of disability or that the accumulation of or clearing of clutter is related to a disability. HUD affirmed. Taylor filed suit against the HPHA and Graser, claiming failure to accommodate, 42 U.S.C. 3601, trespass, and conversion. The district court rejected all claims. The Second Circuit dismissed her appeal for failure to comply with appellate rules. Calling Taylor’s FHA claim “frivolous,” the court held that HPHA and Graser were entitled to attorneys’ fees. View "Taylor v. Harbour Pointe Homeowners Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff rented commercial property to AGC under a lease to expire February 28, 2007. In 2006, AGC stopped paying rent and plaintiff obtained a warrant of eviction in state court. On February 2, 2007, before plaintiff could execute the warrant, AGC filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy; the automatic stay halted eviction efforts. Plaintiff successfully moved to lift the stay and executed the warrant on April 24, 2007. Plaintiff sought, under Section 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, post-petition rent, attorneys’ fees, and interest for the period between the Chapter 7 filing date and the date the warrant of eviction was executed. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, concluding that the pre-petition issuance of the warrant of eviction terminated the relationship such that there was no “unexpired” lease, the presence of which is necessary to obtain administrative expenses under Section 365(d)(3). The district court affirmed. The Second Circuit vacated. A lease is “unexpired” for purposes of the Code where the tenant has the power to revive the lease under applicable state law. In New York it is the execution, and not the issuance, of the warrant of eviction that extinguishes the tenant’s interest in a lease, so, until the warrant is executed, the lease is “unexpired.” View "In re: Assoc. of Graphic Commc'n, Inc." on Justia Law