Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Ownership of the Somerville property has changed many times. It has been used for manufacturing, for machining military parts during World War II, and as warehouses for commercial and industrial tenants, including JANR. The soil and the groundwater became contaminated, likely beginning in the 1940s, when a degreasing agent was dumped on the ground. Contamination worsened after 1983 when improper storage of hazardous waste in the JANR warehouse resulted in spills and leaks. Remedial actions may have contributed to the contamination. The current owner acquired the site in the 1980s. After several earlier suits concerning the contamination, the owner sued a former owner and the United States under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601, the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6972, and the New Jersey Sanitary Landfill Facility Closure Act and Contingency Fund. The district court entered summary judgment rejecting the RCRA claim, held a trial, and determined that the owner, the prior owners, and the United States were each liable for costs of remediation under CERCLA and the Spill Act and allocated percentages. The Third Circuit vacated with respect to award of prejudgment interest and the RCRA claim against the former owners, but otherwise affirmed. View "Litgo NJ, Inc. v. Comm'r NJ Dep't Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

In 1999, I-4 leased Florida land to Lazy Days, with an option to purchase, prohibiting assignment without written consent. In 2008, Lazy Days notified I-4 of its intention to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and assign the lease to LDRV. The parties negotiated a settlement agreement in 2009. I-4 consented to assignment. Lazy Days agreed not to “argue against the Bankruptcy Court abstaining from consideration of Lease interpretation issues ... except to the extent necessary in connection with the assumption and assignment of the Lease.” The agreement provided that “there is no intent to, nor is the Lease modified in any respect,” but did not state whether the purchase option survived. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed a reorganization plan incorporating the agreement and closed the case in 2010. In 2011, LDRV attempted to exercise the option. The parties each filed state court lawsuits and LDRV moved to reopen in Bankruptcy Court, which held that the anti-assignment provision was unenforceable and that refusal to honor the option violated the agreement. The district court vacated. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the Bankruptcy Court properly exercised jurisdiction; the agreement’s exception applied because the proceeding was “in connection with ... assignment of the Lease.” The court rejected arguments that the parties agreed to waive application of 11 U.S.C. 365(f)(3) and that the Bankruptcy Court committed an unconstitutional taking and denied I-4 due process. View "In Re: Lazy Days' RV Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

SCRG purchased a St. Croix alumina refinery in 2002. The plaintiffs (more than 500 individuals) alleged that for 30 years, the facility refined bauxite, creating mounds of the by-product, red mud. Hazardous materials, including chlorine, fluoride, TDS, aluminum, arsenic, coal dust ,and other particulates were buried in the red mud, outdoors, in open piles, as high as 120 feet and covering up to 190 acres. Friable asbestos was also present. The substances were dispersed by wind and erosion. According to the plaintiffs, SCRG purchased the site knowing about the contamination, did nothing to abate it, and allowed it to continue. The district court remanded to the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, finding that the action did not qualify as a “mass action” under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1), because all the claims arise from an event at a single facility, with resulting injuries confined to the Virgin Islands. The Third Circuit affirmed. An event, under CAFA, encompasses a continuing tort, resulting in a regular or continuous release of hazardous chemicals, where no superseding occurrence or significant interruption breaks the chain of causation. Congress intended to allow state or territorial courts to adjudicate claims involving truly localized environmental torts with localized injuries. View "Abraham v. St Croix Renaissance Grp., LLLP" on Justia Law

Since 1976, NAI has operated a flea market on 65.4 acres purchased from the Borough of Palmyra. In 2002, Palmyra began considering redevelopment, including NAI’s parcel. A site inspection uncovered the possible presence of unexploded munitions from a weapons-testing facility used by the Army during World War II. The parties entered into an access agreement, pursuant to which NAI could operate the Market on the weekends, while contractors conducted inspections and remedial work during the week. In 2008, however, an unexploded artillery shell was discovered flush with the surface of the Market’s parking lot. Because vendors often drove stakes into the ground to secure tents, this raised concerns of accidental detonation. After NAI refused to comply voluntarily, the police chief issued an emergency order, restricting access to the property. Hundreds of munitions were found on the property, both explosive and inert. NAI filed suit, claiming that the order was arbitrary under New Jersey law; violated procedural due process; and constituted a “taking” without just compensation. The Market was closed for five months before the parties entered a consent order that allowed the Market to reopen on weekends with barriers and security guards to prohibit public access to hazardous areas. The district court entered summary judgment for the borough and denied NAI attorney’s fees for its claimed victory with respect to the consent order. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra" on Justia Law

The mall is bounded by a railroad track and drainage ditches owned by CSX. Houses beyond the track are higher than the track, which is higher than the mall. CSX’s predecessor installed a berm, straddling the property line, to prevent storm water from flowing onto the mall property. In 2010 storm water breached the berm. Runoff and debris from CSX’s property flowed down the slope and overwhelmed a private storm water inlet in the mall parking lot. CSX assured mall representatives that it planned a ditch to resolve the problem, but, instead, began constructing a spillway on the mall side of the berm to direct storm water into the mall’s drainage inlet. The mall manager discovered and immediately halted the work. The mall claimed negligence and continuing trespass. During discovery, the mall learned that CSX had refurbished the relevant portion of the track and argued that the modifications led to the discharge onto its property and that the discharge was evidence that CSX had violated, 49 C.F.R. 213.33, enacted under the Federal Railroad Safety Act. The district court granted CSX summary judgment, holding that the claims were blocked by the FRSA preemption provision. The Third Circuit vacated, noting the “constrained scope” of FRSA preemption. View "MD Mall Assocs. v. CSX Transp., Inc" on Justia Law

The Sponsors formed West Run to construct and manage West Virginia University off-campus housing and retained CBRE to secure financing. CBRE provided prospective lenders with confidential information. Huntington’s predecessor loaned $39.975 million and construction began. A competing project (Copper Beach) was built across the street. West Run learned that Huntington had loaned $20 million for that project; West Run alleged that Huntington divulged to Copper Beach proprietary West Run information provided by CBRE. West Run‘s occupancy dropped from 95 percent to 64 percent. West Run sued, alleging that Huntington had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by financing Copper Beech. Two similar projects, involving the Sponsors, alleged breach of contract based on Huntington‘s failure to provide funds under their construction loan agreements. Huntington claimed that they had sold insufficient units to require Huntington to disburse additional funds under the agreements. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the complaint contained no corroborating facts that confidential information was disclosed and that no contract terms prohibited Huntington from lending to competitors. The court vacated with respect to the other projects for a chance to provide evidence showing that the pre-sale numbers in the original complaint were incorrect. View "W. Run Student Hous. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Interstate requested approval for nine outdoor advertising signs along U.S. Interstate-295, a major transportation corridor. The township then adopted an ordinance prohibiting billboards. The district court dismissed a constitutional challenge. The Third Circuit affirmed. A reasonable fact-finder could not conclude that there was an insufficient basis for the township’s conclusion that its billboard ban would directly advance its stated goal of improving the aesthetics of the community. The fact that Interstate will not be able to reach the distinct audience of travelers that it desires to target does not mean that adequate alternative means of communication do not exist. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that complete billboard bans may be the only reasonable means by which a legislature can advance its interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. View "Interstate Outdoor Advertising, L.P. v. Zoning Bd., Twp of Mount Laurel" on Justia Law

In 2007, Tellado heard a Spanish-language radio advertisement for mortgage refinancing, called the number, and spoke in Spanish to arrange refinancing of an existing mortgage. Bloom, a closing agent acting as a representative of IndyMac, conducted the closing at the Tellados’ home. The loan documents, including the notice of the right to cancel, were in English. Oral communications between Bloom and the Tellados, were conducted through the Tellados’ daughter, who served as an interpreter for verbal instructions and Bloom’s explanations of the loan documents. IndyMac subsequently failed and was placed in FDIC receivership. In 2009, the Tellados sent a notice of cancellation under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. 201-7. The district court held that IndyMac had failed to provide proper notice and that the three-day cancellation period had never begun; it ordered refund to the Tellados of all payments, termination of the security interest, and payment of a $10,000 penalty. The Third Circuit reversed; the claim is precluded by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(13)(D) because the claim is predicated upon an act or omission of IndyMac. Tellados failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under FIRREA. View "Tellado v. Indymac Mortg. Serv." on Justia Law

The Condominium Association’s declaration required Bayside to provide fresh water and wastewater treatment to the Association and made all of the water facilities common property of the Association. Bayside contracted with TSG to construct and operate a system to fulfill its obligations. TSG charged Bayside $0.02 per gallon. By 2005, Bayside owed millions of dollars to creditors including TSG and the Association. Bayside assigned its rights to TSG, permitting TSG to charge $0.05 per gallon. To secure the Association’s consent Bayside and TSG threatened to cease providing services even though it was not feasible to obtain those services elsewhere. The Association’s Board consented and signed a Water Supply Agreement, which provided that Bayside owned the water facilities and contained an arbitration clause. After not receiving payments under the WSA, TSG temporarily stopped producing potable water for the Association, which then filed suit, asserting criminal extortion under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act; breach of obligations under the Declaration; and ownership of the water treatment systems. The district court ordered arbitration. The Third Circuit affirmed in part but vacated in part. The Association raised a bona fide question as to whether its Board had authority to enter into the WSA, a question that requires judicial determination. View "SBRMCOA, LLC v. Bayside Resort Inc." on Justia Law

The Sherzers obtained two loans secured by mortgages on their home: one for $705,000 and one for $171,000. The lender, Homestar, later assigned both to HSBC. Less than three years after the closing date the Sherzers wrote a letter to Homestar and HSBC, asserting that Homestar had failed to provide all disclosures required by Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 TILA. The letter claimed that these failures were material violations and that the Sherzers were exercising their right to rescind the loan agreements. HSBC agreed to rescind the smaller loan. The Sherzers filed suit, more than three years after their closing date, seeking a declaration of rescission. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely. The Third Circuit reversed. An obligor's right to rescind a loan pursuant to TILA "expire[s] three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first,"Hardiman 15 U.S.C. 1635(f). An obligor must send valid written notice of rescission before the three years expire; the statute says nothing about filing a suit within that three-year period. View "Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs." on Justia Law