Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The tenant moved into an apartment in 2004. The building later came under management by defendants. In 2008 tenant filed suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962, alleging that defendants conspired to harbor illegal aliens and to encourage or induce illegal aliens to reside in the U.S. in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). He claimed that the apartment complex fell into disrepair and that criminal activity went unreported, causing injury to his leasehold property. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. The "harboring" claim was properly dismissed; the complaint did not sufficiently allege that the conduct tended to substantially facilitate an alien's remaining in the U.S. illegally and to prevent government authorities from detecting the unlawful presence. With respect to the "inducing" claim, the court stated that it could not imagine that Congress contemplated that landlords and hotel and motel operators would be responsible for making complex legal determinations about who is permitted to live in this country, much less that they would be criminalized for an error in so doing.

To revitalize the Conshohocken waterfront, the Redevelopment Authority of Montgomery County filed a declaration of condemnation of plaintiffs' property in 1996, which had the effect of transferring title to the property, which housed a successful steel processing business. A state court invalidated the taking and awarded attorneys' fees and expenses. Because the Authority held title to the property throughout the state court action, plaintiffs filed a claim in federal court, seeking just compensation. The district court rejected the claim, because they had never asked the Authority whether it would give them “just compensation.” The state court determined that plaintiffs had obtained all the relief to which they were entitled. The district court dismissed their case, holding that plaintiffs should have brought their federal claims as part of their second action in state court. The Third Circuit reversed. Because title passed, this was a per se taking and the claim was not time-barred. Rejecting a claim of issue preclusion, the court stated that the parties never actually litigated the federal constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code.

From the 1930s until 1982, NL manufactured pigments on 440 acres surrounded by the Raritan River. NL later leased to manufacturers of sulfuric acid, until 2005, when a redevelopment agency acquired the site by eminent domain. NL had entered into an administrative consent order with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, requiring NL to investigate and perform remediation. The state had identified other sources of contamination and suggested a regional approach, but no action was taken. The redevelopment agreement provided that NL would retain liability for contamination of river sediments, but does not call for any remediation. In 2009, the U.S. EPA ordered remediation of river sediments upstream from the site. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed citizens suits under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)(B), and CWA, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1). The district court dismissed, concluding that abstention was appropriate. The Third Circuit vacated, noting that the state has not taken action with respect to the contamination.

Defendant was the fiancee of the leader of a Philadelphia drug distribution ring responsible for selling a large amount of cocaine and cocaine base (crack) from 1998 to 2005. In 2005, the couple used drug money to purchase a new home, which was titled in defendant's name. When her fiancee was charged with drug trafficking and firearms offenses, defendant was charged with money laundering in purchasing the house, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). She appealed her conviction. The Third Circuit vacated. The evidence was not sufficient to establish knowledge of a design to conceal on defendant's part. Defendant lied about her income and had the property titled in her name, not to hide her fiancee's involvement (which was obvious), but to get around his bad credit and purchase the house.

The Forest Service manages the surface of the Allegheny National Forest, but most mineral rights are privately owned. From 1980 until recently the Service cooperated with owners to manage drilling; owners would provide advance notice and the Service would issue a Notice to Proceed. As a result of a settlement with environmental groups, the Service changed its policy and postponed issuance of NTPs until a multi-year, Environmental Impact Study under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4332(C)) is complete. The district court issued a preliminary injunction against the Service, requiring it to return to its prior process. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Service does not have the broad authority it claims over private mineral rights owners' access to surface lands. Its special use regulations do not apply to outstanding rights; the limited regulatory scheme applicable to most reserved rights in the ANF does not impose a permit requirement. Although the Service is entitled to notice, and may request and negotiate accommodation of its state-law right to due regard, its approval is not required for surface access. The moratorium causes irreparable injury to owners by depriving them of unique oil and gas extraction opportunities.

The Township proposed redevelopment that would eliminate 327-329 existing homes in a neighborhood, occupied predominantly by low-income minority residents, and replace them with more expensive housing, unaffordable to current residents. About half of the existing brick row houses, built in the 1950s, were owner-occupied. A 2000 report described the area as characterized by blight, excess land coverage, poor land use, and excess crime; the Township began to acquire properties. By 2008, 75 homes had been destroyed and 148 had been acquired and left vacant. By 2009, 110 more homes were destroyed, causing noise, vibration, dust, and debris. Residents alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3604(a)); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. 1982) ; and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to the Township. The Third Circuit reversed. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the residents, the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under the FHA. The court must ask whether the Township's legitimate objectives could have been achieved in a less discriminatory way. Contrasting statements about the cost and feasibility of an alternative relying on rehabilitation, create genuine issues of material fact.

After refinancing her mortgage in 2006, plaintiff filed suit under the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C 1601, claiming failure to properly notify her of her right to cancel the mortgage. The court instructed the jury that, because her signature was on the notice of right to cancel, something more than her testimony was needed to rebut the presumption that she received it. The jury returned a verdict for defendants. The Third Circuit vacated and remanding, stating that there is no basis in TILA or the Federal Rules of Evidence for the instruction and the error was not harmless. The signature does no more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery.

The district court granted a default judgment of foreclosure in favor of the mortgage company. Following a sale, at which the mortgage company was the successful bidder, the court granted a motion to set aside the sale because the mortgage company had failed to notify a junior lien holder of the sale, as required by state law, so that the junior lien remained in place. The court subsequently granted the junior lien holder's motion to vacate the set-aside order, reasoning that the notice issue involved an independent question of state law and was not properly before it. The Third Circuit vacated. The court's diversity jurisdiction extends to resolving issues that arise from an error committed during the pendency of its jurisdiction over a marshal's sale that it ordered. No overriding state policy or matter of substantial public concern, justifying abstention, was implicated in this case.