Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Countrywide appealed a class certification order of the bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs are former chapter 13 debtors with mortgages serviced by Countrywide. Plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that the fees Countrywide charged while plaintiffs' bankruptcy cases were still pending were unreasonable, unapproved, and undisclosed under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2016(a). Because the bankruptcy court's decision was not an abuse of discretion, the court affirmed its grant of class certification for plaintiff's injunctive relief claim. Because the court's precedence rejected the fail-safe class prohibition, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it defined the class in the present case. Because the court concluded that Countrywide's Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration was not based on newly discovered evidence, the court did not revisit the bankruptcy court's separate merits denial of the motion. View "Rodriguez, et al v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

Vanderbilt sued to foreclose against appellees for defaulting on their installment payments on a mobile home and appellees responded by claiming that they had been released from any underlying debt on the retail installment contract. Intervenors claimed that Vanderbilt, CMH, and their parent company CHI, had filed false liens on their land as collateral for appellees' retail installment contract. The court affirmed the judgment and award of damages with respect to intervenors' claims. The court reversed and remanded the judgment as to Vanderbilt's claims against appellees, as well as appellees' counterclaims. View "Vanderbilt Mtge. and Fin. Inc. v. Flores, et al." on Justia Law

The bankruptcy Trustee of MBS Management Services, Inc. (MBS), a management company for dozens of apartment complexes, appealed judgments rejecting his claim that payments made by the debtor to MXEnergy Electric, Inc (MX) to reimburse MX for supplying electricity to the complexes were avoidable preferences. The bankruptcy court and district court found that the payments were made on a "forward contract" expressly exempt from the Bankruptcy Code's preference provision. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the agreement was a forward contract within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 546(e), and because expert testimony from the President and CEO of MX was admissible, the bankruptcy and district court's correctly rejected the Trustee's avoidance action. View "Lightfoot v. MXenergy Elec., Inc. " on Justia Law

The City of New Orleans filed suit against BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC, claiming that the company owed it additional compensation for the use of its public rights-of-way. The district court rejected the City's claims for additional compensation pursuant to the various contracts between the parties. The court, however, awarded the City $1.5 million in unjust enrichment damages to compensate the City for benefits the company had received from its use of the City's rights-of-way. Both parties appealed. The City then enacted an ordinance to force BellSouth to continue compensating the City in future years for the unjust enrichment identified by the district court. BellSouth moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the City from enforcing the ordinance, which the district court denied. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, in part, to the extent the court rejected the City's claims for damages; and (2) reversed and vacated the district court's judgment awarding unjust enrichment damages to the City, holding that BellSouth had justification in contract for any enrichment it was enjoying from its use of the City's rights-of-way. Remanded with instructions to permanently enjoin enforcement of the City's ordinance. View "City of New Orleans v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc." on Justia Law

The City of New Orleans filed suit against BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC, claiming that the company owed it additional compensation for the use of its public rights-of-way. The district court rejected the City's claims for additional compensation pursuant to the various contracts between the parties. The court, however, awarded the City $1.5 million in unjust enrichment damages to compensate the City for benefits the company had received from its use of the City's rights-of-way. Both parties appealed. The City then enacted an ordinance to force BellSouth to continue compensating the City in future years for the unjust enrichment identified by the district court. BellSouth moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the City from enforcing the ordinance, which the district court denied. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, in part, to the extent the court rejected the City's claims for damages; and (2) reversed and vacated the district court's judgment awarding unjust enrichment damages to the City, holding that BellSouth had justification in contract for any enrichment it was enjoying from its use of the City's rights-of-way. Remanded with instructions to permanently enjoin enforcement of the City's ordinance. View "BellSouth Telecomm., LLC v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Greenwood filed a petition for damages in Louisiana state court, alleging that Chesapeake had damaged Greenwood's property where a mineral lease abutted land that Greenwood was developing into a subdivision. Sitting in diversity and applying Louisiana law, the district court granted summary judgment to Chesapeake, finding that the lease did not give Greenwood the right to recover consequential damages. The court found that the relevant provision of the lease was ambiguous and therefore vacated summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a terminal and switching railroad operating in the City, brought a declaratory judgment against the City alleging that a federal statute preempted all City ordinances that affected its transloading operations. The railroad wanted to expand its operations and the City opposed the expansion, claiming it violated several municipal ordinances. The court reversed the district court's holding of no preemption as to the standard construction details and road grading ordinance, resting its decision on express preemption under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. The court's express preemption holding only pertained to the road and paving areas used in connection with the TCB-MAALT-Halliburton transloading operation. This preemption rendered the City's appeal from the denial of its request for civil penalties for ordinance violations moot. The court reversed what the court concluded was likely a holding by the district court that there was express preemption as to the older, 20-acre transloading center and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's remaining rulings.

Bankruptcy trustee and nondebtor spouse appealed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to H.D. Smith. The trustee and spouse argued that the bankruptcy court erred in holding that H.D. Smith had an enforceable lien against the proceeds of the sale of the debtor's homestead property in excess of the homestead exemption. The court held that, regardless of whether the lien attached prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee took the property with the state-law character it had in the debtor's hands: a property with an unenforceable lien. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The court also held that because it concluded that H.D. Smith's lien was unenforceable, it need not consider whether enforcing the lien would violate 11 U.S.C. 362 or 11 U.S.C. 549. The court also did not consider the issues that the spouse argued in her briefing regarding homestead rights.

This litigation arose out of a contract between the parties in which PDNED agreed to transfer its rights to LHC to purchase shopping mall property from a third party. LHC alleged that, based on representations made by PDNED, LHC expected to lease the property to Lowe's Home Improvement. PDNED subsequently appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of LHC. As a preliminary matter, the court held that it need not resolve the choice-of-law question where the parties agreed that, with a few exceptions, no material differences existed between New Hampshire and Texas law with regard to the case and the court's conclusions would be the same under either state's law. The court held that the purchase and sale agreement (P&S Agreement) precluded LHC's promissory estoppel claim because the agreement itself controlled the extent of PDNED's binding promises with regard to the purchase and sale of the property. The court also held that the district court did not err when it denied PDNED's motion to dismiss LHC's negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations claims as a matter of law where the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support finding PDNED liable for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations. The court also held that the jury's out-of-pocket award was the appropriate measure to compensate LHC for reliance costs but that lost profits were not an appropriate measure of damages for the fraudulent misrepresentations in this case. The court finally held that PDNED could not be considered the prevailing party in this litigation for purposes of the P&S Agreement's attorneys' fees provision. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment against PDNED on LHC's promissory estoppel claim and the jury's award in lost profits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and the jury's award of out-of-pocket damages and the denial of PDNED's motion for attorney's fees.

This case stemmed from FEMA's determination that the Holy Cross School was eligible for public assistance funds to construct a new school campus on the site of Cabrini Church and Cabrini School in Gentilly to replace its old campus six miles away in the Lower Ninth Ward. Friends of Cabrini Church filed a complaint against FEMA, alleging that, inter alia, the section 106 review process, which defined the "area of potential effects" (APE), C.F.R. 800.4(a), 800.16(d), was deficient. On appeal, Friends of Cabrini Church subsequently challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of FEMA. The court held that because Friends of Cabrini Church lacked standing to bring its claims, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.