Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose when Shoe Show, Inc. (Shoe Show) entered into a lease as lessee of a store space in a shopping mall in Houston, Texas. The lease expressly prohibited Shoe Show from operating another business under the name "The SHOE DEPT." or any "substantially similar trade-name," within two miles of the leased premises. Shoe Show subsequently opened a retail footwear store under the name "SHOE SHOW" in a commercial center located less than a quarter mile from the mall in which the leased premises was located. At issue was whether the two trade names were substantially similar. The court held that, under the uncontested facts of the case and the discrete provisions of the lease, the trade name SHOE SHOW was not substantially similar to The SHOE DEPT. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (formerly known as Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP); Countrywide Home Loans of Texas, Incorporated; and Countrywide Home Loans, Incorporated appealed an order for remand where the district court dismissed the lone federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601-1667f, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Defendants argued that this was an abuse of discretion because Countrywide Home Loans of Texas was improperly joined and thus the district court had diversity jurisdiction over the state law claims. Plaintiffs argued that there was no improper joinder and that defendants waived any right to argue improper joinder or the existence of diversity jurisdiction when they failed to remove the action to federal court within 30 days of service of the original complaint that listed Countrywide Home Loans of Texas. The court held that defendants carried their burden of proving improper joinder; the district court had jurisdiction over the state law claims at the time of remand; and the exercise of that jurisdiction was mandatory. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision to remand the state law claims to Texas state court and remanded for further proceedings.

These three closely related appeals arose out of two district court cases, each involving a different tract of land owned by the Avoyelles Parish School Board (School Board), where neither tract was accessible by public road and both shared borders with the Lake Ophelia Wildlife Refuge (Refuge), which was owned by the United States Department of Interior (Department). The School Board filed these suits against all adjoining landowners, including the Department, to fix the School Board's legal rights of passage to the respective enclosed lands. The district court fixed rights of passage that burdened Refuge lands and concluded that the Department could not impose certain desired restrictions on the School Board's actions on Refuge lands. On appeal, the court reversed both judgments in full and remanded for further proceedings.

This case arose when elderly widow Dorothy Chase Stewart filed for bankruptcy in 2007 and Wells Fargo Bank filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court reciting debts owed from an outstanding mortgage on Ms. Stewart's house. The bankruptcy court subsequently found that Wells Fargo's mortgage claims exhibited systematic errors arising from its highly automated, computerized loan-administration program and issued an injunction requiring Wells Fargo to audit every proof of claim it had filed on or filed after April 13, 2007; to provide a complete loan history on every account and file that history with the appropriate court; and "to amend...proofs of claim already on file to comply with the principles established in this case and [In re] Jones." Wells Fargo appealed, challenging the claim amount and the injunction. The court vacated the injunction as exceeding the reach of the bankruptcy court. Because neither the injunction nor the calculation of Ms. Stewart's debt was properly before the court, the court dismissed as moot Wells Fargo's appeal of legal rulings underlying the bankruptcy court's interpretation of the mortgage.

Defendant filed suit in state court demanding compensation from the State of Louisiana for the commandeering of its real property following Hurricane Katrina. While the state court litigation was pending, the United States initiated condemnation proceedings involving part of the same property in federal district court. To avoid potentially conflicting judgments, the United States sought a stay of the state court proceedings. The district court entered a stay and defendant appealed. At issue was whether the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, precluded the issuance of the stay and even if not prohibited, the issuance of the stay was not proper on the facts of the case. The court found that, in light of Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, the uncertainty surrounding the ownership of the property at issue and the extent of the United States' interest militated in favor of enjoining the state court litigation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court noted that the district court would need to determine the best manner in which to proceed in reaching an answer to the title questions that arose because of the commandeering. The court concluded that the district court might resolve the question itself, lift the stay for the limited purpose of allowing the state court to determine title, or take other steps to avoid the potential for inconsistent rulings in the two proceedings.

Appellant appealed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's decision that certain deeds appellant held were legal nullities. The panel certified a question to the Mississippi Supreme Court which stated: "When a minority member of a Mississippi limited liability company prepares and executes, on behalf of the LLC, a deed to substantially all of the LLC's real estate, in favor of another LLC of which the same individual is the sole owner, without authority to do so under the first LLC's operating agreement, is the transfer of real property pursuant to the deed: (i) voidable, such that it is subject to the intervening rights of a subsequent bonafide purchaser for value and without notice, or (ii) void ab initio, i.e., a legal nullity?" The Mississippi Supreme Court explained that the deed was neither voidable nor void ab initio, but "void and of no legal effect" because the minority member (" Michael Earwood"), as an agent of Kinwood Capital Group, L.L.C. ("Kinwood"), lacked actual or apparent authority to convey Kinwood's 520-acre tract of land and Kinwood never ratified the purported transfer.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, Wayne Hagan and James Joubert, alleging that Joubert was negligently excavating on a backhoe and severed plaintiff's underground fiber-optic cable in violation of the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN 40:1749,11 et seq., and that Hagan was vicariously liable because Joubert was acting as his agent at the time. At issue was whether the district court erred when it refused to give the jury plaintiff's proposed instruction on trespass. Also at issue was whether the district court erred when it excluded statements made by Hagan's attorney to plaintiff's employee under Federal Rule of Evidence 408; when it refused to certify plaintiff's witness as an expert; and when it held that defendants were entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. The court certified the first issue where the Louisiana Supreme Court had not previously determined what standard of intent was used for trespass to underground utility cables and the issue was determinative of whether plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on its trespass claim. The court held that the statements made by Hagan's attorney to plaintiff's employer could have been excluded on other grounds given that it was inadmissible hearsay against Joubert and therefore, the court declined to remand for a new trial on this ground. The court also held that the district court did not commit a reversible error where plaintiff did not proffer the substance of plaintiff's witness' excluded testimony. Finally, the court deferred addressing the attorneys' fees issue pending the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision on the first issue.

Plaintiffs, purchasers of condominium units at a planned development on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, demanded rescission of their sales contracts on the basis of violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act ("ILSA"). At issue was whether plaintiffs' condominium units were exempt from the disclosure requirements of ILSA and therefore, defendant would not be liable for failing to provide the required property report. The court held that plaintiffs' condominium units were not entitled to an ILSA exemption and therefore, defendant violated ILSA when it did not provide the required disclosures.

Plaintiffs, purchasers of condominium units at a planned development on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, demanded rescission of their sales contracts on the basis of violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act ("ILSA"). At issue was whether plaintiffs' condominium units were exempt from the disclosure requirements of ILSA and therefore, defendant would not be liable for failing to provide the required property report. The court held that plaintiffs' condominium units were not entitled to an ILSA exemption and therefore, defendant violated ILSA when it did not provide the required disclosures.

Plaintiffs, purchasers of condominium units at a planned development on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, demanded rescission of their sales contracts on the basis of violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act ("ILSA"). At issue was whether plaintiffs' condominium units were exempt from the disclosure requirements of ILSA and therefore, defendant would not be liable for failing to provide the required property report. The court held that plaintiffs' condominium units were not entitled to an ILSA exemption and therefore, defendant violated ILSA when it did not provide the required disclosures.