Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

As a mortgage broker, Chandler was able to falsify documents, close fraudulent loans, and judge what a house would appraise for after cosmetic work. In 2005, Causey and Rainey founded a construction company to make minimal changes to houses. They recruited real estate novices to buy houses. Chandler would fill out a mortgage application, falsifying income, down payments and other information to make the buyer a viable loan candidate. She would order appraisals, title work and pre‐approval from the lender. A “trainee” appraiser reported a greatly inflated price. Chandler gave false information to the lenders on HUD‐1 statements. Chandler made up false construction invoices for the remainder of the loan after expenses were paid. Before the participants were arrested, they had executed the mortgage scheme 25 times. Causey, the only co‐conspirator who did not plead guilty, was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court improperly admitted prejudicial photographs taken of the houses around the time of trial rather than at the time of the sale and evidence of a fraudulent sale that took place outside of the conspiracy. A defense witness’s testimony was properly excluded as undisclosed expert testimony. The court also upheld admission of testimony by a co-conspirator and a two‐level sentencing enhancement for being an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor.”View "United States v. Causey" on Justia Law

In a previous suit, an Illinois county claimed that a mortgage services company (MERSCORP) and banks doing business with it violated an Illinois statute that requires every mortgage to be recorded with the county in which the property is located. MERSCORP operates an online system for registration and assignment of mortgages by banks. Although MERSCORP becomes the mortgagee of record for purposes of recording, the assignments are not substantive. The purpose is to enable repeated assignments of the lender’s promissory note to successive holders. These assignments are not recorded in the county land registries. Only MERSCORP pays a recording fee. Subsequent “assignees” do not have a mortgage to record because they are assignees, not of the property interest that secures the homeowner’s debt, but only of the promissory note. The Seventh Circuit rejected the county’s claim that the defendants were unjustly enriched by using system to claim the valuable protection of recording, using MERSCORP as a placeholder mortgagee and a legal fiction that mortgage transfers are not assignments. The court affirmed the district court’s subsequent dismissal of a similar suit, by another county, again noting that the system is not unlawful.View "Macon Cnty v. MERSCORP, Inc." on Justia Law

IMCC loaned Harbins $60 million to buy Georgia land to construct a shopping center. In addition to a mortgage, IMCC obtained a guaranty from Chivas, providing that if IMCC “forecloses … the amount of the debt may be reduced only by the price for which that collateral is sold at the foreclosure sale, even if the collateral is worth more than the sale price.” Harbins defaulted; IMCC foreclosed in a nonjudicial proceeding, involving a public auction conducted by the sheriff after public notice. IMCC successfully bid $7 million and filed a petition to confirm the auction. Unless such a petition is granted, a mortgagee who obtains property in a nonjudicial foreclosure cannot obtain a deficiency judgment if the property is worth less than the mortgage balance owed. A Georgia court denied confirmation. Chivas refused to honor the guaranty. A district court in Chicago awarded IMCC $17 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the Georgia statute “is odd by modern standards,” but does not prevent a suit against a guarantor. The agreement guaranteed IMCC the difference between what it paid for the land and the unpaid balance of the loan, even if the land is worth more than what IMCC paid for it. The agreement is lawful under Georgia and Illinois law. View "Inland Mortg. Capital Corp v. Chivas Retail Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1983 Bitler leased gas stations to Marathon. The Environmental Protection Agency adopted new regulations so that that underground petroleum tanks and pipes at the gas stations had to be removed, upgraded, or replaced, 40 C.F.R. 280.21(a). In 1992 the parties amended the leases to make Marathon “fully responsible for removing” the tanks and pipes, filling holes created by the removal, complying with all environmental laws, “leav[ing] the Premises in a condition reasonably useful for future commercial use,” and “replac[ing] any asphalt, concrete, or other surface, including landscaping.” Marathon agreed to return the Premises “as nearly as possible in the same condition as it was in prior to such remediation work,” and to be responsible “for any and all liability, losses, damages, costs and expenses,” and to continue paying rent. The properties can be restored as gas stations with above‐ground storage tanks, and may be suitable for other commercial outlets. After completion of the work Bitler sued Marathon, alleging breach of contract and “waste.” The Seventh Circuit vacated to waste regarding Michigan properties, with directions to double those damages. The court affirmed dismissal of some of the contract claims. It would not conform to the reasonable expectations of the parties to limit liability for waste or other misconduct by a tenant simply because a lease had to be extended for an indefinite period to allow a response to unforeseen changes. View "Bitler Inv. Venture II v. Marathon Petroleum Co. LP" on Justia Law

An asbestos survey showed that the Kankakee building contained 2,200 linear feet of asbestos‐containing insulation around pipes. The owner hired Origin Fire Protection, to modify its sprinkler system. O’Malley, who operated Origin, offered to properly remove the pipe insulation for a cash payment ($12,000) and dispose of it in a lawful landfill. O’Malley provided no written contract for the removal work, but provided a written contract for the sprinkler system. O’Malley and Origin were not licensed to remove asbestos. O’Malley hired untrained workers, who stripped dry asbestos insulation off the pipes using a circular saw and other equipment provided by O’Malley. The workers were given paint suits, simple dust masks, and respirators with missing filters. They stopped working after inhaling dust that made them sick. Asbestos insulation was packed into garbage bags and taken to abandoned properties and a store dumpster. The Illinois EPA discovered the dumping; Superfund contractors began cleanup. O’Malley attempted to mislead federal agents. O’Malley was convicted of removing, transporting, and dumping asbestos‐containing insulation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the government did not prove the appropriate mens rea for Clean Air Act violations. O’Malley argued that the government was required to prove that he knew that the asbestos in the building was a regulated type of asbestos. View "United States v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

If an owner of Illinois real estate does not timely pay county property taxes, the county may “sell” the property to a tax purchaser. The tax purchaser does not receive title to the property, but receives a “Certificate of Purchase” which can be used to obtain title if the delinquent taxpayer does not redeem his property within about two years. In this case, the property owner entered bankruptcy during the redemption period. The bankruptcy court held that, if there is still time to redeem, the tax purchaser’s interest is a secured claim that is treatable in bankruptcy and modifiable in a Chapter 13 plan. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that the owner’s Chapter 13 plan was a success; because the tax purchaser’s interest was properly treated as a secured claim, the owner has satisfied the obligation, 11 U.S.C. 1327. Because Illinois courts call a Certificate of Purchase a lien or a species of personal property, the court rejected the purchaser’s argument that it was a future interest or an executory interest in real property. In effect, the tax sale procedure sells the county’s equitable remedy to the tax purchaser. View "Alexandrov v. LaMont" on Justia Law

Menzies, an air cargo handling business, leased CenterPoint’s 185,280-square-foot warehouse near O’Hare Airport. Another tenant used the building to store airplane parts until 2006. Under the lease, Menzies is responsible for repairing the “floor,” while CenterPoint is responsible for repairing the “foundation.” CenterPoint constructed improvements costing $1.4 million, at Menzies’ request, including increasing the number of dock doors from two to 38 and installing 45,000‐pound dock levelers. When Menzies began moving its operations into the building in November 2007, the six‐inch concrete slab did not exhibit any visible damage. By January 2009, the slab had begun to deteriorate. The damage was not consistent with typical wear and tear. The slab could not support Menzies’ equipment. CenterPoint paid $92,000 for repairs, then stopped doing so and did not submit an insurance claim. The slab is so damaged that it must be replaced, at an estimated cost of $966,000 to $1.23 million. Menzies sued CenterPoint for breach and CenterPoint counterclaimed. The district court held that neither party was entitled to recover because the slab had a “dual nature as both floor and foundation,” but “the damage at issue was related to the slab’s function as a floor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Aeroground, Inc. v. CenterPoint Props. Trust" on Justia Law

The debtors borrowed money secured by mortgages on real estate. The mortgages were recorded by the lenders to ensure the priority of their liens. The recorded mortgages did not state the maturity date of the secured debt or the interest rate. Those terms were included in the promissory notes, which were incorporated by reference in the mortgages. The debtors filed for bankruptcy. The trustees filed adversary complaints under 11 U.S.C. 544(a)(3), seeking to avoid the mortgages because they did not state the maturity dates or interest rates. In one case, the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the trustee, but the district court reversed and granted judgment for the lender. In the other case, the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the lender. The Seventh Circuit held that the trustee’s so-called “strong-arm” power to “avoid … any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by—a bona fide purchaser of real property … from the debtor” could not be used to avoid the mortgages under a 2013 amendment to the Illinois statute on the form for recorded mortgage, 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11. View "Bruegge v. Farmer State Bank of Hoffman" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit considered appeals by Illinois and Illinois counties and a Wisconsin county of district court holdings that those governmental bodies cannot levy a tax on sales of real property by Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation). Although both are now private corporations, the relevant statutes provide that they are “exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by any State … or local taxing authority, except that any real property of the corporation shall be subject to State … or local taxation to the same extent as other real property,” 12 U.S.C. 1723a(c)(2), 12 U.S.C. 1452(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A transfer tax is not a tax on realty. After 2008 Fannie Mae owned an immense inventory of defaulted and overvalued subprime mortgages and is under conservatorship by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The states essentially requested the court to “pierce the veil,” in recognition of the fact that if the tax is paid, it will be paid from assets or income of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, but their conservator is the United States, and the assets and income are those of entities charged with a federal duty. View "Milwaukee Cnty v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Horsfall worked as a real estate agent for First Weber, 2001-2002, and was the listing agent on First Weber’s contract with Call, who was trying to sell property. The contract gave First Weber exclusive rights collect commissions for sale of the property during the listing period and an exclusive right to collect commissions from sales to defined “protected buyers” for one year after the listing expired. The Acostas made an offer on the property and became “protected buyers.” Call’s contract with First Weber ended in August and at the same time, Horsfall left First Weber to establish his own brokerage, Picket Fence. In October, the Acostas contacted Horsfall. Without involving First Weber, Horsfall resuscitated the transaction with Call. The Acostas and Call executed a sales contract for the Call property. Picket Fence received a $6,000 commission, inconsistent with Horsfall’s status as First Weber’s agent under the earlier contract and in violation of Wisconsin real estate practice rules. Six years later, First Weber sued Horsfall in state court, asserting r breach of contract, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment. The state court entered a judgment against Horsfall for $10,978.91. Horsfall filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing First Weber as a creditor. First Weber responded that its judgment was non‐dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), as involving “willful and malicious injury.” The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit found the debt dischargeable. View "First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Horsfall" on Justia Law