Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in these consolidated appeals brought claims under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., related to their mortgage transactions. The court held that to accomplish rescission within the meaning of section 1635(f), the obligor must file a rescission action in court. Because neither plaintiffs accomplished rescission in this way within three years of their respective transactions, their right to rescind expired and the district court correctly entered summary judgment on these claims. Further, plaintiffs were not entitled, as a matter of law, to money damages for the banks' refusal to rescind, although their claim was cognizable, where the violation - that each set of plaintiffs were given one, rather than two TILA disclosures - was not facially apparent on the loan documents as set forth in section 1641. View "Keiran, et al. v. Home Capital, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In each of these consolidated cases, JPMorgan attempted to use the Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act (SFA), Ark. Code Ann. 18-50-101 - 18-50-117, to foreclose on the borrower's home. At issue was whether a national banking association chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency but not registered to do business with the Arkansas Secretary of State or the Arkansas Bank Department could use the non-judicial foreclosure procedure provided by the SFA. The court concluded that an entity could be authorized to do business in Arkansas for SFA purposes pursuant to either state or federal law. In JPMorgan's case, federal law provided such authorization. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that JPMorgan was authorized to do business in Arkansas and could avail itself of the benefit of the SFA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Johnson, et al." on Justia Law

A bankruptcy court ordered that the Laurel Avenue house be vacated and authorized U.S. Marshals to physically remove plaintiff, the debtor's son, from the home. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of his suit, which alleged, inter alia, that his constitutional rights were violated when the house, its contents, and his person were searched and seized. The court found no error in the dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against the federal defendants where he did not allege a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics action in the amended complaint, nor did he seek to amend to add the claim; plaintiff's section 1983 claim failed against the city and the city's officers where plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient facts to show a direct causal link between the city's policy or custom and the alleged violation of his constitutional rights; the district court did not err in dismissing his tort claims against the trustees under the doctrine established in Barton v. Barbour, which established that an equity receiver could not be sued without leave of the court that appointed him; and because the dismissal of plaintiff's federal claims was proper, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alexander v. Hedback, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging that Wells Fargo violated Minn. Stat. 580.032, subd. 3 by failing to record a notice of pendency of foreclosure before publishing the foreclosure notice. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss, concluding that the statute did not provide plaintiff with relief in this case because there was no dispute that Wells Fargo properly served plaintiff with notice in compliance with Minn. Stat. 580.03 and, since she received personal service of the foreclosure notice, she could not have been among those for whose benefit the separate notice requirement of Minn. Stat. 580.032, subd. 3 was enacted. View "Badrawi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, acting as trustee for certain farm property pursuant to a deed of trust, brought this interpleader action seeking a determination of rights to the sales proceeds from an auction of the farm. The court held that the district court properly denied CNH's motion for summary judgment where CNH did not have a valid contract to purchase the farm; CNH could not set aside the sale to Gittaway Ranch; CNH failed to offer any evidence that its attorney's fees were reasonable and necessary or incidental to the protection or improvement of the farm; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions against defendants. View "Garden, Jr. v. Central Nebraska Housing Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Grinnell on their claim for equitable garnishment of a personal liability insurance policy issued to the sellers of the home. Plaintiffs claimed that the insureds' misrepresentations regarding the condition of the home qualified as a covered occurrence under the policy. The court concluded, however, that the policy provided coverage only for property damage caused by the occurrence. In this instance, there was no property damage caused by the asserted occurrence, and therefore, there was no applicable coverage. Plaintiffs' alternative argument failed where, even if plaintiffs were correct that the structural damage was caused by a covered occurrence, the damage would be excluded from coverage by the policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Payne, et al. v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

After plaintiffs' house was sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale, they sued the lender, the holder of the Deed of Trust at the time of the sale, and the successor trustee. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Fannie Mae designation; the foreclosure sale's procedures complied with Missouri law; the district court properly ruled that plaintiffs' challenged to activities after the foreclosure sale lacked standing; the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim; and the district court did not err in deciding that plaintiffs had failed to plead facts that proved a duty to investigate the transaction on the part of the fiduciary trustee. View "Hallquist, et al v. United Home Loan, et al" on Justia Law

Affordable appealed the district court's grant of Fannie Mae's motion to dismiss, concluding that EFA had not acted as Fannie Mae's agent in originating the loan for a senior living complex that Affordable purchased and that the loan documents unambiguously authorized a prepayment penalty. The court affirmed the dismissal of Affordable's claims for negligent misrepresentation, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. However, the court reversed the dismissal of Affordable's breach of contract claim where the agreement was ambiguous as to whether "condemnation award" included a sale in lieu of condemnation and remanded for further proceedings. View "Affordable Communities of MO v. Federal Nat'l. Mortgage Assoc." on Justia Law

Clarinet sued Essex alleging that Essex wrongfully refused to pay Clarinet under a commercial general liability insurance policy. Clarinet sought payment for expenses for stabilizing and demolishing a building that it owned, in accordance with Clarinet's interpretation of the policy. Essex denied coverage and refused payment. The insurance policy contained several conditions and exclusions, including the owned property exclusion. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Essex and denied relief to Clarinet because the owned property exclusion barred coverage. View "Clarinet v. Essex Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Georgina Stephens and Andrew Alexander appealed from the district court's decision affirming an order of the bankruptcy court giving possession of disputed property to the trustees of the individual bankruptcy estates of Ms. Stephens and Larry Alexander. Ms. Stephens and Mr. Alexander were previously married, Andrew is their son. This case stemmed from the separate bankruptcy petitions that Ms. Stephens and Mr. Alexander filed during their marriage and concerned the ownership and possession of certain property. Because Andrew had not challenged the district court's determination that he lacked standing to appeal the bankruptcy court's decision, the court deemed the issue waived; the court had jurisdiction to evict Ms. Stephens; the court rejected Ms. Stephens' res judicata and collateral estoppel arguments; and the court court rejected Ms. Stephens' remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Alexander, et al v. Jensen-Carter, et al" on Justia Law