Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After JPMorgan Chase Bank (Chase) initiated foreclosure proceedings on Appellants' home and subsequently bought the property at a sheriff's sale, Appellants filed suit against Chase, doing business as Washington Mutual, seeking damages under theories of promissory estoppel and negligence. The district court dismissed the claims. Appellants subsequently filed a second suit against Chase and Washington Mutual, alleging causes of action relating to purported misrepresentations and alleged failure to disclose information and Chase's alleged failure to provide adequate notice of the sheriff's sale and to respond to two qualified written requests in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA). The district court dismissed all claims against Washington Mutual without prejudice and all claims against Chase with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) other than their claim under RESPA, the claims set forth in Appellants' complaint were barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) as for the RESPA claims, Appellants failed to show how the complaint could be amended to survive a motion to dismiss.

Debtor appealed an order of the bankruptcy court sustaining the chapter 7 trustee's objection to debtor's claimed homestead exemption. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court identified debts debtor incurred prior to October 2007, when the property at issue became his homestead. Debtor had not challenged that finding on appeal. Pursuant to Iowa Code 561.21(1), therefore, the house could be sold to satisfy those debts, notwithstanding debtor's claimed homestead exemption. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order.

Debtor borrowed from Arvest to purchase a newly-constructed home, executing a promissory note and mortgage. After debtor filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief, Arvest then purchased the mortgaged property at a foreclosure sale for substantially less than what debtor owed on the promissory note and filed this adversary proceeding, seeking a judgment declaring the mortgage debt nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2) and (4). At trial, the bankruptcy court directed a verdict for debtor on the section 523(a)(2) claim but concluded that $65,000 of the remaining debt was nondischargeable under section 523(a)(4) because debtor held that amount of settlement proceedings in a fiduciary capacity created by section 4-58-105(b)(2) of the Arkansas Code. The BAP reversed and Arvest appealed. The court agreed with the BAP that the statute did not create the requisite fiduciary relationship, and that debtor was not guilty of embezzlement within the meaning of section 523(a)(4), affirming the judgment.

Plaintiff filed suit in Minnesota state court against her mortgage lender, seeking legal and equitable relief from the lender's foreclosure and sale of her home. The court held that, because there was no dispute as to whether the foreclosure was actually postponed, Minn. Stat. 580.07, subdiv. 1 was inapplicable. The court also held that the Minnesota Credit Agreement Statute (MCAS), Minn. Stat. 513.33, subdiv. 2, prohibited the enforcement of an oral promise to postpone a foreclosure sale and that the lender was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim. Finally, the court held that plaintiff did not raise a genuine question of material fact as to whether she detrimentally relied on the lender's promise. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Counts I-V.

Debtor appealed an order of the bankruptcy court granting relief from the automatic stay to Bank of the West. At issue was whether the bankruptcy court properly granted relief from the automatic stay to Bank of the West to exercise its rights under state law with respect to real property that it purchased at a foreclosure sale. The court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court where Bank of the West was a "party in interest" under Bankruptcy Code 362(d) and where the bankruptcy court acted within its discretion when it granted relief from the stay to Bank of the West for "cause."

This case involved the property rights to coal bed methane gas (CBM) produced from certain lands located in Sebastian County, Arkansas. The original holder of fee simple absolute title to the lands (Grantor) conveyed surface and coal rights in 1965 via an instrument the parties referred to as the Garland Deed. Coal Owner acquired those rights effective April 30, 2010. However, three years before the grant of the coal rights, in 1962, Grantor had conveyed an undivided one-half interest in all oil, gas, and other mineral rights except coal via an instrument known as the Wheeler Deed. In 1976, Grantor conveyed its second undivided one-half interest via an instrument known as the Texas & Pacific Deed. Gas Owners were the successors-in-interest to the rights Grantor conveyed in the Wheeler and Texas & Pacific Deeds. EnerVest entered into various oil and gas leases and contracts with Coal Owner and Gas Owners to produce CBM from the lands and initiated this interpleader action seeking a ruling as to whether Coal Owner or Gas Owners were entitled to the CBM royalties. The parties moved for summary judgment on a stipulated record that included the Wheeler, Garland, and Texas & Pacific Deeds. The court affirmed the district court's holding that Gas Owners were entitled to the CBM royalties where the plain language of the deeds broadly conveyed to Gas Owners all rights to oil, gas, and other mineral resources.

Debtor appealed an order of the Bankruptcy Court directing that a third party receive a portion of a check made payable jointly to the third party and debtor for rent of debtor's property. At issue was whether the third party had a right to funds for rent of debtor's property when the rent check was made payable jointly to debtor and the third party. The court held that the third party had an interest in the funds by virtue of a contract between the parties and, therefore, the third party was entitled to the portions of the funds that the bankruptcy court required debtor to remit to him.

Plaintiffs sought to establish a nationwide class of thousands of borrowers who allegedly paid inflated appraisal fees in connection with real estate transactions financed by Wells Fargo. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims contending that the appraisal practice of Wells Fargo and Rels unjustly enriched Rels and violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.; the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq.; and Arizona's anti-racketeering statute (AZRAC), Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2314.04. Because plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a concrete financial loss caused by a RICO violation, the district court did not err in concluding that they lacked standing under RICO and AZRAC. In regards to the UCL claims, the court agreed with the district court that the complaint did not allege "lost money or property" where plaintiffs admitted that Wells Fargo charged them market rates for appraisal services as disclosed on the settlement. The court also rejected plaintiffs' claims under RESPA Section 8(a) and (b), as well as plaintiffs' assertion that the district court erred in dismissing their claims with prejudice rather than sua sponte allowing them leave to amend the complaint for the third time.

The United States sued defendants, alleging they engaged in a pattern or practice of sex discrimination in the rental of housing. After a jury found for defendants, the district court granted in part defendants' motion for costs and attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, and the government subsequently appealed. In this case, the government brought a single pattern or practice claim. The court held that the district court should have made a single determination about whether the government's suit, as a whole, was substantially justified. The district court improperly considered the case as consisting of ten individual victims' claims for separate assessment, rather than a single pattern or practice claim. Consequently, this error required reversal.

Debtors appealed from the Bankruptcy Court's Order Granting the Trustee's Motion for Approval of Compromise or Settlement of Controversy, relating to claims that they asserted against the Bank for lender liability and discrimination. Debtors also requested oral argument on appeal. The source of the dispute between the parties was a loan secured by debtors' property, which consisted of their residence and an adjacent commercial lot. The court held that the settlement proposed by the Trustee was within the range of reasonable compromises and the Bankruptcy Court did not err in approving it. The court also held that the facts and legal arguments were adequately represented in the briefs and record and that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.