Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Lands Commission appealed the district court's final judgment in this eminent domain case, wherein the United States took a fee simple interest in the property at issue on behalf of the Navy, which has continuously leased this parcel since 1949. In condemning the property, the United States sought to extinguish California's public trust rights. The court concluded that, having paid just compensation, the United States was entitled to the interest it sought in its complaint in condemnation; full fee simple, free of California's public trust. The court concluded that neither the equal-footing doctrine nor the public trust doctrine prevented the federal government from taking that interest in the land unencumbered.

This case arose when plaintiff alleged that defendant owed it mineral royalty payments pursuant to an area-of-interest provision contained in a 1979 agreement. The court certified two questions to the Nevada Supreme Court: (1) Under Nevada law, does the Rule Against Perpetuities apply to an area-of-interest provision in a commercial agreement? and (2) If the Rule Against Perpetuities did apply, is reformation available under Nevada Revised Statute 111.1039(2)? All further proceedings in the case were stayed pending receipt of the answer from the Nevada Supreme Court.

These cross-appeals arose from what the court understood to be the largest civil in rem forfeiture proceeding against firearms unlawfully possessed by a convicted felon in American history. The court addressed several issues, holding that Maria Ferro was not entitled to the protections of the so-called "innocent owner" defense, and the district court was therefore correct to hold that the entire collection was subject to forfeiture; following a comprehensive revision of the forfeiture statutes in 2000, forfeitures of instrumentalities of crimes were subject to excessiveness analysis under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause; excessiveness review must consider the individualized culpability of the property's owner and, when analyzing the offending conduct, it must focus only on the conduct that actually gave rise to the forfeiture of the property at issue, not other criminal conduct by the same person; and because the district court erred on this third point, the court remanded for the district court to undertake once again the excessiveness inquiry.

This appeal grew out of an adversary proceeding in debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint against debtor and her husband, claiming that certain money and property belonged to debtor's bankruptcy estate. The trustee sought turnover to the bankruptcy estate of certain proceedings from the sale of the couple's homestead, a rental property held in the husband's name, and income earned from the rental property. The bankruptcy court rejected all of the trustee's claims and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The court concluded that the proceeds of the homestead sale belonged to debtor's bankruptcy estate but that the rental property held in the husband's name and the income did not. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.

This case required the court to determine whether a mortgage company violated Hawaii state law when it did not publicly announce the postponement of a foreclosure sale of property owned by appellant, and if so, to ascertain the proper remedy for that violation. The court held that the lack of public announcement did violate Hawaii's nonjudicial foreclosure statute, and this defect was a deceptive practice under state law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's avoidance of the foreclosure sale. However, the court remanded to the bankruptcy court for a proper calculation of attorney's fees and damages under Hawaii Revised Statute 480-13.

The State of Nevada filed a parens patriae lawsuit against Bank of America in Clark County District Court, alleging that the Bank misled Nevada consumers about the terms and operation of its home mortgage modification and foreclosure processes, in violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. 598.0903-.0999. Nevada also alleged that the Bank violated an existing consent judgment in a prior case between Nevada and several of the Bank's subsidiaries, entered in Clark County District Court. The Bank removed the action to federal district court, asserting federal subject matter jurisdiction as either a "class action" or "mass action" under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), and as arising under federal law, 28 U.S.C. 1331. Denying Nevada's motion to remand, the federal district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the action as a CAFA "class action," but not as a "mass action," and that it also had federal question jurisdiction because resolving the state claims would require an interpretation of federal law. The court concluded that because parens patriae actions were not removable under CAFA, and the action did not otherwise satisfy CAFA's "mass action" requirements, the district court lacked jurisdiction under CAFA. The court also exercised its interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1453(c) to review the district court's determination that it had federal question jurisdiction because the complaint referenced the federal Home Affordable Mortgage Program and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCP), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The court concluded that the district court lacked federal question jurisdiction. Because there was no basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, the case was remanded to Nevada state court.

This appeal arose in the context of a civil forfeiture action instituted by the government after it seized $133,420 found in claimant's car. The currency was seized from claimant's car as proceeds traceable to controlled substances offenses. Claimant asserted that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the government after determining that claimant lacked standing. The court affirmed the judgment because the district court did not err in striking claimant's interrogatory response claiming ownership of the property and because the remaining evidence was inadequate to establish that claimant had standing.

Four mobile home park owners appealed the dismissal of their suit under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. 3604, 3617, challenging a city zoning ordinance prohibiting any mobilehome park currently operating as senior housing from converting to all-age housing. The court held that because the FHAA was silent on whether such senior housing zones were permissible and because federal regulations allow for them, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This case stemmed from a dispute that arose after a 20 year lease program ended in which Polar Star owned 300 units of family housing located on Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. Polar Star leased the units back to the Air Force but the parties could not agree on the purchase price or the amount of rent payable for an additional year on the lease. The United States first sent notice of a one-year renewal of the lease, then filed a protective eminent domain action to condemn a five-month leasehold in the houses. Polar Star subsequently appealed a number of the district court's rulings. The court held that the district court correctly decided that the government's notice of renewal successfully renewed the Project Lease for one year; the district court's finding that the expiration date of the Ground Lease was the error, and therefore the lease ran for 23 years, was not clearly erroneous; the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the amount of rent due from the Government to Polar Star on the renewal; Polar Star did not file an action in district court, so the only matter before the court was the Government's condemnation action; the district court correctly determined that the condemnation action should be dismissed; Polar Star's entitlement to rent beyond what the Government paid was not asserted on a claim or counterclaim in the district court; and plaintiffs may be entitled to pursue a claim in the Court of Federal Claims. Accordingly, the district court's judgment of dismissal was affirmed.

Plaintiff sought rescission of her loan secured by a trust deed with the Bank for alleged violations of disclosure requirements under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely because it was filed after the three-year period set by 15 U.S.C. 1635(f). Plaintiff argued that because she gave the Bank timely notice of rescission, she was not required to bring suit within the three-year period, and the district court erred in dismissing the case. The court held that, under the court's precedent and Supreme Court precedent, the time limit established by section 1635(f) was applicable here. Moreover, as explained in Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., section 1635(f) was a three-year statute of repose, requiring dismissal of a claim for rescission brought more than three years after the consummation of the loan secured by the first trust deed, regardless of when the borrower sent notice of rescission. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.