Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Kafi, Inc. ("Kafi") owns a residential property in League City, Texas, which it purchased from Joe and Kelly Richardson in September 2020. The Richardsons had financed the property with a loan from Sand Canyon Corporation in 2006, secured by an Adjustable Rate Note and a Deed of Trust. Sand Canyon transferred its interest in the loan to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") in October 2006. Kafi challenged Wells Fargo's right to foreclose on the property, claiming the assignment of the Deed of Trust was forged. Kafi also sought equitable redemption, arguing it should be allowed to pay off any valid liens before foreclosure.The case was initially filed in Texas state court and then removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed Kafi's claims against Sand Canyon and Nationwide Title Clearing, Inc., and dismissed Kafi's standalone forgery claim and claim for exemplary damages. The court allowed Kafi's claims for declaratory relief, quiet title, and equitable redemption to proceed. Wells Fargo and PHH Mortgage Corporation filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted, dismissing Kafi's remaining claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that Wells Fargo, as the holder of the Note, had standing to foreclose on the property under Texas law, regardless of the alleged forgery in the assignment of the Deed of Trust. The court also upheld the dismissal of Kafi's equitable redemption claim, noting that Kafi failed to provide sufficient evidence that it was ready, willing, and able to pay the redemption amount. The court emphasized that Kafi's declaration, which stated it was ready, able, or willing to redeem the property, was insufficient to meet the conjunctive requirement of being ready, willing, and able. Thus, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. View "Kafi, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Clifford Osborne and Deborah Olsen sued their former landlord, Kevin Belton, for disability discrimination and retaliation under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Louisiana Equal Housing Opportunity Act (LEHOA). The dispute arose when Belton, who initially allowed the plaintiffs to keep a dog temporarily, later prohibited the dog and threatened eviction. Despite Osborne providing a letter from his physician stating the need for a service dog due to mental health issues, Belton refused to accept it and proceeded with eviction, which was granted by a Louisiana justice of the peace court.In early 2020, Osborne and Olsen filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. They moved for summary judgment, which Belton did not oppose, leading the district court to grant the motion in August 2022. Belton subsequently filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment nearly a year later, which the district court denied. He then filed a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion, which was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to review only the order denying Belton’s Rule 60(b) motion, as the notice of appeal was timely for this order but not for the underlying summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion, as Belton failed to establish grounds for relief such as excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or a void judgment. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Belton’s Rule 60(b) motion. View "Osborne v. Belton" on Justia Law

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From 2009 to 2015, Clarence Roland engaged in a scheme to defraud mortgage lenders and title insurance companies by using aliases, fake businesses, and fraudulent documents. He promised homeowners facing foreclosure that he could help them eliminate their mortgages. Instead, he transferred property ownership to his shell entities, created fake mortgages, and sold the properties to unsuspecting buyers. Roland used fraudulent notary stamps and signatures to make these transactions appear legitimate.A jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas convicted Roland of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and engaging in monetary transactions over $10,000 derived from unlawful activity. He was sentenced to ten years in prison, ordered to pay restitution of over $3 million, forfeit nearly $2 million, and assessed a $1,000 special assessment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Roland's appeal, where he raised several issues. He argued that the district court erred by admitting evidence of his and his co-conspirator’s prior convictions, limiting his good-faith defense, and denying his request for expert-witness funding. He also claimed that his conduct was not criminal and highlighted a clerical error regarding the special assessment.The Fifth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court's evidentiary rulings, determining that the admission of prior convictions was not plain error and that the limitations on Roland's good-faith defense were either appropriate or harmless. The court also upheld the denial of expert-witness funding, noting Roland's failure to make a formal request. The court agreed with Roland on the clerical error and modified the judgment to remove the $1,000 special assessment. In all other respects, Roland's conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Roland" on Justia Law

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Kehinde Adeyemi Elebute challenged the foreclosure sale of his property in bankruptcy court but was unsuccessful. Years later, he attempted to challenge the foreclosure again in state court. To prevent duplicative litigation, the suit was removed to the bankruptcy court, which reopened and subsequently dismissed Elebute’s case for want of prosecution after he failed to appear at a hearing.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Elebute’s challenge to the reopening and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal. Elebute then appealed both rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court’s order reopening the proceedings, as it was a non-final, interlocutory order. The court agreed with the defendants, Village Capital & Investment, L.L.C., and Michael Weems, that the reopening order was only a preliminary step and did not resolve substantive issues. Therefore, the court dismissed this portion of Elebute’s appeal.Regarding the dismissal for lack of prosecution, the court found that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over Elebute’s claims. The court noted that the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction extends to all civil proceedings related to bankruptcy cases. Since Elebute’s state action challenged Village Capital’s interest in the property central to the earlier bankruptcy case, the actions were related. Consequently, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to dismiss the adversary proceeding.The Fifth Circuit dismissed Elebute’s challenge to the reopening order for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects. The defendants’ amended motion to dismiss a portion of Elebute’s appeal was denied as moot. View "Elebute v. Village Capital" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Wells Fargo and JPMorgan for breach of fiduciary duty after the banks served as trustees for plaintiff's trusts. The district court dismissed all but one of plaintiff's claims, finding a breach as to the remaining claim. The Fifth Circuit held that because plaintiff neither pleaded nor tried his case on the frivolous-lawsuit theory, and because Wells Fargo did not consent to a post-trial amendment, it was improper for the district court to award damages against Wells Fargo on that theory. The court also held that plaintiff's claim that he should have received insurance proceeds upon the House Trust's termination was time-barred; the court declined to consider plaintiff's claim that Wells Fargo double-billed the trusts; plaintiff's claim that Wells Fargo breached its fiduciary duty by using trust funds to pay for legal expenses was time-barred; the court rejected plaintiff's claim that Wells Fargo breached a fiduciary duty by failing to advise him; and plaintiff's claim that JPMorgan breached a fiduciary duty by failing to convey title to certain mineral interests was time-barred. View "Jones, Jr. v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff purchased property on which oil and gas operations had been conducted. Plaintiff filed suit against Hess, asserting claims for damages stemming from contamination caused by the oil- and gas-related activities on the tract. The oil and gas leases expired in 1973 and plaintiff purchased the property in 2007, when all wells had been plugged and abandoned. The district court granted Hess's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the subsequent purchaser rule barred plaintiff's claims. The court explained that a clear consensus has emerged among all Louisiana appellate courts that have considered the issue, and they have held that the subsequent purchaser rule does apply to cases, like this one, involving expired mineral leases. Because this case presented no occasion to depart from precedent, the court deferred to these precedents, and held that the subsequent purchaser doctrine barred plaintiff's claims. The court noted that although the denial of a writ is not necessarily an approval of the appellate court's decision nor precedential, the Louisiana Supreme Court has had multiple opportunities to consider this issue and has repeatedly declined to do so. Finally, the court declined to certify questions to the state court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Guilbeau v. Hess Corp." on Justia Law

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The Board filed suit in Louisiana state court against various companies involved in the exploration for and production of oil reserves off the southern coast of the United States, alleging that defendants' exploration activities caused infrastructural and ecological damage to coastal lands overseen by the Board that increased the risk of flooding due to storm surges and necessitated costly flood protection measures. The district court denied the Board's motion to remand after removal to federal court, and then granted defendants' motion for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The court concluded that the Board's negligence and nuisance claims necessarily raised federal issues sufficient to justify federal jurisdiction and thus the court did not reach the remaining issues. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed the negligence claim because the Board failed to establish that defendants breached a duty of care to it under the facts alleged, the Board's strict liability claim failed because the Board did not state a claim that defendants owed it a duty of care; the district court properly dismissed the servitude of drain claim; and the Board failed to state a claim for nuisance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Board of Commissioners of the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co." on Justia Law

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Twelve individuals in the Houston area who receive Section 8 housing assistance filed suit against AmeriPro and Wells Fargo, alleging discrimination in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 1691 et seq., on the basis of their receipt of public assistance income. The district court granted defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the claims. The court concluded that the Wells Fargo Applicants did not plausibly allege that Wells Fargo discriminated against them on the basis of their Section 8 income or failed to consider their Section 8 income in assessing their creditworthiness; the AmeriPro Inquirers did not plausibly allege that they are "applicants" under the ECOA because they did not actually apply for credit with AmeriPro; and the AmeriPro Applicants did not plausibly allege that Wells Fargo was a "creditor" with respect to them. Therefore, the court affirmed as to these claims. The court concluded that the AmeriPro Applicants did plausibly allege violations of the ECOA by alleging that AmeriPro refused to consider their Section 8 income in assessing their creditworthiness as mortgage applicants, and that they received mortgages on less favorable terms and in lesser amounts than they would have had their Section 8 income been considered. Accordingly, the court reversed as to these claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alexander v. Ameripro Funding" on Justia Law

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This appeal involves the Bank, Ocwen, and Power Default's attempt to foreclose on property in Grand Prairie, Texas. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of her motion for remand based on its finding that Power Default, a non-diverse defendant and substitute trustee for the attempted foreclosure, was improperly joined in the proceeding because the foreclosure did not take place. The district court concluded that plaintiff had no wrongful foreclosure claim against Power Default absent an actual foreclosure. In this case, because she would have been unable to assert a cause of action against Power Default in state court, the district court found that joinder of Power Default as a defendant was improper. Therefore, the court agreed with the district court's analysis and conclusion denying plaintiff's motion to remand to state court. The court also agreed with the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, concluding that plaintiff may not assert a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foster v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co." on Justia Law

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The executor of Bonnie Pereida's estate filed suit and obtained a judgment on claims brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961. Pereida had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on rare coins that she thought would be a good hedge against inflation. In this case, the majority owner of the company that sold her the coins also owned the company that acted as a purportedly independent grader of the coins, and the grades it had assigned did not reflect the coins’ value. The court concluded that Pereida's RICO claims survived her death, but that the evidence did not prove a pattern of racketeering activity at trial. The court found that there is no evidence from which to conclude that the fraud Pereida fell victim to would have continued indefinitely but for this lawsuit. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings as to state law claims. View "Malvino v. Delluniversita" on Justia Law