Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

NCO Financial Systems, Inc. (NCO) entered into a lease agreement with Montgomery Park, LLC (Montgomery Park) for over 100,000 square feet of office space in Baltimore, Maryland. The lease allowed NCO to terminate early after eight years if certain conditions were met. NCO attempted to terminate early, but Montgomery Park claimed the conditions were not satisfied. NCO vacated the premises and stopped paying rent, leading Montgomery Park to send a default notice. NCO then filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that it had properly terminated the lease and that the rent was based on misrepresented square footage.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found in favor of Montgomery Park after a bench trial, awarding it $9,854,566.95 plus ongoing interest. The court also set a schedule for determining Montgomery Park’s claim for costs, fees, and expenses. Montgomery Park filed a motion seeking approximately $3.8 million for these costs, which NCO opposed on several grounds, including the lack of a proper demand for payment and the inclusion of fees for defending against NCO’s initial suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Montgomery Park made a valid demand for payment when it filed its motion for costs, fees, and expenses on August 24, 2022. The court held that default interest should run only from the date of this demand, not from when the costs were incurred, and remanded the case to recalculate the interest. The court affirmed the district court’s award of costs, fees, and expenses, including those incurred in defending against NCO’s claims and expert witness fees, finding no abuse of discretion or error in the district court’s decisions.The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to recalculate the default interest. View "NCO Financial Systems, Inc. v. Montgomery Park, LLC" on Justia Law

Shelby Roberts rented an apartment from Ansley at Roberts Lake Apartments. After a dispute over the lease termination, Ansley retained her $500 security deposit and sent her an invoice for $791.14 for additional damages. Roberts believed these charges were fabricated and refused to pay. Ansley referred the debt to Carter-Young, a collection agency, which reported the debt to credit reporting agencies. Roberts disputed the debt, but Carter-Young only confirmed the debt with Ansley without further investigation. Roberts sued Carter-Young for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina dismissed Roberts' claim, stating that her dispute involved legal, not factual, matters, and thus did not require Carter-Young to investigate under the FCRA. The court held that the FCRA did not mandate investigations into legal disputes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that to state a claim under the FCRA, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the information in their credit report is inaccurate or incomplete and that this inaccuracy is objectively and readily verifiable by the furnisher. The court found that both legal and factual disputes could form the basis of a claim if they meet this standard. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if Roberts' allegations met the new standard of being objectively and readily verifiable. View "Roberts v. Carter-Young, Inc." on Justia Law

Susan Carpenter, as trustee for the H. Joe King, Jr. Revocable Trust, sold two properties in North Carolina in April 2020. Both properties were part of homeowners’ associations managed by William Douglas Management, Inc. Carpenter paid fees for statements of unpaid assessments required for the sales, which she claimed were excessive under North Carolina law. She filed a class action lawsuit against William Douglas and NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., alleging violations of state laws, including the prohibition of transfer fee covenants, the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the Debt Collection Act, along with claims of negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.The case was initially filed in North Carolina state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The district court dismissed Carpenter’s complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that the fees charged were not transfer fees as defined by state law and that the companies were not deceptive or unfair in charging them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the fees charged for the statements of unpaid assessments did not qualify as transfer fees under North Carolina law. The court also found that the fees were not unfair or deceptive under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Consequently, Carpenter’s additional claims of unjust enrichment, violation of the Debt Collection Act, negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy were also dismissed, as they were contingent on the success of her primary claims. View "Carpenter v. William Douglas Management Inc" on Justia Law

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC sought to condemn a 9.89-acre easement on Elizabeth Reynolds' 109-acre farmland in Roanoke County, Virginia, under the Natural Gas Act. The district court granted partial summary judgment and a preliminary injunction for immediate possession to Mountain Valley Pipeline, leaving the issue of just compensation unresolved. Reynolds submitted two expert reports to determine compensation, which the district court excluded, leading to a summary judgment in favor of Mountain Valley Pipeline.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia excluded Reynolds' expert reports, citing Rule 71.1(h) and Rule 702. The court found the first report speculative and the second unreliable due to insufficient data. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment to Mountain Valley Pipeline, awarding just compensation based on the higher estimate of the pipeline company's experts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its application of Rule 71.1(h) and Rule 702. The appellate court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence should apply identically in eminent domain cases as in other cases, and the district court should not have conflated Rule 71.1(h) with Rule 702. The appellate court also determined that the district court should have made findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record when resolving contested factual issues under Rule 71.1(h). The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 9.89 Acres of Land" on Justia Law

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (MVP) condemned a 0.32-acre access easement on Grace Terry's land in southwestern Virginia to deliver heavy equipment to a section of its pipeline. The key issue in this case is the amount of just compensation MVP must pay Terry for the easement. Terry argued that the easement significantly devalued her land, blocking the best hiking trail and citing recent below-market sales of neighboring properties affected by MVP's actions. The district court excluded Terry's testimony on damages and an expert report she submitted, leading to her appeal.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted MVP partial summary judgment and a preliminary injunction for immediate possession of the easement. The court excluded Terry's testimony on damages, finding it speculative and without a rational basis. It also excluded the expert report by Dennis Gruelle, applying a heightened admissibility standard and determining contested facts at the evidentiary stage. The court then granted MVP summary judgment, awarding Terry $10,409 in just compensation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by excluding most of Terry's testimony and the Gruelle Report. The Fourth Circuit found that Terry's personal knowledge of her land and comparable sales were valid bases for her testimony. It also determined that the district court applied erroneous legal principles by using a heightened evidentiary standard for the expert report. The Fourth Circuit vacated the exclusion of the Gruelle Report and reversed the exclusion of most of Terry's testimony, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 0.32 Acres of Land" on Justia Law

Phillip and Sara Alig, along with Daniel and Roxanne Shea, filed a class action lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc. (now Rocket Mortgage, LLC) and Title Source, Inc. (now Amrock, Inc.). They alleged that during the refinancing of their home mortgage loans, they paid for appraisals that were not independent because the defendants had provided appraisers with the homeowners' estimates of their homes' value. They claimed this made the appraisals worthless and asserted statutory, breach of contract, and conspiracy claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia certified a class of West Virginia citizens who refinanced mortgage loans with Quicken and received appraisals that included an estimate of the property's value. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, awarding over $10.6 million in damages. The court found that the plaintiffs had established a conspiracy between the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the class certification and summary judgment on the statutory and conspiracy claims but vacated and remanded the breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which emphasized that every class member must have Article III standing to recover damages.On remand, the district court reinstated its original judgment, stating that TransUnion did not affect the class's standing. However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish that class members suffered concrete harm from the defendants' actions. The court reversed the district court's judgment certifying the class and awarding damages, affirming the judgment on the named plaintiffs' statutory and conspiracy claims, and vacating the judgment on the breach of contract claim, remanding it for further proceedings. View "Alig v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

Danny Fox, an active-duty servicemember, purchased a property in Norfolk, Virginia, in 2015. The City of Norfolk determined the property was unsafe and uninhabitable, repeatedly notifying Fox of building code violations. Despite these notices, Fox did not make the necessary repairs. In December 2018, the city demolished the house, deeming it a public nuisance. Fox subsequently sued the city, claiming inverse condemnation, among other things, arguing the property was not a nuisance and that the city's actions were pretextual to increase its tax base.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court held that Fox's federal constitutional claims were barred by the statute of limitations. It also ruled that Fox's inverse condemnation claim failed because, whether or not the property was a nuisance, he could not demonstrate the city's public use requirement. The court found no evidence to support Fox's claim that the city's actions were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Fox's inverse condemnation claim failed regardless of whether the property was a nuisance. If the property was a nuisance, the city had the authority to abate it without compensation. If it was not a nuisance, Fox could not show a public use, a necessary element for an inverse condemnation claim. The court also found that Fox provided no evidence to support his pretext argument. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the city. View "D.A. Realestate Investment, LLC v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law

North Carolina filed suit against Alcoa, seeking a declaratory judgment that North Carolina owns a 45-mile segment of the riverbed of the Yadkin River in North Carolina. The district court ruled as a matter of law that Alcoa successfully proved its title to 99% of the relevant segment under North Carolina's Marketable Title Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 146-79, and to the remaining 1% under the doctrine of adverse possession. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in its factual finding that the Yadkin River was not navigable at statehood and did not err in concluding, as a matter of law, that Alcoa has good title to the riverbed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "North Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States filed an application for prejudgment remedies under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA), 28 U.S.C. 3001 et seq., seeking writs of attachment against personal and real property owned by defendants and writs of garnishment against bank accounts totaling approximately $16.7 million. The government argued that, because defendants violated the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b, and the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., defendants owed the United States at least $298 million. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their motions to quash the writs of attachment against real and personal property and writs of garnishment against two bank accounts. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the denial was an unreviewable interlocutory order. View "Bluewave Healthcare v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit 15 years after Consolidation Coal began its dewatering operation into Beatrice Mine, alleging that Consolidation Coal damaged plaintiffs' property interests in the exhausted Beatrice Mine and unjustly enriched itself. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that, because Consolidation Coal's water transfer was permitted by a state agency that had been delegated authority by federal law, it amounted to a federally permitted transfer and could not serve as a basis for a cause of action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675; even if plaintiffs were to have the benefit of section 9658's discovery rule, they still could not satisfy the applicable statutes of limitations; the level of public notice and publicity that occurred with respect to Consolidation Coal's dewatering activities should reasonably have informed plaintiffs of those activities more than five years before plaintiffs commenced their lawsuits; and the court declined to toll the statutes of limitations under Virginia law in light of the record in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blankenship v. Consolidation Coal" on Justia Law