Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Blanchards agreed to sell Marathon County property to the Hoffmans, who paid $30,000 up front. The land contract balance was due in 2015, with an option to close early by paying off the Blanchards’ new $142,000 mortgage, obtained as part of the agreement. The parties signed a separate “rental agreement,” under which the Hoffmans paid $500 per month. The land contract was not recorded. The lender obtained an Assignment of Leases and Rents as collateral, but did not obtain an Assignment of Land Contract. The bank recorded its mortgage and the Assignment. In 2014, the Blanchards filed a bankruptcy petition. The trustee filed an adversary proceeding against the lender under 11 U.S.C. 544(a)(3), which grants him the position of a bona fide purchaser of property as of the date of the bankruptcy, to step ahead of the mortgage and use the Blanchards’ interest in the land contract for the benefit of unsecured creditors. The trustee argued that a mortgage can attach a lien only to real property and that the Blanchards' interest under the land contract was personal property. The district court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the bank. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A mortgage can attach a lien to a vendor’s interest in a land contract under Wisconsin law; this lender perfected its lien by recording in county land records rather than under UCC Article 9. View "Liebzeit v. Intercity State Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

The Blanchards agreed to sell Marathon County property to the Hoffmans, who paid $30,000 up front. The land contract balance was due in 2015, with an option to close early by paying off the Blanchards’ new $142,000 mortgage, obtained as part of the agreement. The parties signed a separate “rental agreement,” under which the Hoffmans paid $500 per month. The land contract was not recorded. The lender obtained an Assignment of Leases and Rents as collateral, but did not obtain an Assignment of Land Contract. The bank recorded its mortgage and the Assignment. In 2014, the Blanchards filed a bankruptcy petition. The trustee filed an adversary proceeding against the lender under 11 U.S.C. 544(a)(3), which grants him the position of a bona fide purchaser of property as of the date of the bankruptcy, to step ahead of the mortgage and use the Blanchards’ interest in the land contract for the benefit of unsecured creditors. The trustee argued that a mortgage can attach a lien only to real property and that the Blanchards' interest under the land contract was personal property. The district court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the bank. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A mortgage can attach a lien to a vendor’s interest in a land contract under Wisconsin law; this lender perfected its lien by recording in county land records rather than under UCC Article 9. View "Liebzeit v. Intercity State Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

Jepson executed a note and mortgage on Illinois property, listing America’s Wholesale Lender as the lender and Mortgage Electronics Registration Systems (MERS) as its nominee. Jepson’s note was endorsed in blank by Countrywide, “doing business as America’s Wholesale Lender” and transferred to CWABS, a residential mortgage trust that pools loans and sells certificates backed by the mortgages to investors. CWABS was formed and governed by a Pooling and Service Agreement (PSA). BNYM, trustee for CWABS, now possesses Jepson’s note. MERS assigned Jepson’s mortgage to BNYM. Jepson defaulted. BNYM filed a foreclosure complaint. Jepson filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. BNYM sought to lift the automatic stay. Jepson filed an adversary complaint, seeking a declaration that BNYM had no interest in her mortgage because the note did not include a complete chain of intervening endorsements and was endorsed after the closing date in the PSA and that America’s is a fictitious entity, so that the note was void and not negotiable under Illinois law. The bankruptcy court held that, under governing New York law, Jepson lacked standing to challenge alleged violations of the PSA, dismissed the adversary complaint, and modified the automatic stay to allow BNYM to proceed with its Illinois foreclosure action. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit agreed that Jepson lacks standing to raise challenges based on the PSA, but remanded for consideration of her other claims. View "Jepson v. Bank of NY Mellon" on Justia Law

In 2004, the Simstads, developers, began the process of seeking approval from the Lake County Plan Commission for a proposed subdivision, “Deer Ridge South.” In late 2006, the Commission approved the plans. The Simstads believed that approval was delayed, at great cost to them, because of their support in 1996 for commission member Scheub’s opponent in the County Commissioner primary race. They sued Commission members and Lake County, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and various Indiana laws. A jury ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that a defense of claim preclusion, based on earlier state proceedings, had been waived. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a belated answer to the amended complaint or in allowing the defendants to withdraw their deemed admissions. Rejecting an argument that approval was a ministerial act, the court stated that determination of whether a project meets the ordinances, with or without waivers, involves some degree of discretion. The court noted the absence of evidence of animus. View "Simstad v. Scheub" on Justia Law

Since 2001 Hoyt has owned a 40-acre lot (with a cabin) in a heavily forested region in southwestern Indiana. His lot is surrounded by lots owned by others, including a lot owned by the U.S. Forest Service. None will allow him to use their land to enable vehicular access to his property. No public roads touch his land. The owner of the lot directly to his north allows him to walk through that lot to access his lot. Wanting access to West Burma Road, which runs close to the southeastern corner of Hoyt’s lot, he sued under Indiana law and the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a. The access he sought would cross three lots. The district judge rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, calling the duration of the litigation “inexplicable and inexcusable.” The court rejected claims of prescriptive easement over the Forest Service land and of an easement of necessity over the southwestern lot. View "Hoyt v. Benham" on Justia Law

The Smiths lived in a Joliet home, title to which passed to wife in 2004 as an inheritance. Real estate taxes had gone unpaid in 2000, resulting in a tax lien. At a 2001 auction, SIPI purchased the tax lien and paid the delinquent taxes—$4,046.26—plus costs and was awarded a Certificate of Purchase. Smith did not redeem her tax obligation. SIPI recorded its tax deed in 2005 and sold the property to Midwest for $50,000. In 2007, the Smiths filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief and sought to avoid the tax sale. The bankruptcy judge and the Seventh Circuit found a fraudulent transfer (11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(B)) because the property was not transferred for reasonably equivalent value, but found Midwest a subsequent transferee in good faith. The 1994 Supreme Court decision, BFP v. Resolution Trust, that a mortgage foreclosure sale that complies with state law is deemed for “reasonably equivalent value” as a matter of law, does not apply in Illinois. Unlike mortgage foreclosure sales and some other states’ tax sales, Illinois tax sales do not involve competitive bidding where the highest bid wins. Instead, bidders bid how little money they are willing to accept in return for payment of the owner’s delinquent taxes. The lowest bid wins; bid amounts bear no relationship to the value of the real estate. View "Smith v. Sipi, LLC" on Justia Law