Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Jackson filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy petition. His mortgagee (BOA), sought relief from the stay; abandonment of his residence, a condominium; and in rem relief for two years under 11 U.S.C. 362(d)(4)(B), alleging a substantial arrearage and prior bankruptcy filings that included the Condominium as scheduled property. The court granted the motion. BOA and Jackson entered into a loan modification agreement. The owners’ association (Carlton House) sought a permanent in rem order. The court stated that post-petition amounts were current “and the issue seems to be the desire to move forward with the foreclosure for the outstanding [pre-petition] approximately $5,900.” The court entered a two-year in rem sanction. Jackson received his discharge; the case was closed. Carlton House immediately went to state court to schedule a sheriff’s sale--the final step in a foreclosure action commenced in 2008 by BOA’s predecessor. Carlton House and the lender had obtained a foreclosure decree in 2009. The bankruptcy court reopened the case, concluded that Carlton House violated discharge order by scheduling the sale, awarded monetary sanctions, and enjoined re-scheduling of the sale. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed, noting that Carlton House has statutory obligations to other unit owners. The bankruptcy court effectively imposed an “equity requirement” that is not part of the Ohio foreclosure sale process. View "In re: Jackson" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Robertsons borrowed $192,000, secured by a mortgage on their Memphis home. The note was bundled into a mortgage-backed trust with U.S. Bank as designated supervisor; Wilson as trustee, responsible for conducting any foreclosure sale; and MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems) as the beneficiary. MERS acts as an agent for the owners as mortgage notes are transferred on the secondary market.The Robertsons stopped making payments in 2011. MERS assigned the deed to U.S. Bank. In 2014, Wilson sent the Robertsons a Notice of Trustee’s Sale. The Robertsons responded with a “notice of rescission,” alleging that U.S. Bank had violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and lacked standing to foreclose, then sued U.S. Bank and Wilson in state court. U.S. Bank removed the case to federal court, where the Robertsons agreed to dismiss Wilson. The district court granted U.S. Bank summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Wilson waived its right to remove the case; U.S. Bank failed to comply with a TILA notice requirement, giving the Robertsons the right to rescind the loan; U.S. Bank lacked standing to enforce the note because it never showed it had a stake in the loan; and U.S. Bank forfeited its right to foreclose when it failed to raise the claim in its answer to the Robertsons’ complaint. View "Robertson v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2001, EQT sold or leased to Journey several oil- and natural-gas-producing properties in Kentucky. Both parties continued to conduct oil and natural-gas operations in the state, but Journey later concluded that EQT was operating on some of the lands that had been conveyed to Journey. Journey sought a declaration that it owned or controlled those properties and that EQT was liable for the oil and natural gas that EQT had removed from those properties. The district court concluded on summary judgment that the parties’ 2001 contract had unambiguously conveyed the disputed properties to Journey. A jury found that EQT’s trespasses on Journey’s lands were not in good faith. The court subsequently required EQT to pay $14,288,432 in damages and transfer certain oil and natural-gas wells to Journey. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in construing the parties’ contract, in excluding portions of EQT’s proffered evidence, and in crafting the remedy for EQT’s trespasses. EQT carried out its drilling despite obvious indicators that its ownership of the underlying property was doubtful, establishing an ample basis to conclude that EQT’s trespasses were not in good faith. View "Journey Acquisition-II, L.P. v. EQT Prod.Co." on Justia Law

Sawyer, with co-defendants, formed A&E to recover salvageable materials (copper, steel, aluminum) from the 300-acre Hamblen County site of the former Liberty Fibers rayon plant, which contained buildings, a water treatment facility, and extensive above-ground piping. The defendants knew that many of the buildings contained regulated asbestos-containing material (RACM), such as pipe-wrap, insulation, roofing, and floor tiles, much of which was marked. Demolition did not comply with National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) governing the handling and disposal of asbestos. Workers were not provided with proper respirators or protective suits; some were asked to remove or handle friable asbestos without adequately wetting it. In a 2008 consent agreement, A&E agreed to correct the violations and comply with NESHAP during future removal and demolition. In 2009, the EPA terminated the agreement and issued an immediate compliance order. Federal agents searched the site, seized documents, and took samples of RACM. EPA, acting under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), cleaned up the site, at a cost of $16,265,418. In 2011, Sawyer and his co-defendants were charged. Sawyer pled guilty to conspiring to violate the Clean Air Act, 18 U.S.C. 371. His PSR calculated a guideline sentencing range of 87-108 months. The statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. 371 is 60 months, so his effective range was 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Sawyer’s 60-month sentence and an order holding the co-defendants jointly and severally liable for $10,388,576.71 in restitution to the EPA. View "United States v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

Because of zoning by Upper Arlington, a suburb of Columbus, Ohio, Tree of Life Christian Schools could not use its otherwise-unused land and building to operate a religious school. The government denied a rezoning application because such a use would not accord with provisions of the government’s Master Plan, which call for maintaining commercial use zoning to maximize tax revenue. TOL filed suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc– 2000cc-5, alleging that the government illegally failed to treat TOL Christian Schools on equal terms with nonreligious assemblies or institutions. The district court granted the government summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for resolution of the factual issue: whether the government treated nonreligious assemblies or institutions that would fail to maximize income-tax revenue in the same way it has treated the proposed religious school. View "Tree of Life Christian Schools v. City of Upper Arlington" on Justia Law

Thomas owns hotels. He purchased 34 acres adjacent to I-24 between Nashville and Chattanooga in 2013 for $160,000, to develop a first-tier hotel. Most of the property is zoned agricultural-residential; a smaller portion is zoned rural center district. It has always been used for agriculture, The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) filed a condemnation action (40 U.S.C. 3113) with a deposit of $15,500 as estimated just compensation, for an easement 100 feet wide (1.72 acres) along I-24 for above-ground electrical power transmission lines. Thomas requested a trial on just compensation and disclosed his intent to present expert testimony that the property was no longer feasible for hotel development, because “power lines create both a visual and psychological barrier to guests.” The court granted the TVA’s motion to exclude the testimony, based on reliability defects. At trial, Thomas explained that the power lines are dangerous and unattractive. Thomas had not sought a rezoning. TVA’s expert opined that it was not financially feasible to develop a hotel on the property because of soil conditions, frontage, and the need for a zoning change and utilities. The court awarded Thomas just compensation of $10,000. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Thomas’s arguments about valuation. Thomas, who bore the burden of proof, did not overcome the presumption that the highest and best use was the property's existing use as agricultural land. View "Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 1.72 Acres of Land in Tenn." on Justia Law

Great Smoky Mountains National Park, 500,000 acres of public lands in Tennessee and North Carolina. includes parts of the Appalachian Trail. The Park required backcountry visitors to obtain a permit. Some campsites also required reservations, which were managed through third-party software called Wilderness Trakker. Technical support for Wilderness Trakker was discontinued. Park staff convened a task force to investigate alternatives, including funding an online system through a new fee for permits and reservations. The Park developed a public-engagement plan, emphasizing expected improvements in trip planning, reservations, and customer service, and issued press releases and a proposal for circulation to stakeholders explaining the new fee. The proposal invited comments and advertised two open houses. The Park received 230 written comments; 69 persons attended the open houses. Analysis of the feedback noted general opposition to fees, concern about the use of an outside contractor to manage the reservation system, and differing views about the need for additional backcountry management. The Park implemented the new fee of four dollars per person, per night at backcountry campsites and shelters. SFW challenged the fee and moved to open discovery to supplement the administrative record. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion and summary judgment in favor of the Park Service, rejecting challenges under the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act, 16 U.S.C. 6801. View "So. Forest Watch, Inc. v. Jewell" on Justia Law

In 2002, the Cartees placed a deed of trust on their Nashville home to secure a loan from Citizens Bank. Although the recorded deed's acknowledgement declares that it was acknowledged in Alabama, it was executed and acknowledged in Tennessee. A month later, the Citizens Deed of Trust was re-recorded; the acknowledgment was revised, with a note declaring that “THIS DOCUMENT IS BEING RERECORDED TO ADD THE DERIVATION CLAUSE AND TO CORRECT THE NOTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT.” The rerecorded deed was not reexecuted or acknowledged by the Cartees, nor did they have any knowledge of the rerecording. In 2004, the Cartees and Regions Bank entered into a credit agreement secured by a second deed of trust, also recorded. After 2005, federal tax liens, judgment liens, and a mechanic’s lien were recorded against the property. Years later, the Cartees defaulted on their mortgage loan. The Cartees defaulted on several forebearance agreements; Diana Cartee filed for bankruptcy. A foreclosure sale resulted in proceeds that satisfied the debt to Citizens, with a surplus of $281,632.74. In an interpleader action, the court awarded Regions the surplus proceeds and granted the successful foreclosure bidder summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Cartees could not attempt to invalidate the foreclosure by challenging the validity of the bidder’s deed, based on the “defect” in the Citizens Deed. View "Watson v. Cartee" on Justia Law

Ronald Davis, the owner of a corporation, was liable for over $1 million in unpaid federal employment taxes and penalties. After demands for payment went unanswered, the government filed suit against Ronald to reduce its tax assessments to judgment and sought to enforce its tax liens through the sale of the primary residence of Ronald and his wife, Diane. The government named Diane, who did not owe any unpaid taxes, as a defendant in the action because she had an interest in the properties. The district court issued an order of sale authorizing the sale of the primary residence. Diane appealed, arguing (1) the district court should have allowed the government to sell only Ronald’s interest in the property; and (2) the order of sale violated 26 U.S.C. 7403 and the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order of sale, holding (1) the district court did not err when it declined to limit the government to the sale of Ronald’s interest in the property; and (2) the order of sale did not violate section 7403 or the Just Compensation Clause. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Columbia stores natural gas in Medina Field, a naturally-occurring system of porous underground rock, pumping gas into the Field during summer, during low demand, and withdrawing it during winter. Medina is among 14 Ohio gas storage fields used by Columbia. Columbia received a federal Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 15 U.S.C. 717f, and was required to compensate those who own part of the Field by contractual agreement or eminent domain. The owners allege that Columbia stored gas for an indeterminate time without offering compensation and then offered $250 per lot. Each Medina owner rejected this offer. Columbia did not bring eminent domain proceedings. Other Ohio landowners accused Columbia of similar behavior and filed the Wilson class action in the Southern District of Ohio, including the Medina owners within the putative class. The Medina owners filed suit in the Northern District. Both actions claim trespass and unjust enrichment under Ohio law, and inverse condemnation under the Natural Gas Act. The Wilson suit also seeks damages for “native” natural gas Columbia takes when it withdraws its own gas. Columbia filed a counterclaim in Wilson, seeking to exercise eminent domain over every member of the putative class and join the Medina owners. The Northern District applied the first-to-file rule and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The rule does apply, but dismissal was an abuse of discretion given jurisdictional and procedural hurdles to having the Medina claims heard in Wilson. View "Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC" on Justia Law