Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant's patent discloses an investment tool designed to enable property owners to buy and sell properties without incurring tax liability by enabling like-kind exchanges under 26 U.S.C. 1031. The claims require aggregation of multiple properties into a portfolio; interests in the portfolio are divided into "deed shares" and sold to investors similar to the sale of stock. Each deedshare can be encumbered by its own mortgage. The patent allows for a master tenant to perform administrative tasks such as paying insurance, property taxes, and rents. The district court invalidated each of 41 claims in the patent for failing to claim patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C.101, reasoning that the claims were not tied to a particular machine or apparatus and that none of the claims transform any article to a different state or thing. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims attempt to capture unpatentable abstract subject matter.

Plaintiff, a concessionaire for a recreation facility at Lake Berryessa, made improvements for a resort, boat ramps, roads, sewage system, retaining walls, water purification plant, and parking. Before its agreement expired, plaintiff and others sued, under the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 1491(b)(1)-(4)) challenging a plan for soliciting new concessionaire bids, claiming that the federal agency had to require new concessionaires to compensate for facilities. The Court of Federal Claims held that outgoing concessionaires had to remove or abandon the facilities, unless the government required that they remain, in which case concessionaires would receive compensation for selected facilities. The Federal Circuit affirmed. When plaintiff's agreement expired in 2008, it left intact facilities behind, although the government did not request that it do so. Two years later, the government contracted with a new company. Plaintiff claims that the company or the government have used the facilities and filed a complaint, claiming that the government should be found to have retrospectively required their retention. The claims court dismissed based on issue preclusion and that plaintiff had no property interest in the facilities after expiration of the lease. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the government did not "require" that the facilities be left.

In 2010, the court of claims awarded owners $3,043,051, plus interest, for the temporary taking of a blanket easement over five parcels in the Otay Mesa area of San Diego County, California, limiting the government's liability to the period April, 1999 to October, 2008. The taking was the result of Border Patrol activities outside the boundaries of an easement that had been purchased by the government for those purposes, and included creating new roads, constructing a permanent tented structure, and installing under-ground motion-detecting sensors. The Federal Circuit affirmed the limitation of liability to five parcels and the stated time period, but reversed the calculation of damages. The claims court erred in concluding that the taking was temporary rather than a permanent physical taking. The government stipulated that its easement was "perpetual" and has not removed its equipment.

Plaintiff purchased approximately 4,000 acres of land in Titus County, Texas, for use as a mitigation bank to offset the environmental impact of more destructive land use. 33 U.S.C. 1344. Before the purchase, the Army Corps of Engineers communicated that it then saw no impediments to creating the mitigation bank. After the Texas Water Development Board announced that the Reservoir would become less viable (if not infeasible) if the mitigation bank were approved, the Corps denied the application because the mitigation bank overlapped with the proposed Reservoir and it concluded that plaintiff's land might not exist in perpetuity. The district court dismissed a claim for just compensation. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not have a cognizable property interest in obtaining a mitigation banking instrument. The claim was essentially that plaintiff detrimentally relied on representations made by the Corps.

The Tribes share an interest in a Wyoming Reservation. Consolidated suits, filed in 1979, claimed that the government breached fiduciary and statutory duties by mismanaging the Reservation's natural resources and income derived from exploitation of those resources. The Court of Federal Claims divided the suit into phases. One addressed sand and gravel and has been settled. The other two phases were devoted to oil and gas issues. An issue concerning the Government's failure to collect royalties after October, 1973 has been resolved. The final phase concerned pre-1973 oil and gas royalty collection and a series of discrete oil-and-gas issues. In 2007, the court granted the government judgment on the pleadings, finding that the claim was not filed within six years of the date on which it first accrued. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the claim asserted a continuing trespass, so that the Tribes can seek damages for trespasses which occurred within six years of the filing of this suit and all trespasses that occurred after the filing of this suit. The Tribes must establish that the government had a duty to eject trespassers from the parcels.

Incentives under the National Housing Act, to encourage private developers to meet the needs of moderate income families, included below-market 40-year mortgages, with an option to prepay after 20 years. Restrictions, for example, on rent increases, were in effect until the mortgage was paid off. The prepayment option gave developers an opportunity to convert to market rate housing. To avoid a shortage of affordable housing, Congress enacted Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act, 101 Stat. 1877 (1988), and Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act, 104 Stat. 4249 (1990) under which an owner needed HUD approval to prepay or to go through regulatory hoops. In 1996 Congress restored prepayment rights. Plaintiff was prohibited from prepayment for five years, 10 days. The Court of Federal Claims held that the restriction of prepayment rights constituted a taking but did not constitute a breach of contract, because there was no privity between HUD and plaintiff. The Federal Circuit affirmed on the contract claim, but reversed with respect to temporary taking. The evidence did not demonstrate that plaintiff's investment backed expectations were objectively reasonable in light of industry practice,