Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the HOA in an action brought by the bank after the HOA conducted a foreclosure on residential property. Under Nevada law, HOAs are granted a lien with superpriority status on property governed by the association and the portion of the lien with superpriority status consists of the last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and any unpaid maintenance and nuisance abatement charges.Under Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, the panel held that the bank's tender of nine months of HOA dues ($423) satisfied the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien. The panel also held that the HOA had no good faith basis for believing that the bank's tender was insufficient. The panel held that Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, was no longer controlling and rejected the bank's argument that the Nevada HOA lien statute violated the Due Process Clause, in light of SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon. The panel held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116 et seq. was not facially unconstitutional on the basis of an impermissible opt-in scheme, and the bank received actual notice in this case. Finally, the panel agreed with Nevada precedent that Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116 et seq. was not preempted by the federal mortgage insurance program. View "Bank of America v. Arlington West Twilight Homeowners Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a federal civil rights action against defendants, alleging numerous federal constitutional violations and a disparate impact claim under the Fair Housing Act. Almost simultaneously, the city filed a nuisance complaint in state court against plaintiffs and the city filed a motion for abstention, or in the alternative, a motion to dismiss the federal action. The county filed a nearly identical motion the next day. The district court granted both the city and the county's motions, concluding that abstention was appropriate under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).Determining that it had jurisdiction over the appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly abstained under Younger in every aspect, except with respect to the allegedly unreasonable search, which must be severed from the other claims. In this case, Younger abstention was appropriate as to all claims except the unreasonable search claim, because success by plaintiffs on such claims would invalidate the code enforcement proceeding. In regard to the unreasonable search claim, the district court erred in abstaining because the relief sought on alleged Fourth Amendment violations did not meet the Court's requirement that the relief have the practical effect of enjoining the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Herrera v. City of Palmdale" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of HomeAway.com and Airbnb Inc.'s (the Platforms) lawsuits challenging the City of Santa Monica’s Ordinance 2535, which imposes various obligations on companies that host online platforms for short-term vacation rentals. The panel held that the district court properly dismissed the Platforms' complaints for failure to state a claim and dismissed as moot the appeals from the denial of preliminary injunctive relief.The panel rejected the Platforms' claim that the ordinance was preempted by the Communications Decency Act (CDA) because it required them to monitor and remove third-party content, and held that neither express preemption nor obstacle preemption applied to the ordinance. The panel also rejected the Platforms' contention that the ordinance impermissibly infringed upon their First Amendment rights, and held that the ordinance regulated nonexpressive conduct, specifically booking transactions, not free speech. The panel held that, even assuming the ordinance would lead the Platforms to voluntarily remove some advertisements for lawful rentals, there would not be a severe limitation on the public's access to lawful advertisements, especially considering the existence of alternative channels like Craigslist. The panel reasoned that such an incidental burden was far from a substantial restriction on the freedom of speech. View "HomeAway.com v. City of Santa Monica" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Hawai'i Supreme Court: What is the applicable statute of limitations for a claim against the State of Hawai'i alleging an unlawful taking of "[p]rivate property . . . for public use without just compensation," Haw. Const. art. I, 20? View "DW Aina Le'A Development, LLC v. Hawai'i Land Use Commission" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's forfeiture order against defendant after she had pleaded guilty to attempted smuggling of ammunition from the United States into Mexico. Although the ammunition was subject to forfeiture, defendant had caused it to be transferred to a third party. The panel held that the district court properly ordered forfeiture of substitute property under 28 U.S.C. 2461(c) and 21 U.S.C. 853(p). In this case, defendant's acts and omissions caused the ammunition to be transferred to a third party and the forfeiture of $1,235 in the form of a money judgment was proper. View "United States v. Valdez" on Justia Law

If a creditor fails to make required disclosures under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), borrowers are allowed three years from the loan's consummation date to rescind certain loans. However, TILA does not include a statute of limitations outlining when an action to enforce such a rescission must be brought.The Ninth Circuit applied the analogous state law statute of limitations -- Washington's six year contract statute of limitations -- to TILA rescission enforcement claims. The panel held that plaintiff's TILA claim was timely under Washington's statute of limitations. In this case, the cause of action arose in May 2013 when the Bank failed to take any action to wind up the loan within 20 days of receiving plaintiff's notice of rescission. The panel also held that the district court improperly denied plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. View "Hoang v. Bank of America NA" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs, the owners of a Montana ranch, in a dispute over the ownership of dinosaur fossils. Prior to the discovery of the fossils, the previous owners of the ranch sold their surface and one-third of the mineral estate to plaintiffs, expressly reserving the remaining two-thirds of the mineral estate.The panel held that definitions of "mineral" in Montana statutes were contradictory and thus inconclusive. The panel explained that the Montana Supreme Court has generally adopted the test in Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994 (Tex. 1940), for determining whether a particular substance was a mineral in the context of deeds and agreements regarding mineral rights to land. Applying the Heinatz test, the panel held that the dinosaur fossils were "minerals" under the terms of the deed and belonged to the owners of the mineral estate. In this case, the fossils were rare and exceptional, and have special value. View "Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC" on Justia Law

G&G appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendant, a citizen of Italy, in G&G's suit asserting various state law claims. G&G alleged that Rustic stole a large, valuable oil painting from her former husband and G&G's predecessor-in-interest. The district court held that G&G's claims were barred by California's borrowing statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 361.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order with respect to the conversion claim, holding that the district court properly determined that this claim accrued sometime in 2000 and was time-barred under both the Italian and California statutes of limitations. The panel vacated and remanded the district court's order with respect to the replevin and unjust enrichment claims, holding that there was no indication that the district court determined when those claims accrued. Finally, the panel vacated and remanded the district court's order with respect to the claim for declaratory relief, holding that the disputed facts on this claim defeated summary judgment in favor of defendant. View "G and G Productions LLC v. Rusic" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended the certification order in an appeal challenging Nevada state water law. The panel certified the following questions to the Supreme Court of Nevada: Does the public trust doctrine apply to rights already adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation and, if so, to what extent? If the public trust doctrine applies and allows for reallocation of rights settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation, does the abrogation of such adjudicated or vested rights constitute a "taking" under the Nevada Constitution requiring payment of just compensation? View "Mineral County v. Walker River Irrigation District" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for King County in an action to quiet title to a rail corridor that the Surface Transportation Board had railbanked under the Trails Act. As a preliminary matter, the panel held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 because plaintiffs' state law claim necessarily turned on some construction of federal law that was actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting any congressionally approved federal-state balance. The panel also held that plaintiffs lacked Article III and statutory standing to challenge King County's interest in the Corridor because they have no property interests in the Corridor; King County owns the portion of the Corridor adjacent to the Hornish Property in fee; the Trails Act preserved the railroad easement and created a new easement for trail use, both of which were conveyed to King County; and the centerline presumption did not apply in this case. The panel also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to and quieted title in King County where King County possessed the railroad easement and recreational easement, and the easement's width adjacent to the Non-Hornish Plaintiffs' properties was 100 feet. Finally, the panel denied plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record. View "Hornish v. King County" on Justia Law