Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Government seeks forfeiture of the Building, as well as other assets owned by claimants. The parties subsequently cross-appeal the district court's order determining that the Government had probable cause to forfeit the Building and granting the motion of claimants to modify a protective order by releasing to them a portion of the rental income generated from the Building.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of probable cause where the district court described at length the non-tainted evidence on which it relied to find probable cause, and the district court did not refuse to consider claimants' statute-of-limitations defense. The district court also did not commit reversible error by concluding that, at this stage, claimants' statute of limitations defense did not defeat a probable cause finding. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion where the district court declined to draw an adverse inference against the Government for failing to produce statute-of-limitations discovery following the court's 2016 and 2019 opinions requiring it to do so. However, the court concluded that the return-of-rents remedy is appropriate here and modified the district court's order releasing the rental income to cover rental income generated from January 5, 2018, until October 13, 2020. View "In Re: 650 Fifth Avenue Co. & Related Properties" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's order granting debtor's motion to avoid a judicial lien. Debtor seeks, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(1) and (f)(1)(A), to exempt her interest in, and avoid a judicial lien upon, a property that her dependent son uses as a non-primary residence.The court held that the term "residence" in the so-called homestead exemption of section 522(d)(1) includes both primary and nonprimary residences. In this case, the ordinary meaning of the word "residence" does not exclude non-primary residences. Furthermore, Congress's deliberate choice of terminology, the text of the statute, and the legislative history weigh in favor of the court's conclusion. View "Donovan v. Maresca" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York's motion for judgment on the pleadings for its claims asserting a tribal right to possession of land under the Indian Commerce Clause (ICC), federal treaties and statutes, and federal common law. This action arose from a disputed tract of 19.6 acres of land in the Town of Vernon in Oneida County, New York, over which both the Nation and defendant assert ownership.The court granted the district court's decision and order granting the Nation's motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaim. The court held that: (1) the district court correctly granted the Nation's motion for judgment on the pleadings because title was not properly transferred to defendant, and defendant's defenses do not raise any issues of material fact that would preclude the requested declaratory and injunctive relief sought by the Nation; and (2) the district court did not err by declining to apply an immovable property exception to tribal sovereign immunity in dismissing defendant's counterclaim. View "Oneida Indian Nation v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Cayuga Indian Nation of New York and the district court's permanent injunction enjoining the County from foreclosing on the Cayuga Indian Nation's real property for nonpayment of taxes. The court agreed with the district court that tribal sovereign immunity from suit bars the County from pursuing tax enforcement actions under Article 11 of the New York Real Property Tax Law against the Cayuga Indian Nation. The court explained that the County's foreclosure proceedings are not permitted by the traditional common law exception to sovereign immunity that covers certain actions related to immovable property. In this case, the foreclosure actions fall outside the purview of the common law version of the immovable-property exception. The court also rejected the County's reading of City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), as abrogating a tribe's immunity from suit. View "Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County" on Justia Law

This case arose from defendants' ownership in a manufacturing facility that used and disposed perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) which contaminated the water supply in the Village of Hoosick Falls, New York. Plaintiff, a construction company operating in the Village and the property owner, filed suit alleging property damage resulting from defendants' negligence in using and disposing of PFOA. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of defendants' motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims that defendants' negligence caused the corporate plaintiff to lose revenues and caused the individual plaintiff to suffer devaluation of his land.The Second Circuit held that the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss the claim of the property owner but erred in denying the motion to dismiss the claim of the company. The court saw no error in the district court's conclusion that the principle of 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc., 96 N.Y.2d 8 280, 727 N.Y.S.2d 49 (2001), is inapposite to the claim of the owner, because he alleged physical contamination of his property, and thus is entitled to seek damages not only for that intrusion but also for the diminution in value of the property. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the owner's negligence claim was properly denied. However, the company's negligence claim to recover its purely economic damages should have been dismissed. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the remaining claims lacked merit. View "R.M. Bacon, LLC v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp." on Justia Law

This case arose from defendants' ownership in a manufacturing facility that used and disposed perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) which contaminated the water supply in the Village of Hoosick Falls, New York. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).For the reasons discussed in the Second Circuit's opinion issued on the same day in Benoit v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., Nos. 17-3941, etc., which was argued in tandem with the present appeal and involved the same issues, the court rejected defendants' contentions that the district court erred in denying their motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims of personal injury and requests for medical monitoring as relief for such injuries, and in denying their motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims of property damage. The court held that the district court's ruling that medical monitoring is available relief for claims solely of property damage is not an order that meets the criteria for immediate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Therefore, the court dismissed, as improvidently allowed, so much of the appeal as seeks reversal of that part of the district court's order. View "Baker v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp." on Justia Law

This case arose from defendants' ownership in a manufacturing facility that used and disposed perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) which contaminated the water supply in the Village of Hoosick Falls, New York. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's order denying their Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, in 16 temporarily consolidated actions, to dismiss plaintiffs' claims.The Second Circuit held that the district court properly denied defendants' motion to dismiss the claims of injury to persons or property, and for medical monitoring with respect to personal injury. In regard to the district court's ruling that costs of medical monitoring can be awarded on the basis solely of injury to property, the court held that because plaintiffs request various types of relief in addition to medical monitoring, the ruling that medical monitoring is available relief for property damage is not one that meets the criteria for immediate review under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). Therefore, the court dismissed, as improvidently allowed, so much of the appeal as seeks review of that part of the district court's order. View "Benoit v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's multiple orders granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and holding Defendant March liable for interest at a default rate of 24 percent per annum dating back to February 1, 2008. In this case, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Madison Street; the district court's order confirming the interest calculations of the court-appointed referee; and the district court's denial of reconsideration or to adjust its award of per diem interest to Madison Street based on the delayed "entry of judgment." The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and concluded that they were either forfeited or without merit. View "1077 Madison Street, LLC v. March" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's award of statutory damages to plaintiffs under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. Defendants are developers who destroyed aerosol artwork that plaintiff painted on buildings owned by defendants. The site was known as 5Pointz in Long Island City, New York, and evolved into a major global center for aerosol art, attracting thousands of visitors, numerous celebrities, and extensive media coverage.The court held that the district court correctly determined that temporary artwork may achieve recognized stature so as to be protected from destruction by VARA and that plaintiffs' work had achieved that stature. The court also held that the district court did not err in finding defendants' violations of VARA to be willful and that the district court's award of statutory damages was not an abuse of discretion. View "Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P." on Justia Law

In a foreclosure action, the Second Circuit certified the following two questions to the New York Court of Appeals: (1) Where a foreclosure plaintiff seeks to establish compliance with RPAPL 1304 through proof of a standard office mailing procedure, and the defendant both denies receipt and seeks to rebut the presumption of receipt by showing that the mailing procedure was not followed, what showing must the defendant make to render inadequate the plaintiff's proof of compliance with section 1304? (2) Where there are multiple borrowers on a single loan, does RPAPL 1306 require that a lender's filing include information about all borrowers, or does section 1306 require only that a lender's filing include information about one borrower? View "CIT Bank N.A. v. Schiffman" on Justia Law