Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In late 2019, Verizon Wireless identified a coverage gap in Berlin Township, Ohio, and partnered with TowerCo to construct a cell tower to address this issue. TowerCo secured a lease with the local school district to build the tower on school property. Initially, TowerCo notified local residents as required by zoning regulations but later claimed immunity from these regulations under Ohio's "Brownfield immunity" doctrine, arguing that the project served a public purpose. Despite this claim, the Township insisted on compliance with local zoning laws, leading to a dispute.The Township filed a complaint in the Delaware County Common Pleas Court seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to halt the tower's construction. TowerCo counterclaimed under the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and removed the case to federal court. After negotiations failed, TowerCo filed a separate federal lawsuit asserting TCA violations and sought a preliminary injunction to continue construction. The district court granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the Township's actions likely violated the TCA by effectively prohibiting wireless services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order. The appellate court held that the Township's filing of a state court lawsuit did not constitute a "final action" under the TCA, which is necessary to trigger the Act's remedies. Additionally, TowerCo failed to file its federal TCA claims within the 30-day statutory deadline after the Township's state court filing. The court concluded that TowerCo's claims were not ripe and were time-barred, and thus, TowerCo could not show a likelihood of success on the merits. Consequently, the preliminary injunction was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "TowerCo 2013, LLC v. Berlin Township Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

The case involves eight landowners who sued Midland and Gladwin Counties in Michigan, alleging a taking under the federal and state constitutions following the failure of the Edenville Dam, which resulted in flooding of several cities downstream. The dam, built in 1924, had a history of flood control issues. In 2018, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission revoked the existing owner's license and transferred regulatory authority over the dam to the Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy. In compliance with Michigan law, the counties assembled a task force to manage the lake above the dam and filed a petition in 2019 to maintain the lake levels. In May 2020, several days of historic rainfall raised the water level three feet above its previous maximum, triggering the dam's failure and causing extensive damage to properties downstream.The district court granted summary judgment to the counties, concluding that their efforts to maintain the water levels did not show that they intended to flood the downstream properties and "take" their land. The landowners appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the counties' petition to maintain the lake depth at the same level that had existed for roughly a century did not show that they intended to flood the downstream properties. The court also noted that the counties played no part in regulating or controlling the dam's infrastructure. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the dam's failure was caused by soil vulnerabilities, not inadequate spillways, as determined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's independent forensic team. Therefore, the court concluded that no taking occurred as a matter of federal or state law. View "Bruneau v. Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy" on Justia Law

The case involves Oakland Tactical Supply, LLC and five Michigan residents who sued Howell Township, Michigan, alleging that the township's zoning restrictions, which prevented Oakland Tactical from constructing and operating a commercial shooting range, violated the Second Amendment. The district court granted the township's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the zoning restrictions did not violate the Second Amendment. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The district court's decision was made before the Supreme Court announced a new framework for deciding Second Amendment challenges in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Bruen, and the district court again granted judgment for the township.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that while the Second Amendment protects the right to engage in commercial firearms training as necessary to protect the right to effectively bear arms in case of confrontation, it does not extend to training in a particular location or at the extremely long distances Oakland Tactical seeks to provide. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' proposed conduct—commercial training in a particular location and long-distance commercial training—was not protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. Therefore, the township's zoning restrictions did not violate the Second Amendment. View "Oakland Tactical Supply, LLC v. Howell Township" on Justia Law

The case involves Norton Outdoor Advertising, a company that operates billboards within the Village of St. Bernard, Ohio. The Village revoked one of Norton's permits after it constructed two variable-message signs. The Village's ordinance regulates signs based on whether what is being advertised is located on or off the premises of the sign. The ordinance also has an exemption that functions beyond this on- and off-premises dichotomy, which is content based.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the Village, finding that Norton lacked standing to challenge any provisions of the ordinances other than the ban on variable-message displays. The court found these provisions to be content-neutral regulations under the Supreme Court precedent and that the regulations satisfied intermediate scrutiny.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court found that the Village's ordinance, which included a content-based exemption, must satisfy strict scrutiny. The court concluded that the Village's ordinance was not narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling interest and therefore could not stand as written. The court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings, including consideration of whether the unconstitutional provision is severable. View "Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of St. Bernard" on Justia Law

In this case, Norfolk Southern Railway Company and Dille Road Recycling, LLC disputed over a narrow parcel of land adjacent to Norfolk’s active rail line in Euclid, Ohio. Although Norfolk owned the land, Dille had been using it for nearly two decades. The parties took the matter to federal court after negotiations failed. Dille sought to claim the parcel through adverse possession or a prescriptive easement, while Norfolk argued that Dille’s property claims were preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA). The district court held that Dille’s prescriptive-easement claim was not preempted and granted Dille the easement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, ruling that federal law preempted Dille’s state-law prescriptive-easement claim. The court determined that the easement Dille sought was so exclusive and conflicting that it was essentially adverse possession by another name. The court noted that while Dille claimed the easement was nonexclusive, the reality was that Dille's use of the parcel did not allow for shared use with Norfolk. The court also found that Dille's proposed use of the parcel was much closer to the complete taking of the property, which would unreasonably interfere with rail transportation and therefore was preempted by the ICCTA. The court reasoned that the possession or conflicting use of railroad property can be burdensome even if the railroad is not currently using the contested property. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Dille Road Recycling, LLC" on Justia Law

In March 2015, Jere Hinman hired BrightView Landscape Development, Inc., to design and construct a pool at her residence. BrightView subcontracted with Georgia Gunite and Pool Company, Inc., to install plumbing and spray shotcrete for the pool shell. In November 2015, Hinman contacted BrightView after receiving an unusually high water bill and discovered that the pool was leaking water due to a missing part that was not included in Georgia Gunite’s scope of work. BrightView and Georgia Gunite worked together to address the issue in April 2016. In 2018, Hinman sued BrightView for defective construction of the pool, and BrightView filed a third-party complaint against Georgia Gunite, seeking indemnification based on the subcontractor agreement. Georgia Gunite moved for summary judgment, arguing that BrightView's claim was barred by Tennessee's four-year statute of repose for actions alleging defective improvements to real estate.The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, which granted summary judgment in favor of Georgia Gunite. The court held that, although BrightView's indemnification claim against Georgia Gunite was contractual in nature, it fell within the scope of Tennessee's statute of repose for deficient construction of an improvement to real property because, at its core, it sought to recover damages arising from such deficient construction. The court rejected BrightView's argument that the statute of repose only applies to tort actions. The court also rejected BrightView's argument that the application of the statute of repose in this case would extinguish its claim before it even accrued, noting that this argument is directed at the nature of a statute of repose. The court further held that the repose statute is not mutually exclusive with statutes of limitation. Thus, BrightView's claim against Georgia Gunite was barred because it was not brought within four years after substantial completion of the pool construction. View "Hinman v. ValleyCrest Landscaping Dev." on Justia Law

Michigan’s Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (UUPA) allows the state to take custody—not ownership—of unclaimed property “in trust for the benefit of the rightful owner” After publishing required notices, the state sells or liquidates the unclaimed property within three years of receiving it, unless the owner brings a valid claim, then deposits the proceeds into its general fund, subtracting reasonable administration costs; the owner can no longer reclaim his property, but can still recover the “net proceeds” from its sale. UUPA apermits owners to recover the interest earned on their property and post-liquidation interest if the property accrued interest before the state took custody of it.Two companies delivered O’Connor’s properties—checks collectively worth no more than $350— to the state after he failed to claim them. The state liquidated them. O’Connor filed a claim for compensation. Michigan reimbursed O’Connor for the value of his property, but not any post-liquidation interest. O’Connor alleges that neither the state nor the third-party holders provided him with the statutorily required notices. O’Connor sued Michigan under the Fifth Amendment; Michigan’s Treasurer, and the Administrative Manager of the Unclaimed Property Program, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit held that the officials are entitled to qualified immunity on O’Connor’s taking claims but not his due process claims. The district court correctly dismissed O’Connor’s claims against the state but should not have dismissed them with prejudice. View "O'Connor v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

Built in 1924, the Edenville Dam near Midland, Michigan, has earthen embankments spanning the Tittabawassee and Tobacco Rivers, forming a 2,600-acre reservoir. In 1998, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a license to Wolverine Power to operate the Dam. FERC directed Wolverine to increase the Dam’s spillway capacity. Wolverine became insolvent. In 2003, Boyce’s predecessor purchased Wolverine’s license. Boyce promised to increase spillway capacity but failed to do so and committed numerous other regulatory violations: unauthorized repairs, dredging, and land-clearing; failing to file a public safety plan; and failing to properly monitor water quality. In 2018, FERC revoked Boyce’s license. Jurisdiction over the Dam passed to Michigan’s Department of Environmental, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE), which regulates over 1,000 dams. EGLE inspected the Dam and found it to be in “fair” condition. In May 2020, the Tittabawassee portion of the Dam collapsed following heavy rain, causing another downstream dam to fail. Thousands of residents (including the Allens) were forced to evacuate. Boyce filed for bankruptcy.The Allens sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages and restitution from the United States, arguing that FERC negligently entrusted Boyce with the Dam. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. The United States was entitled to sovereign immunity and did not waive that immunity in the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a–823g. Section 803(c) imposes liability on the licensees who build and manage hydropower projects. View "Allen v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Plaintiffs each purchased real estate in Cleveland, planning to rehabilitate and redevelop the properties. Before those purchases, Cleveland declared the buildings on the properties public nuisances, condemned them, and ordered that they be demolished. Following the purchases, and after the Plaintiffs invested time and resources into renovating the buildings, Cleveland authorized private contractors to demolish them. After the demolition of the buildings, the Plaintiffs sued, arguing that the demolitions violated state laws and federal constitutional provisions. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Each Plaintiff received “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” After their purchases, Cleveland sent “new owner letters” via certified mail both to the property address and to each Plaintiff's statutory agent, including both the notice of condemnation and demolition order. Neither Plaintiff applied for required rehabilitation permits. View "First Floor Living LLC v. City of Cleveland, Ohio" on Justia Law

Fillmore County Park in Genoa Charter Township, Michigan, includes a 15-station “Leopold the Lion Reading Trail” with large signs, telling the story. On a wooded 40-acre property a few miles away, Catholic Healthcare created a prayer trail with 14 “Stations of the Cross.” None of the improvements were visible from outside the property. The Township treated the prayer trail as a church building, for which a “special land use” permit was required. At considerable expense, Catholic Healthcare submitted two unsuccessful applications. The Township demanded the removal of the Stations of the Cross, plus a stone altar and mural.Catholic Healthcare sought a preliminary injunction to restore the Stations of the Cross, altar, and mural. The district court twice denied that request, holding that its free-exercise and statutory claims are unripe. The Sixth Circuit reversed. In land-use cases, claims are ripe when the government has adopted a “definitive position” as to “how the regulations at issue apply to the particular land in question.” Here, the Township has uniformly insisted that Catholic Healthcare obtain a special land-use permit and has twice refused to grant a permit. Those events have “inflicted an actual, concrete injury” because the Township has actually forced them to remove the religious displays. Catholic Healthcare is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim under 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(1), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. View "Catholic Healthcare International Inc. v. Genoa Charter Township, Michigan" on Justia Law