Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Michigan’s Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (UUPA) allows the state to take custody—not ownership—of unclaimed property “in trust for the benefit of the rightful owner” After publishing required notices, the state sells or liquidates the unclaimed property within three years of receiving it, unless the owner brings a valid claim, then deposits the proceeds into its general fund, subtracting reasonable administration costs; the owner can no longer reclaim his property, but can still recover the “net proceeds” from its sale. UUPA apermits owners to recover the interest earned on their property and post-liquidation interest if the property accrued interest before the state took custody of it.Two companies delivered O’Connor’s properties—checks collectively worth no more than $350— to the state after he failed to claim them. The state liquidated them. O’Connor filed a claim for compensation. Michigan reimbursed O’Connor for the value of his property, but not any post-liquidation interest. O’Connor alleges that neither the state nor the third-party holders provided him with the statutorily required notices. O’Connor sued Michigan under the Fifth Amendment; Michigan’s Treasurer, and the Administrative Manager of the Unclaimed Property Program, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit held that the officials are entitled to qualified immunity on O’Connor’s taking claims but not his due process claims. The district court correctly dismissed O’Connor’s claims against the state but should not have dismissed them with prejudice. View "O'Connor v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

Built in 1924, the Edenville Dam near Midland, Michigan, has earthen embankments spanning the Tittabawassee and Tobacco Rivers, forming a 2,600-acre reservoir. In 1998, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a license to Wolverine Power to operate the Dam. FERC directed Wolverine to increase the Dam’s spillway capacity. Wolverine became insolvent. In 2003, Boyce’s predecessor purchased Wolverine’s license. Boyce promised to increase spillway capacity but failed to do so and committed numerous other regulatory violations: unauthorized repairs, dredging, and land-clearing; failing to file a public safety plan; and failing to properly monitor water quality. In 2018, FERC revoked Boyce’s license. Jurisdiction over the Dam passed to Michigan’s Department of Environmental, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE), which regulates over 1,000 dams. EGLE inspected the Dam and found it to be in “fair” condition. In May 2020, the Tittabawassee portion of the Dam collapsed following heavy rain, causing another downstream dam to fail. Thousands of residents (including the Allens) were forced to evacuate. Boyce filed for bankruptcy.The Allens sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages and restitution from the United States, arguing that FERC negligently entrusted Boyce with the Dam. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. The United States was entitled to sovereign immunity and did not waive that immunity in the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a–823g. Section 803(c) imposes liability on the licensees who build and manage hydropower projects. View "Allen v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Plaintiffs each purchased real estate in Cleveland, planning to rehabilitate and redevelop the properties. Before those purchases, Cleveland declared the buildings on the properties public nuisances, condemned them, and ordered that they be demolished. Following the purchases, and after the Plaintiffs invested time and resources into renovating the buildings, Cleveland authorized private contractors to demolish them. After the demolition of the buildings, the Plaintiffs sued, arguing that the demolitions violated state laws and federal constitutional provisions. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Each Plaintiff received “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” After their purchases, Cleveland sent “new owner letters” via certified mail both to the property address and to each Plaintiff's statutory agent, including both the notice of condemnation and demolition order. Neither Plaintiff applied for required rehabilitation permits. View "First Floor Living LLC v. City of Cleveland, Ohio" on Justia Law

Fillmore County Park in Genoa Charter Township, Michigan, includes a 15-station “Leopold the Lion Reading Trail” with large signs, telling the story. On a wooded 40-acre property a few miles away, Catholic Healthcare created a prayer trail with 14 “Stations of the Cross.” None of the improvements were visible from outside the property. The Township treated the prayer trail as a church building, for which a “special land use” permit was required. At considerable expense, Catholic Healthcare submitted two unsuccessful applications. The Township demanded the removal of the Stations of the Cross, plus a stone altar and mural.Catholic Healthcare sought a preliminary injunction to restore the Stations of the Cross, altar, and mural. The district court twice denied that request, holding that its free-exercise and statutory claims are unripe. The Sixth Circuit reversed. In land-use cases, claims are ripe when the government has adopted a “definitive position” as to “how the regulations at issue apply to the particular land in question.” Here, the Township has uniformly insisted that Catholic Healthcare obtain a special land-use permit and has twice refused to grant a permit. Those events have “inflicted an actual, concrete injury” because the Township has actually forced them to remove the religious displays. Catholic Healthcare is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim under 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a)(1), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. View "Catholic Healthcare International Inc. v. Genoa Charter Township, Michigan" on Justia Law

Freed fell behind approximately $1,100 on his property taxes. Thomas, Gratiot County’s treasurer, foreclosed on Freed’s property and sold it at a public auction for $42,000. The County retained the entire proceeds. Freed sued the County and Thomas under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and an unconstitutional excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.Following a remand, the district court granted Freed summary judgment on his Fifth Amendment claim, rejecting Freed’s argument that he was entitled to the fair market value of his property, minus his debt, and holding that Freed was owed just compensation in the amount of the difference between the foreclosure sale and his debt, plus interest from the date of the foreclosure sale. Freed was owed about $40,900 plus interest, $56,800 less than he was seeking. The court also held that Freed’s claims against Thomas were barred by qualified immunity and denied Freed’s subsequent motion for attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Following a public sale, a debtor is entitled to any surplus proceeds from the sale, which represent the value of the equitable title extinguished. Thomas did not violate a right that was clearly established at the time of her alleged misconduct. View "Freed v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Three individuals filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Wayne County has a policy or practice of seizing vehicles and their contents without probable cause, simply because of the vehicle’s location in an area generally associated with crime. Wayne County impounds the vehicles and their contents until the owner pays a redemption fee: $900 for the first seizure, $1,800 for the second, and $2,700 for the third, plus towing and storage fees. The owner's only alternatives are to abandon the vehicle or to wait for prosecutors to decide whether to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings. Before a forfeiture action is brought, there are multiple pretrial conferences involving the owner and prosecutors, without a judge; prosecutors attempt to persuade the owner to pay the fee by pointing out that storage fees accrue daily. Missing just one conference results in automatic forfeiture. It takes at least four months, beyond any previous delays to arrive before a neutral decisionmaker. The seizure proceedings are conducted under Michigan’s Nuisance Abatement statute, the Controlled Substances Act, and the Omnibus Forfeiture Act, which do not protect plaintiffs from the pre-hearing deprivation of their properties.The Sixth Circuit held that Wayne County violated the Constitution when it seized plaintiffs’ personal vehicles—which were vital to their transportation and livelihoods— with no timely process to contest the seizure. Wayne County was required to provide an interim hearing within two weeks to test the probable validity of the deprivation. View "Ingram v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

In 2016, Salansky, the Great Smoky Mountains National Park’s Fire Management Officer, discovered a slow-moving fire covering less than an acre. Due to the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday, most of the Park’s staff were away. Eight days later (November 24), Salansky observed that building a fire line would be impossible. Salansky opted to let the fire burn, using the natural terrain for containment. On November 27, Salansky requested additional firefighting resources. A National Guard helicopter dropped water onto the fire. By evening, the fire had spread to 35-40 acres within Park boundaries. Salansky did not monitor the fire overnight. At 4:05 a.m., the National Weather Service issued a high-wind warning. By 7:30 a.m., Salansky estimated that the fire had grown to 250-500 acres. Burning embers created smaller fires a mile away. People in Gatlinburg observed heavy smoke and ash. A 10:58 a.m. call was the first communication between Park staff and any local official about the fire. Around 5:45 p.m., the Gatlinburg Fire Department received reports of fires within the city. Winds gusted to 87 mph and the fire grew to 5,000 acres. Total evacuation of the Gatlinburg area was ordered. Evacuation efforts were hampered by infrastructure damage. Ultimately, 14 people died, 191 were injured, 2,500 structures were damaged or destroyed, and more than 17,000 acres burned.The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal of “failure to warn” suits under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA). Before filing suit under the FTCA, a claimant must “present” that claim to the agency, 28 U.S.C. 2675(a); the plaintiffs’ forms sufficiently enabled the Department of the Interior to investigate. On remand, to determine whether the claims are barred by the FTCA's discretionary-function exception, the district court should address whether certain publications constitute mandatory directives. View "Abbott v. United States" on Justia Law

International sought permission to erect two two-sided billboards in the City of Troy. These billboards were to be 14 by 48 feet in area and 70 feet in height when mounted; they did not conform to height, size, and setback requirements in the Ordinance. After the City denied its permit application and request for a variance, International sued, citing the First Amendment and arguing that the Ordinance’s variance procedure imposed an invalid prior restraint and that its permit exceptions were content-based restrictions on free speech. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment to the City on International’s prior-restraint claim but remanded for the court to consider whether the Ordinance, with the permit exceptions, survived strict scrutiny.The district court held that the permitting requirements, with the content-based exceptions. did not survive strict scrutiny but that the permit exceptions are severable, leaving intact the Ordinance’s height, size, and setback requirements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. International’s proposed billboards do not satisfy those valid, content-neutral standards, View "International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT) contracted with Jones to repair State Route 141. The project involved 68,615 tons of “graded solid rock” for the new road's bottom layer. To obtain graded solid rock, Jones leased land near the roadway, paying the property owner $75,282. Jones prepared the Site and began pattern blasting the limestone to produce appropriately sized rock pieces, using a “shaker” bucket to allow debris to fall away. Appropriately-sized rocks were hauled to the road site. The Site also served as a waste pit for material from the road repair. After several months, a Federal Mine Safety & Health Administration Inspector inspected the Site, determined that Jones had violated several Administration standards, and issued citations and orders.An ALJ ruled that the Site was a mine subject to the Mine Act, not a “borrow pit,” which is not subject to the Administration’s jurisdiction. On remand, the case was assigned to another ALJ, who indicated that she had read the vacated decision. Jone moved for recusal, citing the Sixth Circuit’s command that Jones receive fresh proceedings. The ALJ denied the motion and held that the Site was a mine, not a borrow pit, based on findings that Jones did not only use the Site on a one-time basis or only intermittently; engaged in milling, sizing, and crushing; and did not use the rock more for bulk fill than for its intrinsic qualities. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision as supported by substantial evidence. View "Jones Brothers, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Administration" on Justia Law

Nashville passed a “sidewalk ordinance.” To obtain a building permit, an owner must grant an easement across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere.In a challenge to the ordinance under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the landowner plaintiffs asked the court to apply the “unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted in 1987 to assess conditions on building permits (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission). Nashville argued that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions, Nashville argued in favor of the application of the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess zoning restrictions in “Penn Central” (1978). The district court granted Nashville summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the landowners. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text, history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative conditions. Nollan’s test should apply to both types, including those imposed by the sidewalk ordinance. View "Knight v. e Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law