Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Richard DeVillier and over 120 other property owners in Texas alleged that the State of Texas had taken their property for stormwater storage without just compensation, in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The state had installed a barrier along a highway median to prevent stormwater from covering the road, which resulted in flooding on the petitioners' land during heavy rainfall. DeVillier argued that the Takings Clause itself authorized him to bring suit, even if the legislature had not affirmatively provided a cause of action.The District Court denied Texas' motion to dismiss the federal inverse-condemnation claim, concluding that a property owner may sue a State directly under the Takings Clause. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not provide a right of action for takings claims against a state.The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found that Texas law provides a cause of action that allows property owners to vindicate their rights under the Takings Clause. Therefore, DeVillier's claims may proceed under Texas' state-law cause of action. The Court did not resolve the question of whether a property owner may sue for just compensation directly under the Takings Clause, as it was not necessary to do so in this case. View "DeVillier v. Texas" on Justia Law

George Sheetz sought to build a small, prefabricated home on his residential parcel of land in El Dorado County, California. However, to obtain a permit, he was required to pay a substantial fee to mitigate local traffic congestion. Sheetz challenged this fee as an unlawful “exaction” of money under the Takings Clause, arguing that the fee amount should be necessary to offset traffic congestion attributable to his specific development. The County’s predetermined fee schedule, Sheetz argued, failed to meet that requirement.The trial court rejected Sheetz’s claim and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The Court of Appeal asserted that the Nollan/Dolan test, which requires permit conditions to have an “essential nexus” to the government’s land-use interest and “rough proportionality” to the development’s impact on the land-use interest, applies only to permit conditions imposed “on an individual and discretionary basis.” Fees imposed on “a broad class of property owners through legislative action,” it said, need not satisfy that test. The California Supreme Court denied review.The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment of the California Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative permit conditions. The Court found no basis in constitutional text, history, or precedent for affording property rights less protection in the hands of legislators than administrators. The Court did not address the parties’ other disputes over the validity of the traffic impact fee, including whether a permit condition imposed on a class of properties must be tailored with the same degree of specificity as a permit condition that targets a particular development. The case was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. View "Sheetz v. El Dorado County" on Justia Law

Tyler's Hennepin County, Minnesota condominium accumulated about $15,000 in unpaid real estate taxes plus interest and penalties. The County seized the condo and sold it for $40,000, keeping the $25,000 excess over Tyler’s tax debt for itself, Minn. Stat. 281.18, 282.07, 282.08. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Tyler’s suit.The Supreme Court reversed. Tyler plausibly alleges that Hennepin County’s retention of the excess value of her home above her debt violated the Takings Clause. Whether the remaining value from a tax sale is property protected under the Takings Clause depends on state law, “traditional property law principles,” historical practice, and Supreme Court precedents. Though state law is an important source of property rights, it cannot “sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests” in assets it wishes to appropriate. The County's use of its power to sell Tyler’s home to recover the unpaid property taxes to confiscate more property than was due effected a “classic taking in which the government directly appropriates private property for its own use.” Supreme Court precedent recognizes that a taxpayer is entitled to any surplus in excess of the debt owed. Minnesota law itself recognizes in other contexts that a property owner is entitled to any surplus in excess of her debt. The Court rejected an argument that Tyler had no property interest in the surplus because she constructively abandoned her home by failing to pay her taxes. View "Tyler v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

Sackett began backfilling an Idaho lot with dirt to build a home. The Environmental Protection Agency informed Sackett that the property contained wetlands and that the backfilling violated the Clean Water Act, which prohibits discharging pollutants into “the waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). The EPA ordered Sackett to restore the site, threatening penalties of over $40,000 per day. The EPA classified the Sacket wetlands as “waters of the United States” because they were near a ditch that fed into a creek, which fed into Priest Lake, a navigable, intrastate lake. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the EPA.The Supreme Court reversed. CWA jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland requires that the adjacent body of water constitutes waters of the United States (a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters) and a continuous surface connection between the wetland and that water, making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”The Court reviewed the history of judicial interpretation of “the waters of the United States” and enforcement by federal agencies, which argued that the significant-nexus test was sufficient to establish jurisdiction over “adjacent” wetlands. Under that test, nearly all waters and wetlands are potentially susceptible to regulation, “putting a staggering array of landowners at risk of criminal prosecution for such mundane activities as moving dirt.” The CWA’s use of “waters” encompasses only relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies, ordinarily called streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes. Wetlands qualify as “waters of the United States” only if “indistinguishable from waters of the United States,” having a continuous surface connection to bodies that are waters of the United States in their own right, with no clear demarcation between waters and wetlands. View "Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Petitioners acquired their properties along the road in 1991 and 2004; in 1962, their predecessors in interest had granted the government an easement for the road. The government moved to dismiss the petitioners' suit under the Quiet Title Act, citing the 12-year limitations period, 28 U.S.C. 2409a(g). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court reversed, characterizing section 2409a(g) as a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule, intended to promote the orderly progress of litigation. Limits on subject-matter jurisdiction have a unique potential to disrupt the orderly course of litigation, so courts should not lightly apply that label to procedures Congress enacted to keep things running smoothly unless traditional tools of statutory construction plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences. Congress’s separation of a filing deadline from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the time bar is not jurisdictional. The Quiet Title Act’s jurisdictional grant is in section 1346(f ), far from 2409a(g), with nothing linking those separate provisions. Section 2409a(g) speaks only to a claim’s timeliness.The Court characterized a case cited by the government as a “textbook drive-by jurisdictional” ruling that “should be accorded no precedential effect” as to whether a limit is jurisdictional. Rejecting other cited cases, the Court stated that it has never definitively interpreted section 2409a(g) as jurisdictional. View "Wilkins v. United States" on Justia Law

Under the Natural Gas Act, to build an interstate pipeline, a natural gas company must obtain from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) a certificate of "public convenience and necessity,” 15 U.S.C. 717f(e). A 1947 amendment, section 717f(h), authorized certificate holders to exercise the federal eminent domain power. FERC granted PennEast a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a 116-mile pipeline from Pennsylvania to New Jersey. Challenges to that authorization remain pending. PennEast sought to exercise the federal eminent domain power to obtain rights-of-way along the pipeline route, including land in which New Jersey asserts a property interest. New Jersey asserted sovereign immunity. The Third Circuit concluded that PennEast was not authorized to condemn New Jersey’s property.The Supreme Court reversed, first holding that New Jersey’s appeal is not a collateral attack on the FERC order. Section 717f(h) authorizes FERC certificate holders to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or states, and is consistent with established federal government practice for the construction of infrastructure, whether by government or through a private company.States may be sued only in limited circumstances: where the state expressly consents; where Congress clearly abrogates the state’s immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment; or if it has implicitly agreed to suit in “the structure of the original Constitution.” The states implicitly consented to private condemnation suits when they ratified the Constitution, including the eminent domain power, which is inextricably intertwined with condemnation authority. Separating the two would diminish the federal eminent domain power, which the states may not do. View "PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned a tenancy-in-common interest in a multi-unit San Francisco residential building. Until 2013, San Francisco accepted only 200 applications annually for conversion of such arrangements into condominium ownership. A new program allowed owners to seek conversion subject to conditions, including that nonoccupant owners had to offer their existing tenants a lifetime lease. The plaintiffs and their co-owners obtained approval for conversion. The city refused the plaintiffs’ subsequent request that the city either excuse them from executing the lifetime lease or compensate them. The plaintiffs’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that the lifetime-lease requirement was an unconstitutional regulatory taking. The district court rejected this claim, citing the Supreme Court’s “Williamson County” holding that certain takings actions are not “ripe” for federal resolution until the plaintiff seeks compensation through state procedures. While an appeal was pending, the Court repudiated that Williamson County requirement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the requirement of “finality.”The Supreme Court vacated. To establish “finality,” a plaintiff need only show that there is no question about how the regulations apply to the land in question. Here, the city’s position is clear: the plaintiffs must execute the lifetime lease or face an “enforcement action.” That position has inflicted a concrete injury. Once the government is committed to a position, the dispute is ripe for judicial resolution. Section 1983 guarantees a federal forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment by state officials. Exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite. While a plaintiff’s failure to properly pursue administrative procedures may render a claim unripe if avenues remain for the government to clarify or change its decision, administrative missteps do not defeat ripeness once the government has adopted its final position. Ordinary finality is sufficient because the Fifth Amendment enjoys “full-fledged constitutional status.” View "Pakdel v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

A California regulation mandates that agricultural employers allow union organizers onto their property for up to three hours per day, 120 days per year. Union organizers sought access to property owned by two California growers, who sought to enjoin enforcement of the access regulation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit.The Supreme Court reversed. California’s access regulation constitutes a per se physical taking and the growers’ complaint states a claim for an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. When the government, rather than appropriating private property for itself or a third party, imposes regulations restricting an owner’s ability to use his own property, courts generally determine whether a taking has occurred by applying the “Penn Central” factors. When the government physically appropriates property, the flexible Penn Central analysis has no place. California’s access regulation appropriates a right to invade the growers’ property and therefore constitutes a per se physical taking. Rather than restraining the growers’ use of their own property, the regulation appropriates for the enjoyment of third parties (union organizers) the owners’ right to exclude. The right to exclude is “a fundamental element of the property right.” The duration of a physical appropriation bears only on the amount of compensation due. The California regulation is not transformed from a physical taking into a use restriction just because the access granted is restricted to union organizers, for a narrow purpose, and for a limited time.The Court distinguished restrictions on how a business generally open to the public may treat individuals on the premises; isolated physical invasions, not undertaken pursuant to a granted right of access; and requirements that property owners cede a right of access as a condition of receiving certain benefits. Government inspection regimes will generally not constitute takings. View "Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid" on Justia Law

Atlantic sought to construct a 604-mile natural gas pipeline from West Virginia to North Carolina, crossing 16 miles of land within the George Washington National Forest. Atlantic secured a special use permit from the U.S. Forest Service, obtaining a right-of-way for a 0.1-mile segment of pipe 600 feet below a portion of the Appalachian National Scenic Trail, which also crosses the National Forest. The Fourth Circuit vacated the permit.The Supreme Court reversed. The Department of the Interior’s assignment of responsibility for the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the Trail land into land within the National Park System that is not eligible for a pipeline lease. The Forest Service had the authority to issue the special use permit.Under 16 U.S.C. 521, the Forest Service has jurisdiction over the National Forest. The National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 244(a), applies to the Appalachian Trail; the Secretary of the Interior has delegated to the National Park System the authority to enter into “rights-of-way” agreements for the Trail. The Leasing Act enables any “appropriate agency head” to grant “[r]ights-of-way through any Federal lands . . . for pipeline purposes,” 30 U.S.C. 185(a), except lands in the National Park System. The National Park System is administered by the Secretary of the Interior, through the National Park Service, 54 U.S.C. 100501. The Forest Service “right-of-way” agreements with the National Park Service for the Appalachian Trail did not convert National Forest “Federal lands” under the Leasing Act into “lands” within the “National Park System.” A right-of-way grant only nonpossessory rights of use. Although the federal government owns all lands involved, a right-of-way between two agencies grants only an easement, not jurisdiction over the land itself. View "United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association" on Justia Law

For nearly a century, the Anaconda Copper Smelter contaminated 300 square miles with arsenic and lead. For 35 years, the EPA has worked with the now-closed smelter’s current owner, Atlantic Richfield, to implement a cleanup plan. Landowners sued Atlantic Richfield in state court for common law nuisance, trespass, and strict liability, seeking restoration damages, which Montana law requires to be spent on property rehabilitation. The landowners’ proposed plan exceeds the measures found necessary to protect human health and the environment by EPA. Montana courts rejected an argument that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, section 113, stripped them of jurisdiction. Section 113 states that no potentially responsible party (PRP) "may undertake any remedial action” at the site without EPA approval and provides federal courts with “exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under” the Act.The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in part. The Act does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over this lawsuit. The common law claims “arise under” Montana law, not under the Act. Section 113(b) deprives state courts of jurisdiction over cases “arising under” the Act while section 113(h) deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over certain “challenges” to remedial actions; section 113(h) does not broaden section 113(b).The Court vacated in part. The landowners are PRPs who need EPA approval to take remedial action. Section 107, the liability section, includes any “owner” of “a facility.” “Facility” is defined to include “any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located.” Because arsenic and lead are hazardous substances that have “come to be located” on the landowners’ properties, the landowners are PRPs. Even “innocent landowners," whose land has been contaminated by another, and who are shielded from liability by section 107(b)(3), may fall within the broad definitions of PRPs in sections 107(a)(1)–(4). Interpreting PRPs to include property owners reflects the objective of a single EPA-led cleanup effort rather than thousands of competing efforts. The EPA policy of not suing innocent owners does not alter the landowners’ status as PRPs. View "Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian" on Justia Law