Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants, Marion Energy and the State of Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, leased and owned oil and gas deposits lying underneath property owned by the KFJ Ranch Partnership. In order to build a road to access those deposits, Appellants sought to condemn a portion of KFJ's land by relying upon a statute that permits the exercise of eminent domain for the construction of roads to facilitate the working of mineral deposits. The district court dismissed Appellants' condemnation action, concluding that the statute did not provide the authority to take land for roads to access oil and gas deposits. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that the phrase "mineral deposits" in the statute was ambiguous, and because all ambiguities in a statute purporting to grant the power of eminent domain are strictly construed against the condemning party, Appellants were not authorized by the statute to condemn KFJ's land.

Sanpete America purchased 110 acres of farmland and water rights from Christian Willardsen pursuant to a land purchase agreement and a warranty deed. After discovering problems with respect to the conveyance of the water right at issue, Sanpete America filed a complaint against Willardsen and Douglas Neeley, Willardsen's attorney, asserting various causes of action and seeking damages. Two successive district court judges issued judgments dismissing Sanpete America's claims against Willardsen and Neeley. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed both judges' conclusion that Sanpete America was entitled to no damages and judgment dismissing Sanpete America's claims, holding (1) Willardsen conveyed his portion of the water right to Sanpete America under a warranty deed, (2) Willardsen breached no covenants in the deed, and (3) Neeley's actions were not the cause of Sanpete America's alleged damages.

This case concerned the application of payments made in connection with a real estate transaction between Kang Park and Marsha Park and Gary Stanford. The district court granted summary judgment to the Parks, determining, as a matter of law, that none of the payments Stanford submitted to the Parks could be credited toward a personal guaranty Stanford had made on the note payable to the Parks. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that no evidence indicated the Parks had actual knowledge that Stanford intended for the past payments to apply to his guaranty and no agreement or contractual provision expressly required the Parks to make such an application. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals applied the wrong test in its holding, and rather, a rule in which payments are credited toward a personal guaranty when the recipient of the payments has a reasonable basis to know the payments were submitted in satisfaction of the guaranty governed the application of payments toward a personal guaranty; and (2) genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment under the rule and the record required further development. Remanded.

Barbara and Steven Selvig, as sellers, and Blockbuster Enterprises, as buyer, entered into a real estate purchase contract for the purchase of a bed and breakfast. The contract specified that the deed to the property would be recorded when Blockbuster paid the full purchase price. Before paying the full purchase price, however, Blockbuster recorded the deed. The sellers sued in district court on several theories of liability. The district court granted Blockbuster's motion to dismiss, dismissing (1) the seller's claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, holding that the sellers had elected their remedy pursuant to an election of remedies provision in the contract by keeping the earnest money deposit; and (2) the seller's unjust enrichment claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in dismissing the seller's contractual claims because the election of remedies provision does not apply to a breach of contract claim out of a wrongful recording of the deed; and (2) the district court correctly dismissed the seller's claim for unjust enrichment because the sale of the property was covered by a written contract.

Defendant Sandy City and Plaintiffs Mark Haik and several others all hold deeds to the same water right. Sandy City recorded a sales agreement for the right in 1977, but did not record the deed until 2004. The Plaintiffs purchased the same water right in 2003, and recorded that deed immediately. The district court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs. The court reasoned that the recorded contract was not sufficient notice to Plaintiffs. The agreement was an executory contract that gave no indication whether the deed to the right was actually delivered. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the district court erred in giving the right to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court found that in some circumstances ârecord noticeâ of an equitable interest in water rights could subvert a claim by another good faith purchaser of the same right, but those circumstances were not present in this case. The Court held that since Plaintiffs were the first to file their deed, they held the water right.

The Oak Lane Homeowners Association (the Association) sought review of the appellate courtâs judgment in favor of Defendants Dennis and Renae Griffin. The previous owners of the Griffinsâ property âhad an understandingâ that the lane in question could only be used with permission. The Griffins had used the lane for ingress and egress for fifteen years. Their neighbors sought to form the Association in order to maintain the lane. When the Association asked the Griffins to join, the Griffins refused, and asserted their intent to continue to use the lane. The Association sought quitclaim deeds from all original owners of the platted lots. After receiving them, the Association placed huge boulders in the edges to prevent the Griffins from accessing their property from the lane. The Association argued that the Defendants did not have a private easement over a private lane. The appellate court found that a private easement was created in favor of the Griffiths because their deed in the subdivisionâs recorded plat showed their property abuts the private lane. On appeal, the Association argued that recognizing the Griffinsâ âeasement by platâ is inconsistent with the state law. The Supreme Court disagreed: â[w]e have repeatedly held that when a property abuts a public roadway, a private easement over that roadway arises in favor of the abutting landowner.â Seeing no reason to distinguish a private lane from a public road, the Court upheld the appellate courtâs grant of summary judgment to the Griffins.