Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was how and when a party acquires title to property under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. This case was based on a boundary dispute between Wayne Hughes and Patricia Hampton-Hughes (collectively, Hugheses) and their neighbor, Q-2, LLC and its predecessors-in-interest (collectively, Q-2). Q-2 brought an action to quiet title to the disputed property under the theory of boundary by acquiescence. The Hugheses counterclaimed, asserting that even if Q-2 had acquired the property through boundary by acquiescence, the Hugheses had reacquired the property by adverse possession. The trial court dismissed the Hugheses’ counterclaim on summary judgment and subsequently quieted title to the property in Q-2. The court of appeals concluded (1) the trial court correctly concluded that Q-2 had obtained title to the property through boundary by acquiescence, but (2) the Hugheses introduced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on their claim of adverse possession. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a party obtains title under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence by operation of law at the time the elements of the doctrine are satisfied. View "Q-2 LLC v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Mind & Motion entered into a real estate purchase contract (REPC) with Celtic Bank to buy a piece of property the Bank had acquired from a developer through foreclosure. The REPC required Celtic Bank to record plats by a certain date for the first phase of development of condominiums on the land and allowed Mind & Motion discretion to extend the recording deadline as necessary to allow the Bank sufficient time to record. Mind & Motion extended the recording deadline once but declined to extend it a second time. Mind & Motion subsequently sued Celtic Bank for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mind & Motion, ruling that the recording provision was a covenant, not a condition. Celtic Bank appealed, arguing that the recording provision was unambiguously a condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the recording provision is a covenant, not a condition; and (2) there is no latent ambiguity in the REPC. View "Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp." on Justia Law

Mind & Motion Utah Investments, LLC entered into a real estate purchase contract (REPC) with Celtic Bank to buy a piece of property the Bank had acquired from a developer through foreclosure. The prior owner and received approval to construct condominium units on the land but had not recorded the plats for the first phase of development. Mind & Motion agreed to purchase the property, but the REPC required the Bank to record the plats by a certain date and allowed Mind & Motion discretion to extend the recording deadline as necessary to allow the Bank enough time to record. Under the REPC, if Mind & Motion extended the deadline, the deadline to complete the transaction would be automatically extended. Mind & Motion extended the recording deadline once but refused to extend it a second time. Mind & Motion subsequently sued Celtic Bank for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Mind & Motion, concluding that the recording provision was unambiguously a covenant, not a condition. Celtic Bank appealed, arguing that the recording provision was unambiguously a condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the recording provision was a covenant, not a condition, and there was no latent ambiguity in the REPC. View "Mind & Motion v. Celtic Bank" on Justia Law

628 Park Avenue, LLC filed a complaint asserting claims for unlawful detainer, breach of a promissory note, breach of lease, and declaratory relief against James Ring and other defendants. A default judgment was entered against Ring. The judgment, however, was nonfinal because claims against other defendants remained pending when it was entered. Because 628 Park Avenue recorded the default judgment it claimed to have acquired a judgment lien. The district court concluded that 628 Park Avenue possessed a valid judgment lien against the property in the amount of the original default judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judgment sustaining a lien under Utah Code 78B-5-202(7) must be a final judgment; and (2) the recorded judgment in this case was insufficient because it merely identified the judgment debtor by name and did not provide sufficient information as required by section 78B-5-202(7)(a)(i). View "Irving Place Assocs. v. 628 Park Ave, LLC" on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) condemned a fifteen-acre parcel owned by Michael Carlson despite the fact that it needed just over one acre for its planned project. At issue in this case was whether Utah Code 72-5-113 authorized UDOT’s condemnation of the excess property and whether the taking failed for lack of a “public use” as required under the Takings Clause of the Utah Constitution or United States Constitution. The Supreme Court agreed with UDOT’s construction of section 113 and granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT without expressly addressing the constitutionality of the taking. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s endorsement of UDOT’s statutory authority to condemn excess property for transportation purposes; but (2) reversed and remanded to allow the district court to determine the constitutionality of UDOT’s condemnation of Carlson’s excess property. View "Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Carlson" on Justia Law

The trustee of the United Effort Plan Trust filed a complaint against the City of Hildale and the Twin City Water Authority (TCWA) (together, Appellants) to compel the subdivision of certain parcels of Trust property located within the City’s boundaries. Because Appellants failed to appear or answer the complaint, the district court entered default judgment against them. Thereafter, Appellants filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment. While the motion was pending, Appellants filed a direct appeal from the default judgment. The district court denied Appellants’ Rule 60(b) motion, and Appellants did not appeal the denial. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed Appellants’ direct appeal from the default judgment, holding that the direct appeal was the incorrect vehicle for relief because it relied exclusively on Rule 60(b) arguments made to the district court in the postjudgment motion and disposed of in the unappealed order. View "Wisan v. City of Hildale" on Justia Law

This action concerned the sale of certain property to Plaintiffs. The property was sold by Robert Rood, who, together with his company Level One Capital Partners, LLC, originated loans funded by Southern Management Corporation Retirement Trust (SMCRT). In 2006, Level One originated a loan to Thomas Gramuglia, which was secured by a trust deed for property Gramuglia owned in Park City. Gramuglia later sold the property to Plaintiffs. At the time of the purchase, Plaintiffs did not know the beneficial interest under the trust deed had been assigned to SMCRT. After SMCRT gave notice of its intent to foreclose on the property, Plaintiffs sued SMCRT. The district court determined (1) the trust deed encumbering the Plaintiffs’ property in Park City was invalid, (2) SMCRT had slandered Plaintiffs’ title, (3) SMCRT was liable for damages, and (4) Plaintiffs were entitled to recover their attorney fees, and a portion of those fees should be trebled. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and the majority of its award of damages; but (2) reversed the court’s grant of treble attorney fees, holding that the court erred when it concluded that Utah Code 57-1-38(3) permits the trebling of attorney fees. View "Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. Ret. Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, homeowners, filed a negligence action against a water conservancy district (the District) after one of its water pipelines broke, resulting in damage to Plaintiffs' home. The district court granted summary judgment for the District, concluding that Plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim because they had failed to designate an expert to testify regarding the applicable standard of care. The court of appeals reversed, finding expert testimony was unnecessary because the District's previous internal decision that the pipeline should be replaced sustained a standard of care calling for replacement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the District's determination recommending replacement did not establish that replacement was required by the standard of care; and (2) Plaintiffs' failure to designate an expert to establish a basis for a duty to replace a pipeline was fatal to their negligence claim. View "Jenkins v. Jordan Valley Water Conservancy Dist." on Justia Law

In 2004, Sellers entered into a real estate purchase contract with Buyers. A portion of the purchase price was to be financed through a third-party purchase money mortgage by Bank. Another portion of the purchase price was to be provided through seller financing, known as vendor purchase money mortgage. Sellers executed a warranty deed conveying the property to Buyers. Buyers executed a deed of trust naming Bank as beneficiary and a trust deed evidencing Seller financing. Bank's trust deed was subsequently assigned to Wells Fargo Bank. After closing, Buyers defaulted on their obligations to both Bank and Sellers. In 2005, Wells Fargo foreclosed on the property. The property was then ultimately conveyed to Defendant. In 2009, Sellers assigned their interest in the outstanding Sellers trust deed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff recorded a notice of default, stating that it had elected to sell the property to satisfy the amount owing. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Defendant had taken the property as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff, as vendor purchase money mortgagee, may have a superior claim of right, but its claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. View "Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias" on Justia Law

Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) initiated an unlawful detainer action against Appellant, claiming ownership of Appellant's home pursuant to a trustee's deed it obtained from ReconTrust, a national bank that conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in its capacity as trustee of the trust deed that Appellant had executed to secure her mortgage. After an immediate occupancy hearing, the district court entered an order of restitution requiring that Appellant vacate her home. At issue on appeal was whether ReconTrust had authority to conduct the foreclosure sale and convey Appellant's home to the FNMA where Utah Code 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 limits the power of sale to trustees who are either members of the Utah State Bar or title insurance companies with an office in Utah. The district court concluded that ReconTrust, as a national bank, was authorized to conduct the sale under federal law and that federal law preempted Utah law. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order of restitution, holding that the relevant Utah statutes were not preempted by federal law, and therefore, a national bank seeking to foreclose real property in Utah must comply with Utah law. Remanded. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Sundquist" on Justia Law