Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Sellers entered into a real estate purchase contract with Buyers. A portion of the purchase price was to be financed through a third-party purchase money mortgage by Bank. Another portion of the purchase price was to be provided through seller financing, known as vendor purchase money mortgage. Sellers executed a warranty deed conveying the property to Buyers. Buyers executed a deed of trust naming Bank as beneficiary and a trust deed evidencing Seller financing. Bank's trust deed was subsequently assigned to Wells Fargo Bank. After closing, Buyers defaulted on their obligations to both Bank and Sellers. In 2005, Wells Fargo foreclosed on the property. The property was then ultimately conveyed to Defendant. In 2009, Sellers assigned their interest in the outstanding Sellers trust deed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff recorded a notice of default, stating that it had elected to sell the property to satisfy the amount owing. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Defendant had taken the property as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff, as vendor purchase money mortgagee, may have a superior claim of right, but its claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. View "Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias" on Justia Law

Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) initiated an unlawful detainer action against Appellant, claiming ownership of Appellant's home pursuant to a trustee's deed it obtained from ReconTrust, a national bank that conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in its capacity as trustee of the trust deed that Appellant had executed to secure her mortgage. After an immediate occupancy hearing, the district court entered an order of restitution requiring that Appellant vacate her home. At issue on appeal was whether ReconTrust had authority to conduct the foreclosure sale and convey Appellant's home to the FNMA where Utah Code 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 limits the power of sale to trustees who are either members of the Utah State Bar or title insurance companies with an office in Utah. The district court concluded that ReconTrust, as a national bank, was authorized to conduct the sale under federal law and that federal law preempted Utah law. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order of restitution, holding that the relevant Utah statutes were not preempted by federal law, and therefore, a national bank seeking to foreclose real property in Utah must comply with Utah law. Remanded. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Sundquist" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners in a development, filed a derivative suit against Defendants, the directors of the non-profit homeowners association that provided road maintenance and other services to the development, alleging that the directors favored their own properties in their allocation of road construction and maintenance funds. Instead of defending the suit on the merits, Plaintiffs appointed an independent committee to evaluate whether maintenance of the derivative suit was in the best interest of the nonprofit corporation pursuant to Utah Code 16-6a-612(4). Based on the committee's report, the district court dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the members of the committee, all of whom owned property allegedly receiving preferential treatment, were "independent" under section 612(4). Remanded to allow the district court to assess whether the directors were independent, applying the definition of independence clarified by the Court in this opinion. View "Hi-Country Prop. Rights Group v. Emmer" on Justia Law

The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake and Sandy (District) held an appurtenant easement that crossed Petitioner's residential property for the purpose of maintaining the Salt Lake Aqueduct. In 2009, Petitioner began making improvements to his backyard. In 2010, the District filed a complaint against Petitioner, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its rights under the easement as well as injunctive relief requiring Petitioner to remove the existing improvements and enjoining him from making any additional improvements. The district court eventually entered default judgment against Petitioner on grounds that he failed to answer the complaint. Petitioner moved to set aside the default judgment, claiming mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The district court denied Petitioner's motion. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's denial of Petitioner's motion, holding (1) the court abused its discretion when it refused to set aside the default judgment without determining whether Petitioner knew that he had been served and was required to file an answer; and (2) Petitioner alleged a meritorious defense. Remanded. View "Metro. Water Dist. of Salt Lake & Sandy v. Sorf" on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) owned a piece of property on land adjacent to property owned by Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a condemnation action, asserting a right to condemn a portion of UDOT's parcel to construct an access road to the development Plaintiff planned to build on its property. The district court granted summary judgment for UDOT, finding that the two parties' uses were incompatible because the detention pond on UDOT's property left no room for Schroeder's proposed road. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the district court's invocation of the more necessary public use doctrine and its refusal to allow an exception under the doctrine of compatible uses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, absent any basis for a compatible use exception in this case, UDOT was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Schroeder Invs., L.C. v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Wolf Mountain and ASC Utah (ASCU) had been litigating their rights and responsibilities regarding development in a resort of several years. In 2011, the jury awarded ASCU $54,437,000 in damages. Wolf Mountain appealed. Meanwhile, in an effort to collect on the judgment, ASCU filed an application for writ of execution, listing Wolf Mountain's real and personal property. The court ordered Wolf Mountain's property to be sold, and after a public sale, ASCU purchased Wolf Mountain's interests in the claim asserted in this litigation. Wolf Mountain did not appeal from the writ of execution or any of the related orders or proceedings. ASCU then moved to dismiss Wolf Mountain's appeal as moot, arguing that because ASCU now owned Wolf Mountain's appellate rights, there was no longer a controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) ASCU did not acquire Wolf Mountain's appellate rights, and therefore, an actual controversy existed; and (2) Wolf Mountain failed to demonstrate that the district court erred or abused its discretion in any way. View "ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C." on Justia Law

In 2006, the Central Utah Water Conservancy District (District) filed an action to condemn six waterfront lots owned by Petitioner. When negotiations reached an impasse on the value of the lots, the District instituted the underlying condemnation proceeding. The jury returned a verdict for Petitioner in the amount of $56,000. Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. Petitioner filed an appeal less than thirty days after the entry of the district court's ruling and order. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal without prejudice based upon lack of jurisdiction, holding that under Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2) and the Supreme Court's decision in Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., Petitioner's appeal was not ripe because it was not taken from a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under Rule 7(f)(2), Petitioner's appeal was premature and that the court of appeals therefore correctly dismissed it without prejudice. View "Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist. v. King" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two agreements: a ground lease agreement between ASC Utah, Inc. (ASCU) and Wolf Mountain Resorts, and a specifically planned area (SPA) development agreement, which had thirty-six signatories, including ASCU, Wolf Mountain, the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership (Osguthorpe). ASCU and Wolf Mountain began litigating claims involving both the ground lease and the SPA agreement. Shortly thereafter, Osguthorpe sued ASCU and Wolf Mountain, alleging that each party had breached a land-lease agreement distinct from the ground lease or the SPA agreement. The district court consolidated Osguthorpe's separate actions into ASCU's litigation. Osguthorpe later moved to compel arbitration on all the claims related to the SPA agreement, including the claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain, to which Osguthrope was not a party. The district court denied Osguthrope's motion. Osguthrope withdrew its SPA claims from the case, leaving for appeal only Osguthrope's motion to compel arbitration of the SPA claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the disputes for which Osguthrope sought to compel arbitration were not subject to the SPA agreement's arbitration provision; and (2) furthermore, as a non-party to the disputes, Osguthrope had no contractual right to compel their arbitration. View "Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C." on Justia Law

In this dispute two companies claimed superior interests in a subdivision property. VCS, Inc. performed work on the subdivision as a general contractor and claimed a valid mechanic's lien on the property. Utah Community Bank (UCB) claimed it acquired an interest in the same property by extending a construction loan, secured by a deed of trust, to the subdivision's owner. VCS sued UCB to vindicate its allegedly superior interest in the property. UCB, in response, asserted that VCS's mechanic's lien was not valid as against UCB's interest because VCS failed to record a timely lis pendens. The district court granted summary judgment for UCB. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) VCS's failure to record a timely lis pendens rendered its mechanic's lien void and unenforceable as against UCB; (2) VCS was not entitled to equitable relief under the doctrine of unjust enrichment because it failed to appropriate exhaust its legal remedies; (3) accordingly, the district court did not err in awarding attorney fees to UCB; and (4) likewise, UCB was entitled to its reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. View "VCS, Inc. v. La Salle Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal resulted from an action in eminent domain in which the Utah Department of Transportation sought to condemn an access point easement on property owned by FPA West Point. FPA's codefendant and lessee, Kmart Corporation, also claimed an interest in the access. Because of the different interests claimed by FPA and Kmart, FPA filed a motion asking the court to order separate just compensation determinations. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court was correct in determining that the values of respective interests in a parcel of condemned property must be individually assessed; (2) the value of respective interests may be individually assessed in either separate or consolidated proceedings; (3) accordingly, the district court has discretion to order separate proceedings in an action involving multiple interest holders in a condemned parcel of property; and (4) because it was unclear whether the district court intended that FPA's and Kmart's interests be assessed through separate or through consolidated proceedings, the case was remanded with instructions to determine whether to order separate or consolidated proceedings in this matter. View "Utah Dep't of Transp. v. FPA West Point, LLC" on Justia Law