Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The lender Cenlar FSB appealed a judgment in favor of the borrowers Laurie and Joseph Malenfant, Jr. in the lender’s second action for a judgment on the note and foreclosure, after the first was dismissed with prejudice. The lender argued that the first dismissal could not be interpreted as vacating the judgment on the note and for foreclosure that the trial court had previously issued in that case. Alternatively, the lender contended that its notice of default in the initial foreclosure action was sufficient to satisfy its notice obligation in connection with its second foreclosure action. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of the first action on the promissory note and complaint for foreclosure did effectively vacate that court’s prior judgment for lender on the note and for foreclosure. Furthermore, the lender was not, on this record, entitled to pursue a second action because it had not taken any steps to reinstate borrower’s monthly payment obligations after lender had accelerated the note. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Cenlar FSB v. Malenfant, Jr." on Justia Law

This case came before the Vermont Supreme Court following the Environmental Division's decision on remand that a rock-crushing operation by North East Materials Group, LLC, (NEMG) was exempt from Act 250 as a preexisting development. The Environmental Division reached the same conclusion in its first decision, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the court used the wrong legal standard in deciding that the rock-crushing operation did not constitute a cognizable physical change to the preexisting development and that one of the main factual findings in support of the decision was clearly erroneous. Appellants, a group on thirteen neighbors to the operation, appealed, arguing that the Environmental Division erred in applying the Supreme Court's instructions on remand. After review a second time, the Supreme Court concluded that, even assuming that crushing operations were part of the preexisting quarrying development, findings on the location and volume of the crushing operations were too limited to support a conclusion that the present operations did not constitute a cognizable change to the existing development. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re North East Materials Group LLC Act 250 JO #5-21" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a decision of the environmental division of the superior court affirming several permits issued to appellee Costco Wholesale Corporation for the expansion of its existing retail store and the addition of an adjacent six-pump gasoline station in the Town of Colchester. Appellants R.L. Vallee, Inc. and Timberlake Associates LLP owned retail gasoline-service facilities located near the planned development. Appellant Vallee argued the trial court erred in: (1) determining that Costco’s proposed traffic-mitigation measures were sufficient for issuance of an Act 250 permit; (2) making findings concerning the impact of an underground stormwater outlet pipe, and with respect to which the court limited cross examination by Vallee’s counsel; (3) concluding that the project would not adversely affect a Class 2 wetland for issuance of an individual wetland permit; and (4) excluding testimony and a related exhibit prepared by appellant Vallee’s wetland consultant. Appellant Timberlake argued that the trial court erred in relying on a presumption with respect to the project’s impact on water pollution and waste disposal under Act 250. The Supreme Court found no error in the environmental division's order and affirmed it. View "In re Costco Stormwater Dishcharge Permit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-landowner Donald Gould appealed three superior court rulings pertaining to the Town of Monkton’s new zoning regulations. Landowner alleged that the new zoning regulations under a "UPD" or "Unified Planning Document" interfered with his long-held development plans and reduced the potential economic return on his property in Monkton. On appeal of the superior court's rulings, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by finding: (1) that it had no jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate the new zoning regulations; (2) that landowner had no due process interest in the process by which zoning regulations were adopted; and (3) that landowner had no due process property interest in the application of the previous zoning regulations. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gould v. Town of Monkton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-lender Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (as trustee) appealed a superior court decision to grant defendant-borrower Kevin Pinette's motion to dismiss. The lender tried to foreclose on property of Pinette, but the superior court dismissed its claims on foreclosure, the unpaid balance on a promissory note, and a deficiency judgment on the ground that they were barred by claim preclusion, as lender had previously instituted an identical action against borrower in 2013, which had been dismissed for failure to prosecute. On appeal, the lender argued that because the 2013 action did not actually adjudge the enforceability of the note and mortgage, the dismissal did not have preclusive effect. Further, lender urged the Vermont Supreme Court to hold that in the mortgage foreclosure context, dismissals with prejudice did not bar subsequent actions based upon new defaults occurring after dismissal of the prior action. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Deutsche Bank v. Pinette" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether, and under what circumstances, a court may decline on equitable grounds to enforce a provision in a long-term ground lease giving the lessor the right to terminate the lease and reenter the premises in the event of a default. Plaintiff Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC (MBP) sued defendant Mallets Bay Homeowner’s Association seeking to void a multi-year ground lease for property abutting Lake Champlain on account of alleged breaches of the covenants in that agreement. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the Association had violated its obligations under the lease by failing to reasonably maintain the embankments abutting Lake Champlain to protect them from erosion. However, the court declined to enforce the forfeiture clause in the lease against the Association, and awarded MBP damages to enable it to undertake the necessary restoration and bank protection. The Association appealed the ruling that it breached the lease, and MBP appealed the trial court’s award of damages in lieu of forfeiture. After review of the particular facts of this matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the Association breached the lease, but reversed its refusals to declare termination of the lease and to issue a writ of possession to MBP. The case was remanded for reconsideration of MBP’s remedy. View "Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC v. Mallets Bay Homeowner's Assn." on Justia Law

Applicants Cynthia and Charles Burns wanted to make modifications to a two-unit residential building they owned in Burlington. A group of nineteen Burlington residents (neighbors) appealed a Superior Court, Environmental Division decision declining to reach the merits of neighbors’ claim that applicants converted their home into a duplex without a zoning permit on the grounds that the challenge was precluded by a prior decision under 24 V.S.A. 4472(d) or to consider whether a permit was required for applicants’ other modifications. On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, neighbors argued: (1) that their challenge was not precluded under section 4472(d) because the prior decision had not been rendered by the Burlington Zoning Administrator as the statute requires; (2) that preventing an appeal without affording notice and opportunity to be heard violated their due process rights; and (3) that they were entitled to a determination by the Environmental Division of whether applicants’ other modifications violated the zoning ordinance because they were done without a permit. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Burns Two-Unit Residential Building (Long, et al. Appellants)" on Justia Law

Defendant Dylan Stinson appealed a judgment finding him liable to plaintiffs Kevin and Linda Flanagan for damage to their vacation home from a fire started in an outdoor fireplace on their deck by a group of teenagers who were there without their permission. Stinson contended that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to find him liable for the damage under a concerted-action theory; (2) it was improper for the trial court to admit and rely on evidence of the actual cash value of the lost personal property; and (3) the pre and postjudgment interest rate awarded by the trial court was unconstitutional under the U.S. and Vermont Constitutions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Concord General Mutual Insurance Company v. Gritman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Matthew Burgess appealed decisions of the superior court’s civil division which dismissed certain defendants and granting summary judgment to another defendant with respect to plaintiff’s claim that he was entitled to either a tax collector’s deed conveying him property he redeemed from foreclosure or damages compensating him for not being conveyed the deed. Plaintiff’s parents, John and Virginia Burgess, mortgaged property located in defendant Town of Morristown through defendant Lamoille Housing Partnership, Inc. (LHP), a nonprofit corporation that assisted people in finding affordable housing. The Burgesses purchased the property through LHP’s Home Land Program, by which ownership of the underlying land was severed from ownership of the house in which the Burgesses resided. Under the arrangement, a warranty deed from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Rural Development conveyed the land and improvements to the Burgesses, who granted a mortgage deed to the USDA Rural Development encumbering both the land and improvements. The Burgesses then conveyed the land to LHP, retaining only the title to the improvements. LHP and the Burgesses then entered into a ground lease granting the Burgesses a leasehold interest in the land for a ninety-nine-year term subject to certain terms and conditions, including that the Burgesses pay the property taxes on the entire property. The Burgesses later disputed their obligation to pay property taxes, which ultimately resulted in their son attempting to redeem the property through foreclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court: "a simple review of the governing statutes reveals that redemption of property sold at a tax sale does not entitle the redeeming party to a collector’s deed." View "Burgess v. Lamoille Housing Partnership" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a struggle Vermont towns have had with taxing parcels of land that lie in more than one tax district. Taxpayer owned three units in a condominium community that was in both the Town of Sudbury and its neighbor, Hubbardton. Taxpayer objected to Sudbury’s tax assessment of the portion within its boundaries, arguing that the trial court erred in upholding: (1) the state law through which Sudbury made its tax assessment; (2) Sudbury’s valuation of the portion within its boundaries; and (3) Sudbury’s method of apportioning the tax burden among the owners of the condominium community. Finding no error to any of these issues, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Adams v. Town of Sudbury" on Justia Law