Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The parties to this appeal were co-lessees in a thirty-year ground lease for a ten-acre parcel of land owned by Star Meadows Farm, Inc. and located in Walden. The parties constructed improvements on the land and shared the parcel as unmarried cohabitants prior to the events that gave rise to this action. Upon termination of their relationship, plaintiff Karen Wynkoop sought a declaratory judgment to partition the property and compensation for ouster. Defendant Gerard Stratthaus appealed the trial court’s property division and compensation to plaintiff. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed with respect to the determination that partition of the leasehold was authorized by law, that plaintiff should have received credit in determining her share of the value of the property for her services as general contractor of the joint construction project, and that plaintiff was ousted by defendant from the property. The judgment was reversed and remanded for the trial court to correct errors in its final calculation of the percentage share of the value of the property held by each party consistent with this opinion and is remanded for the court to determine the value of the property and the appropriate partition remedy. View "Wynkoop v. Stratthaus" on Justia Law

The Town of Underhill appealed a trial court order that affirmed a decision of the County Road Commissioners requiring the Town to maintain a segment of Town Highway 26 (TH 26), a Class 4 highway. TH 26 has existed, in some form, for nearly 150 years. In 2001, the Town sought to reclassify a segment of TH 26 between Irish Settlement Road and Pleasant Valley Road as a legal trail, and the remainder of the roadway as a Class 4 highway. Following protracted litigation, these changes became effective in June 2010, and TH 26 became part of the Town’s six miles of Class 4 highways. Prior to the reclassification of TH 26, the Town performed periodic maintenance and repair work to both the roadway and the twenty-two culverts that were installed along and under TH 26 over the past thirty years. Although the ditches along TH 26 do not appear to have been maintained since 2010, the Town has continued to do some work, primarily the addition of base material to the roadway. Appellees David Demarest, Jeffrey Moulton, and Jonathan Fuller owned property on TH 26 in the Town of Underhill. Appellees Fuller and Demarest resided at their properties full time, while two additional residents along the road were part-time residents. In 2012, appellees filed a notice of insufficiency pursuant to 19 V.S.A. 971 requesting maintenance of TH 26, which had been largely deferred following the roadway reclassification. The Town denied appellees’ allegations, asserting that TH 26 was being maintained to the extent required by the necessity of the Town, the public good, and the convenience of the inhabitants of the Town. Appellees then brought an action for the appointment of County Road Commissioners pursuant to 19 V.S.A. 971 et seq. to compel the Town to undertake repairs of TH 26. Specifically, appellees sought repairs and maintenance to drainage, culverts, and the road surface, so as to make it reasonably safe and accessible for appellees’ use as residents of the Town. The Town contended on appeal that the trial court misconstrued and incorrectly applied the statutory provisions for the maintenance of Class 4 roads and erroneously established its own maintenance standard. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Town and reversed. View "Demarest v. Town of Underhill" on Justia Law

Defendants-counterclaimants Jeanmarie Leonard and Carol Sayour appealed the grant of summary judgment on their counterclaims in favor of plaintiff Jennifer Weinstein and third-party defendants, Lloyd Weinstein, plaintiff’s husband, and his law firm, The Weinstein Group, P.C. This case started in an application for a permit to construct a barn made by defendants in May 2012. Defendants received a zoning permit from Manchester’s zoning administrator allowing them to construct a barn on Lot #10. Pursuant to the Declaration for Rocking Stone Farm, defendants received a waiver from the Homeowner’s Association. Plaintiff appealed the permit to the Manchester Development Review Board (the “DRB”). The DRB affirmed the grant of the permit. Defendant Leonard and her husband were walking along Lot #10 with a landscape contractor when plaintiff began yelling at them from her upstairs window. Plaintiff then left her home and entered Lot #10, accompanied by a “very large dog.” Despite being asked to leave, she physically confronted the Leonards, who eventually left the lot. Two days later, plaintiff filed an appeal of the DRB’s decision to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court. Plaintiff, a trained attorney, initially represented herself, but Mr. Weinstein and his law firm, The Weinstein Group, P.C., entered an appearance as counsel for her. Both the Association and counsel for defendants advised plaintiff by letter that her opposition to the barn permit constituted a violation of the Non-Interference Clause of the Declaration, which provided that each owner of a lot in Rocking Stone Farm agreed “not [to] take any action to contest or interfere with any development in the Community so long as such development is consistent with the Land Use Approvals.” The Environmental Division rendered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff also filed suit against defendants in superior court with a ten-count complaint, alleging, among other things, that the Declaration had been breached by defendants’ construction of the barn. Defendants filed counterclaims against plaintiff for trespass, civil assault, breach of contract, tortious invasion of privacy, as well as abuse of process and third-party claims against Mr. Weinstein and his law firm for abuse of process and breach of contract. Finding no reason to disturb the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as it did in plaintiff’s favor, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weinstein v. Leonard" on Justia Law

Defendant-landlords appealed a jury verdict and post-judgment order involving warranty-of-habitability and consumer-protection claims. Landlords William and Susan O’Brien purchased the subject property in the 1980s, which included a two-story house and brick building (referred to as the creamery) with a common wall to the rear of the house. In December 2002, following foreclosure proceedings on their home, plaintiff-tenants, Timothy and Penny Terry, along with their two children, accepted landlords’ offer to occupy the house rent-free for a short period. After their first year in the house, tenants began paying rent. There was no written rental agreement, but from at least December 2005, six years before tenants filed this lawsuit, there was an oral agreement to pay monthly rent in an amount that varied over the years. Eventually, the parties’ relationship deteriorated. In March 2005, Burlington Code Enforcement (BCE) inspected the house and cited landlords for multiple problems that required repair. A follow-up inspection in January 2006 confirmed that most of the repairs had been completed. BCE inspected the property again later in 2006 and found additional items that required repair, most of which were completed soon thereafter. In 2008, BCE performed several more inspections and issued notices of violations, many of which concerned the creamery. In May 2008, Vermont Gas inspected the house’s furnace and determined that it needed to be repaired or replaced because it was in extremely poor condition. In November 2008, landlords had space heater installed on the first floor of the house, but it was insufficient to heat the second floor. As a result, tenants began using space heaters on the second floor at night. In late 2008, a fire broke out in the attic of the house above one of the bedrooms. The state fire investigator determined that the fire had begun at an electrical splice located in the attic. The investigator also noted tenants’ use of multiple extension cords and supplemental wiring due to the insufficient number of functioning outlets. The investigator concluded that the fire was caused by a combination of the load on the older electrical system, moisture from the cellulose insulation, and the inability of the knob-and-tube wiring to shed heat due to it being buried in the insulation. In 2011, the Terrys filed suit against landlords, alleging: (1) breach of the oral rental agreement; (2) breach of the warranty of habitability; (3) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment (with respect to public health hazards); (4) violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA); (5) negligence; and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Tenants sought, among other things, compensatory, consequential, punitive, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. Landlords counterclaimed for unpaid rent. Landlords’ arguments on appeal of the jury verdict were: (1) the trial court’s jury instructions misled the jury on tenants’ habitability and CPA claims, resulting in prejudice to landlords; (2) the court erred by vacating the jury’s unpaid-rent award in its post-judgment order; and (3) the court abused its discretion by awarding tenants attorney’s fees on their habitability and CPA claims and by denying landlords’ attorney’s fees based on tenants’ contributory negligence. The Supreme Court found that the trial court’s CPA instruction was overly broad and prejudicial to the landlords, and therefore the verdict was vacated with respect to the CPA claim. Absent their habitability claim, there was no basis for tenants to withhold rent. Therefore, the jury’s verdict regarding unpaid rent must stand. The Court also vacated the award of attorney fees, and remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Terry v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a superior court decision to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant Caroline Marini on plaintiff EverBank’s complaint for foreclosure on a mortgage that Caroline signed in 2009 together with her co-defendant and then-husband Gary Marini. In ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, following a hearing, the trial court concluded that Caroline was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on EverBank’s foreclosure complaint because the undisputed material facts established that Caroline signed the mortgage under the threat of physical violence from Gary and thus the mortgage was void as to her. The trial court also concluded that regardless of whether the mortgage was void as to Caroline, EverBank was not a bona fide purchaser. EverBank subsequently moved to alter or amend the judgment on the ground that the grant of summary judgment as to Caroline unjustly enriched her. The trial court denied the motion, explaining that EverBank had not raised the issue of unjust enrichment in response to Caroline’s cross-motion for summary judgment. EverBank appealed both decisions. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision granting summary judgment in favor of Caroline on the issue of whether the mortgage was void, and directed the trial court to enter judgment for EverBank on that issue. The Court remanded for trial the issues of whether the mortgage was voidable and, if so, whether it was enforceable because it was ratified by Caroline, but affirmed the trial court’s decision that the bona fide purchaser doctrine was not available to EverBank. View "Everbank v. Marini" on Justia Law

Developer Vermont North Properties (VNP) appealed from the trial court’s decision in favor of the Village of Derby Center. The dispute centered on VNP’s rights, if any, to water and sewer allocations from the systems managed by the Village in connection with a VNP construction project. The trial court determined that: the Village could charge fees for reserved water and sewer allocations; the Village’s fees were reasonable; the Village could revoke VNP’s reserved allocations for nonpayment of fees; and the Village was not estopped from denying water and sewer connections to VNP on account of nonpayment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that VNP had enforceable reserved water and sewer allocations, but the Village could charge equitable fees for these reservations and may revoke the reservations for nonpayment. Furthermore, the Court concluded that VNP failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the unreasonableness of the Village’s reservation fees, and on that basis the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Vermont North Properties v. Village of Derby Center" on Justia Law

In February 2005, tenants Brian Ayer and Debbie Martell began leasing a single-family home from landlord-plaintiff JW, LLC. Tenants resided in the home with their children and animals, including dogs and chickens. At the time tenants moved in, the house was relatively new and in excellent condition. The monthly rent was $1300. Tenants paid no rent in March and April 2012. They paid rent in May 2012 plus $300 in arrears, but made no further rental payments. Landlord filed for eviction in July 2012. The court issued a rent escrow order. Tenants made only a partial rental payment in August, and the court issued an order for a writ of possession. The writ issued on August 10, 2012 and was served ten days later. The writ stated that tenants had to vacate the premises by midnight on September 6, 2012. On the return of service, the sheriff noted that he had explained the writ and tenants had no questions, and, although tenants refused to take the paperwork, the sheriff left it at the residence. Landlord denied tenant further access to the residence to claim property. Landlord also denied tenant access to the items that landlord had retained. Landlord claimed that the justification for retaining tenants’ personal property was based on two statutes. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the status of tenants’ personal property, which landlord cleared from the leased premises at the time a writ of possession was executed. The trial court concluded that landlord did not rightfully have possession of the property and ordered landlord to return it to tenant. Landlord argued that pursuant to statute he was entitled to retain the property, and, in the alternative, the court erred in denying his request for a writ of attachment for the property. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court that 12 V.S.A. 4854a only allowed a landlord who has evicted a tenant to dispose of trash without the threat of liability, and for other property requires a landlord "to make reasonable efforts to find out what tenant plans to do and to store the property for 60 days." Because the dwelling unit was not abandoned and the tenant did not vacate, 9 V.S.A. 4462 did not apply, and there was no statutory basis to require a landlord to store property remaining in a dwelling unit after an eviction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "JW, LLC v. Ayer and Martell" on Justia Law

Appellant-taxpayer Elaine Hoiska appealed the Vermont State Appraiser’s valuation of her property in the Town of East Montpelier. She argued that the appraisal incorrectly treated her property as comprising two contiguous lots under common ownership, and accordingly assigns a higher value to the property than if it were a single developable lot. More specifically, appellant took issue with the appraiser’s legal conclusion that she legally subdivided the land in 1978 by procuring a survey, not filed in the land records, that includes a line purportedly dividing the lot into two parcels. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the state appraiser’s findings did not support the legal conclusion that appellant effectively subdivided her property in 1978, and reversed. View "Hoiska v. Town of East Montpelier" on Justia Law

Landowners Owen and Katherine Beauchesne appealed various proceedings involving their complaints challenging the operation of Hale Mountain Fish and Game Club. Here, they appealed the Environmental Division of the superior court's judgment that Hale Mountain was entitled to reissuance of a zoning permit for certain enumerated improvements on its property once it received site plan approval from the Town of Shaftsbury Development Review Board. Based primarily on principles of preservation and res judicata, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "In re Hale Mountain Fish & Game Club" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs James and Elise Brault appealed a trial court's order granting judgment to defendant Jeanne Welch in a dispute over a right-of-way. The deed in question purported to convey "a right of way five feet wide leading to the lake along the existing block wall and southerly thereof." The court found this language unambiguous. Its plain meaning was that the right-of-way was located on the south side of the block wall. The court explained that the words "southerly thereof" modified the term right-of-way, and it found this interpretation strongly reinforced by the word "thereof," which meant "of that" or "concerning that." In arguing that the right-of-way had to be located on the northern side of the block wall, the Braults asserted that the words "southerly thereof" modified the words "the existing block wall," that is, the block wall was "southerly" of the right of way. The court found this to be an unreasonable interpretation of the deed language, and one that was inconsistent with how English was spoken and read. The Braults maintained that language in the original deed from the Griffiths to their son and daughter-in-law, "southerly thereof" must mean that the right-of-way was actually northerly of the block wall, primarily because a location northerly of the wall avoided any encroachment over the property line with the neighboring lot. The difficulty with the Braults' argument, the court explained, was that it violated the parol evidence rule. The court found that the question of the circumstances that might have produced the disputed provision in the deed also suffered from a shortage of evidence. Because the exact dimensions of the Welch lot were not established, the court found that it was not known whether the block wall marked the exact boundary on the south side of the lot. Nor could the court discern what circumstances led to the use of the word "southerly thereof" due to "a shortage of evidence." The court concluded that the Braults failed to meet their burden of proof, and it entered judgment in Welch's favor. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Braults maintained that the trial court should have found the description of the right-of-way to be ambiguous because it was a simple scrivener's error that misstated which side of the wall the easement is on. Finding no error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Brault v. Welch" on Justia Law