Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose following a fire that destroyed a commercial building in Rutland in 2010. Plaintiff Johnathan Lasek leased the northern half of the building and used the space as a workshop for his house-staining business. He stored staining products and other equipment and constructed a business office in the northeastern corner of the building. The southwestern corner of the building contained a fully enclosed room that was occupied by another commercial tenant, Vermont Vapor Inc. (VVI). The remainder of the building was used by landlord Downing Properties, LLC, as storage for ATVs, motorcycles, and snowmobiles. VVI used its space as a laboratory for mixing the liquid filler for electronic cigarettes. VVI owner Adam Tredwell and his father Warren altered the room to Adam's specificationsm, adding sheetrock and other materials to create a “clean room.” He also installed an eight-inch fan on the south wall of the laboratory that vented to the outside of the building. An industrial space heater was suspended from the rafters of the warehouse, above the ceiling of the laboratory. The Tredwells connected the heater to a propane tank so that they could heat the space in the winter months. Warren was the last person in the laboratory the night before the fire. When firefighters arrived shortly after the fire was reported, the northwest corner of the building (plaintiff's corner) had a large hole in the roof and was heavily engulfed in flames. VVI's corner was not on fire at that time. Plaintiff sued VVI for negligence and strict liability, alleging that VVI had caused the fire by mishandling liquid nicotine. He also sued landlord for breach of the implied warranty of suitability for commercial use, negligence, breach of the duty to warn, and unjust enrichment. After plaintiff's presentation of his case, the trial court granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law. This appeal followed. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred: (1) in excluding the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness on causation; (2) in granting defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law; (3) in excluding an eyewitness's statements to police; (4) by denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial; (5) by awarding all deposition costs to defendants; and (6) in refusing to disqualify counsel for defendant-landlord. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects, with the exception of the award of deposition costs. View "Lasek v. Vermont Vapor, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2002, defendant Richard Hardie borrowed money from Brattleboro Savings & Loan Association in order to purchase a vacation home in Weathersfield. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the property and included a "second home rider" clause, asserting that the property was not a primary residence. Hardie was married to intervenor-appellee Lisa Mangini at the time, but was the sole owner of the property, and Mangini did not sign either the promissory note or the mortgage. Hardie twice refinanced the property without Mangini's participation, both with second home riders. By 2007, Hardie and Mangini's marriage was deteriorating. Mangini left the couple's New Jersey home and moved into the Weathersfield property. In 2008, Mangini filed for divorce in Vermont. In her divorce filing, Mangini claimed that the property had become her primary residence as of May 2007. Also in the divorce filing, Mangini requested "an award of the Weathersfield home and the adjoining land either without any encumbrances, or, in the alternative, that [Hardie] be responsible for paying off and releasing the mortgage[] to [Brattleboro Savings]." While Mangini was occupying the property and the divorce was pending, Hardie refinanced the mortgage on the Weathersfield property. The 2008 refinancing was completed without Mangini's participation, and Hardie again claimed that the property was a second home. In 2011, Brattleboro Savings commenced a foreclosure action on the property, naming only Hardie as a defendant. Despite not being named in the foreclosure case, Mangini filed an answer asserting an affirmative defense that she had established a homestead interest in the property prior to the 2008 mortgage, and that therefore the 2008 mortgage was "inoperative to convey" her homestead interest. Brattleboro Savings filed two motions for summary judgment, one requesting a foreclosure judgment against Hardie and the second seeking judgment against Mangini on her homestead claim. Mangini filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, detailing for the first time her claim that she had acquired an equitable interest in the property by her divorce filing. Brattleboro Savings appealed a superior court's decision denying its motions for summary judgment and granting Mangini's cross-motion for summary judgment, finding that Mangini held title to the Weathersfield property free and clear of a mortgage to plaintiff. The superior court ruled that the mortgage was inoperative because Hardie, mortgaged the property without the participation of Mangini in violation of 27 V.S.A. section 141(a). Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of Mangini's motion for summary judgment and the denial of Brattleboro Saving's motions for summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brattleboro Savings & Loan Assn. v. Hardie, et al." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case stemmed from a dispute over title to an old railroad bed adjacent to defendants' property that plaintiff purchased with the goal of creating a public recreational trail. Defendants challenged the trial court's determination that plaintiff acquired a valid fee simple interest in the property, asserting that title either reverted to them when the railroad abandoned the line or vested in them through adverse possession. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determination. View "Old Railroad Bed, LLC v. Marcus, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants Amherst Realty, LLC, Richard Madowitz, and the personal representatives of the Estate of Douglas Kohl appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment to The Woods at Killington Owners’ Association on Amherst Realty’s claim of breach of contract based on the Association’s alleged interference with its development rights at The Woods at Killington. The Association cross-appealed the superior court’s decision granting summary judgment to Amherst Realty on the Association’s consumer fraud counterclaim. This controversy the center of this case concerned the consequences of the attempt and ultimate failure to build 40 units at The Woods. But finding no reason to reverse the superior court on either parties' claims, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Amherst Realty, LLC v. The Woods at Killington Owners Association, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellee taxpayer Trevor Jenkins owned and lived on property in the Town of Milton. He failed to pay property taxes for the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 tax years. The Town mailed him three delinquent tax notices, in June 2008, June 2009, and January 2010, respectively, advising him to take additional steps to avoid a tax sale. The notices were sent to taxpayer by first-class mail. He denied receiving them, and the notices were not returned to the Town. In 2010, a notice of tax sale was sent via registered mail, return receipt requested. Nearly two weeks before the tax sale, the notice sent to taxpayer by registered mail was returned to the Town’s attorney unclaimed after two attempts at delivery. The Town proceeded with the sale and Loren and Kathryn Hogaboom purchased taxpayer’s property at auction. On the day following the tax sale, the Town’s attorney sent a letter by first-class mail informing taxpayer that his property had been sold in a tax sale, he had one year from the date of sale to redeem the property, and interest would accrue on the purchase amount. This letter was not returned to the Town’s attorney. Taxpayer did not redeem the property during the one-year period, and the Town issued a deed to the purchasers. Purchasers filed a complaint for ejectment in 2011, seeking a writ of possession for the property. Taxpayer admitted his failure to pay taxes but denied ever having received notice of the tax sale. He filed a counterclaim against purchasers and a third-party complaint against the Town, seeking a declaratory judgment setting aside the tax sale as void. Purchasers and the Town both filed motions for summary judgment, contending that notice to taxpayer satisfied the requirements of due process. The Superior Court concluded taxpayer's due process rights were violated because of the undelivered notices. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hogaboom v. Jenkins v. Town of Milton" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for unlawful trespass. Green Mountain Power Corporation (GMP) is an electric utility that operates several wind-power sites throughout Vermont. Construction required cutting trees, excavating, and blasting rock to produce a "crane road" on which the turbines could be erected by crane. Because a portion of the crane road would be within 100 feet of the GMP's leased property's boundary line, some blast safety zones actually extended into neighboring land owned by Donald and Shirley Nelson, who strongly opposed the project. The Nelsons allowed a group to protest the wind-power site by setting up camp on the portion of the Nelsons' land that fell within a blast safety zone. This prompted GMP and its blasting subcontractor to increase their safety measures, risking a delay of construction of more than five weeks and threatening GMP's eligibility for the federal tax credits. In Fall 2011, GMP initiated a civil suit against the Nelsons for nuisance and interference with contract. While the suit was pending, Defendants passed through an existing property line and entered a portion of the crane-road construction site located on land disputed by the Nelsons and GMP. GMP halted construction, and a representative asked defendants to leave. Although aware of the boundary dispute, defendants refused to leave, claiming permission from the Nelsons, who they maintained owned the disputed land. GMP then contacted local police, who arrived at the scene and asked defendants to leave. Defendants again refused and were arrested. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not dismissing the case in the interests of justice. View "Vermont v. Gillard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janet Knutsen appealed a superior court decision to deny her motion for summary judgment and and for granting defendant Vermont Association of Realtors, Inc.'s (VAR) motion for summary judgment on her consumer fraud claim arising out of her purchase of a home in Moretown. Plaintiff argued that VAR's form purchase and sale agreement, which was used in her real estate purchase (to which VAR was not a party) violated the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) in that two provisions of the form were unfair and deceptive, and that she was therefore entitled to damages under section 2461(b) of the CFA. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly held that 'VAR's sole connection to this case was its drafting of the template clauses that [plaintiff] and her buyer's broker used for the purchase of the house, and that could not support a consumer fraud claim. View "Knutsen v. Dion" on Justia Law

The issue before the court in this case arose from a proposed housing development in West Woodstock. In a prior case involving this development, the Supreme Court affirmed permits for the project granted by the town development review board and the district environmental commission and affirmed by the environmental division of the superior court. In this appeal, brought by the owners of abutting properties to the land in question, more narrow questions related to easements and other property rights were brought before the court. After review of the trial court record and the arguments presented by the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Roy v. Woodstock Community Trust, Inc." on Justia Law

Taxpayer Brownington Center Church of Brownington, Vermont (now known as New Hope Bible Church and Ministries, Inc.) (the Church)), appealed a Superior Court determination that certain land and buildings owned by the Church were not exempt from real estate taxes for the tax year commencing April 1, 2009 under 32 V.S.A. 3832(2). The parties did not dispute that the property was dedicated for pious use and that it is owned and operated by the Church as a nonprofit organization. The issue was whether the property was excluded from the pious-use exemption of section 3802(4) by the language in section 3832(2). The Church argued that the property qualified for exemption, primarily because everything that occurred on the property facilitated its religious ministry and that “worship and service of the Believer in Christ” takes place everywhere on the premises. Under this belief, the Church maintains that the steel equipment building, the cabins, kitchen and the tent, are all church edifices. It defines “church edifice” to be a “structure or facility that is used exclusively or primarily to propagate a religious message to persons who receive that message for a worshipful purpose.” It contended that an overnight summer camp for religious purposes transformed the entire property into a place of worship and education. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Brownington Center Church v. Town of Irasburg" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Peter and Nicole Dernier appealed the dismissal of their action for: (1) a declaratory judgment that defendant U.S. Bank National Association could not enforce the mortgage and promissory note for the debt associated with plaintiffs' purchase of their house based on irregularities and fraud in the transfer of both instruments; (2) a declaration that U.S. Bank has violated Vermont's Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) by asserting its right to enforce the mortgage and note; and (3) attorney's fees and costs under the CFA. They also appealed the trial court's failure to enter a default judgment against defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). Plaintiffs fell behind on their mortgage, and brought suit against two parties: Mortgage Network, Inc. (MNI), which is in the chain of title for both the note and the mortgage, and MERS, which is in the chain of title for the mortgage as a "nominee" for MNI. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the mortgage was void, asserting that: (1) MERS, as a nominee, never had any beneficial interest in the mortgage; (2) MNI had assigned its interest in both instruments to others without notifying plaintiffs; and (3) no party with the right to foreclose the mortgage had recorded its interest. MNI responded that plaintiffs had named MNI as a party in error, because MNI did "not own the right to the mortgage in question." MERS did not respond. Around this time, plaintiffs received a letter in which U.S. Bank represented that it possessed the original promissory note and mortgage and that it had the right to institute foreclosure proceedings on the property. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to amend and dismissed plaintiffs' case for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs appealed. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in dismissing Counts 1 and 2 of plaintiffs' amended complaint for lack of standing, to the extent that these counts alleged irregularities in the transfer of the note and mortgage unconnected to the pooling and servicing agreement. The Court affirmed as to dismissal of Counts 3 and 4 of plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Dernier v. Mortgage Network, Inc." on Justia Law