Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This condemnation case was filed in July 1992, "making it very, very old."  On its fourth time reviewing this matter, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the superior court abused its discretion when it declined to find that there had been a material increase in the value of a sand pit owned by Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Company (HS&G) between 2000 and 2009.  Upon review, the Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion, and affirmed the court’s denial of HS&G’s motion to amend the final judgment.

Taxpayer Margaret Murray appealed a superior court's order that dismissed her tax abatement appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued that the superior court erroneously concluded that she could not appeal the abatement decision because she failed to challenge the valuation of the property in the appraisal process.  Upon review, the Court concluded that Taxpayer's abatement appeal to the superior court was not foreclosed by her failure to appeal the valuation of her property, and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs James and Heidi Glassford, who brought suit to obtain compensation for an allegedly negligent home inspection, appealed a superior court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of home inspector Defendants The BrickKicker and GDM Home Services, Inc. (a franchisee of BrickKicker) based on the terms of a binding arbitration agreement in the parties' contract. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the superior court erred in rejecting Plaintiffs' contention that the terms of the home inspection contract were unconscionable under the common law and unfair and deceptive under Vermont’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Upon review of the contract in question, as well as the superior court record, the Supreme Court found the contractual provisions limiting liability to the cost of the inspection and yet requiring arbitration that would necessarily cost more than the amount of the liability limit unconscionable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

Taxpayer-Petitioner Michael Garbitelli appealed a superior court judgment that affirmed the Town of Brookfield Board of Abatement's denial of his request for a tax abatement. During a townwide reappraisal in 2007, Petitioner refused to allow the listers to inspect his property, other than the foyer and the basement. His property was assessed at $1.6 million. Petitioner then appealed this assessment, and the Supreme Court affirmed, noting that Petitioner had refused entry to the tax assessor and therefore failed to provide an adequate basis to demonstrate that the assessment was erroneous. Taxpayer later allowed entry to the listers for 2009, which resulted in an assessment of $957,000. Taxpayer then moved for a tax abatement for the years 2007 and 2008. The Board denied the request, finding that there was no mistake attributable to the listers since they were denied entry and were forced to use the best information available to them. Although the Supreme Court agreed with Petitioner's interpretation of the abatement statute’s meaning, it reached the same result as the superior court: "[Petitioner] argues principally that the 'extreme disparity' between $1.6 million and $957,000 is an 'obvious mistake' amounting to manifest error." The Court disagreed with that premise and affirmed the superior court.

This is Defendant Robert O'Connor's second appeal in a partition action brought by his former girlfriend Plaintiff Debra Whippie to resolve the parties' respective interests in a house they held as tenants-in-common. The parties had had a ten-year relationship and two children together when they purchased a single-family residence together in 2002. Both parties were obligated on the mortgage, and both their names appeared on the deed. In the beginning, the parties agreed to share expenses equally; however, Plaintiff stopped paying her share of expenses in early 2003. She sought public sale of the property and an equitable division of the proceeds. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's findings that Plaintiff initially acquired an equal share in the property, that she ceased contributing to expenses in early 2003, and that Defendant's letter of no-trespass excluded her from the property. The Court remanded for an accounting of the parties' interests in the property based on their relative contributions, directing the trial court to determine the parties' shares and instructing the court not to credit Plaintiff for certain expenses. On remand, the trial court reconsidered the issues without an evidentiary hearing. The court granted Plaintiff an offset representing half of the rental value for the period of ouster and 61% of the property's value. Defendant then appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant was entitled to compensation for half of the maintenance costs he paid for the entire period, even after the ouster. On second remand, the trial court was directed to determine the value of Defendant's expenditures on maintenance costs for the period of September 2004 to September 2007. Half of this amount should be deducted from Plaintiff's share. Her share should then be credited with the already determined rental value for the ouster period.

This appeal arose from a dispute over an administrative amendment to the master development plan for Killington Resort Village granted to its co-applicants, the current owners of Killington Resort Village and SP Land Company. The District One Environmental Commission originally granted this administrative amendment authorizing the creation of fifteen subdivided lots over approximately 368 acres of Killington Resort Village for transfer to SP Land Company for "future development purposes" pursuant to Act 250 Rule 34(D). Mountainside Properties, LLC, an adjoining property owner, appealed the Environmental Court's denial of its motion to alter and amend the grant of summary judgment in favor of SP Land. Mountainside argued that the Environmental Court erred because: (1) administrative amendments under Rule 34(D) require an underlying Act 250 land use permit, and (2) co-applicants' fifteen-lot subdivision cannot be approved without demonstrating compliance with all Act 250 criteria under 10 V.S.A. 6086(a), as required by 10 V.S.A. 6081(a). Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Mountainside's argument and reversed the Environmental Court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This case originated from a quiet-title action by Defendant Richard Rupe and his father, Michael C. Rupe, who laid claim to certain mineral rights by way of adverse possession. Plaintiff Gary Rupe, Richard's brother, subsequently asserted his own claim to the mineral rights in question, and the probate court granted him a one-third interest in the rights.  Defendant and his father appealed the probate decision to the superior court, which, after first granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on certain issues, ultimately dismissed plaintiff's claim to the mineral rights and awarded all rights, title, and interest to Defendant. Plaintiff appealed the superior court judgment, arguing: (1) the court exceeded its authority by considering more than the issues raised in the statement of questions submitted on appeal from the probate court; (2) the court misstated the elements of proof for adverse possession and misapplied the law; (3) the court erred in failing to find adverse possession through co-tenancy; and (4) the court erred in its requirements relating to a claim of unjust enrichment. Taking each in turn, the Supreme Court reviewed the superior court record and affirmed its decision with respect to all of Plaintiff's issues on appeal.

This appeal represented "the latest skirmish" in a long-running dispute over plans to develop a Wal-Mart discount retail store on an undeveloped 100-acre parcel of land in the Town of St. Albans. Appellants were interested individuals and groups opposed to the project. They appealed an Environmental Court decision that granted the site plan, conditional use, subdivision, and Act 250 permits for the development. They contended the trial court erred in: (1) approving site plan and conditional use permits despite the alleged conflict of interest of several members of the Town's development review board; (2) finding that the subdivision was compatible with adjacent land uses; and (3) concluding that the developer could reapply for an Act 250 permit despite an earlier denial.  Upon review of the lower court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.  

This case was an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of Appellant RBS Citizens, N.A.'s motion for a writ of attachment to Appellee Jan Ouhrabka's property, which Appellee owned jointly with his wife as tenants by entirety.  The trial court held that a creditor like RBS cannot attach property owned jointly by a debtor and a nondebtor when they hold that property as tenants by entirety.  RBS contended on appeal that the estate of tenancy by entirety is an anachronism whose continuing utility should be reconsidered.  In the alternative, RBS argued that Vermont law did not explicitly preclude granting a creditor prejudgment attachment where the property is held jointly by the debtor and a nondebtor in a tenancy by entirety.  Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court disagreed with RBS' argument and affirmed the lower court's decision.

In this dispute between neighboring landowners, Defendants-Neighbors Demetrios and Alexandria Michaelides and Erwin and Ramona Waibel appealed a superior court order that rejected their claim that Plaintiff Jonathan Tibbetts violated a deed restriction limiting the number of houses to be constructed on his property.  Among other claims, Defendants contended the trial court erred in concluding that they lacked standing to enforce the restriction. When Plaintiff attempted to sell the property in question in 2005, the potential buyers discovered a five-house restriction in the deed between the previous original grantor and grantee and required consent of the owners of the five other houses as a condition of the sale.  Defendants refused to consent, and Plaintiff thereupon filed the underlying declaratory judgment action to clear the property of the restriction and obtain marketable title. Defendants answered and counterclaimed for a declaration that Plaintiff's residence violated the deed restriction and an injunction requiring its removal. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  In March 2010, the trial court issued a written ruling in favor of Plaintiff.  The court concluded that the five-house restriction in the original grantor-grantee deed was intended to benefit the land retained by the previous grantee-owner, and that Neighbors therefore lacked standing to enforce it.  The court issued a final judgment order in May 2010 and denied a motion for reconsideration the following July.  Upon review of the deed and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and affirmed its decision.