Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008 the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner of Virginia condemned the Taco Bell restaurant building located near a federal highway. Taco Bell argued that approximately 42 pieces of equipment used in the restaurant as part of Taco Bell's business were fixtures and therefore should be included in determining the just compensation for the property taken. The trial court held that the items in question were personal property and there was no factual determination to be made by the jury because the evidence showed that the items could have been removed from the property. Taco Bell appealed, arguing that the trial court did not properly apply the Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement test for determining whether sufficient evidence was presented to submit the issue to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while the items in question were moveable, there was evidence the items were of the type needed for the purpose to which the property was devoted, and therefore the evidence on the issue whether the items were fixtures or personalty for condemnation purposes was sufficient to submit to the jury.

Gardiner Mulford purchased a tract of land after being advised by the seller that it might be landlocked and reviewing an appraisal that concluded an access easement would need to be acquired. Mulford began to use an old plank road on Walnut Hill Farm Group's land to access his property. Mulford was arrested for trespassing. Mulford then filed a four-count complaint against Walnut Hill, alleging the roadbed was a lawful, recorded easement. The trial court held for Walnut Hill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in finding (1) a public body did not accept an offer to dedicate the roadway, and therefore the roadbed was not public; (2) the elements of proof for a prescriptive easement, including use of an easement by prior occupants, were not established, and therefore Mulford was not entitled to a prescriptive easement; and (3) because Mulford did not allege that Walnut Hill made any representation regarding an easement upon which he relied, Walnut Hill was not equitably estopped from denying the easement.

Appellee John Jennings operates a commercial marina/boatyard. He challenged the local zoning board's authority to regulate the construction of additional mooring slips that would lie beyond the mean low-water mark of a navigable body of water on his property. Appellant also challenged the authority's "special exception permit" ordinance, claiming that the ordinance lacks adequate standards to guide the governing body's decision to grant or deny a permit. On review, the Supreme Court found no errors from the lower court's record on either ground: "the County's zoning authority 'embrace[s] the entirety of [Appellee's] proposed construction, even the portion that 'extends into the Chesapeake Bay's tidal tributaries.'" The Court affirmed the lower court's denial of Appellee's request for declaratory relief.

In 2008, the Board of County Supervisors filed a petition for condemnation in trial court against Appellee's Charles and Anna Dean, seeking to obtain the Deans' property to expand a bus maintenance facility and parking structure. The Deans' property consisted of approximately one acre, and had been used previously as a gas station and transmission repair shop. The County had tried to purchase the property, but had been unable to reach an agreement regarding compensation for the property. Before trial, the County filed a motion in limine requesting the court exclude evidence of a purported comparable sale that the Deans relied on to arrive at a price for their property. At trial, the County's expert appraiser testified that the Deans' property was worth $475,000; the Deans' expert valued the property at $900,000. Ultimately the jury fixed the property's value at $488,750. The Deans filed exceptions to the jury's report that the court overruled and denied. On review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the County's motion in limine and excluding evidence regarding the "comparable sale," and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

In 1925, the owner of a parcel of land adjacent to the James River obtained the right to construct a wharf and pier extending into the river and adjacent to public land, then owned by the Isle of Wight County. Over time, the wharf was extended to include a pavilion and attached piers resting on pilings placed in the subsurface lands of the river, within the area between the mean low-water mark and the line of navigation. Through a chain of successive recorded transfers, the pavilion and piers were acquired by members of the Bracey family, including Appellee R. Forrest Scott. The family performed extensive renovations and began using the pavilions as a family retreat. The pavilion and connecting piers were destroyed by hurricane in 2003, and although a number of pilings that supported the original structures remain in place, there has been no reconstruction. In 2006, Appellant Burwell's Bay Improvement Association received approval to construct a pier from its property into the riparian area formerly containing the pavilion and piers that were destroyed in 2003. In March, 2007, Scott and other members of the Bracey sought a declaratory judgment from the circuit court that they own the riparian and other rights on and adjacent to the public area, to determine the extent of those rights, and to enjoin construction by Appellant that would interfere with the family's rights. The circuit court found that the family failed to establish ownership of the riparian rights by adverse possession or a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to review whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the use of the riparian rights was exclusive and continuous for the required period of time. The Court found because the family chose not to reconstruct after the 2003 hurricane, the piers that remained was not enough to use tacking to establish exclusive and continuous use of the area and riparian rights. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.