Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Decedent executed a will in which all of his possessions to his wife. Decedent and his wife (Ex-Wife) divorced a few months later. One year later, Decedent died. Ex-Wife later sold the real property devised to her in Decedent's will to Petitioners. Thereafter, Decedent's mother (Respondent) filed an objection to final settlement, contending that Decedent's divorce from Ex-Wife after the execution of his will and prior to his death automatically revoked any disposition to Ex-Wife. The county commission ordered that Decedent's estate should pass to his heirs at law as if he had no will and found that Respondent was the sole heir to Decedent's estate. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition to quiet title to real estate and claim for unjust enrichment against Decedent's estate. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that Ex-Wife did not possess title to convey to Petitioners and that title to the subject real property should be quieted in Respondent's favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Respondent was not time-barred from claiming title to the subject property; and (2) the circuit court did not err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent. View "Johnson v. Kirby" on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondents executed a land contract whereby Respondents agreed to sell a piece of property to Petitioners. After the land contract had been fully consummated, Respondents refused to tender a deed to Petitioners. Petitioners filed suit, seeking a delivery of a general warranty deed for the property, including all oil and gas rights. Two months later, Respondents tendered a deed to Petitioners reserving oil and gas rights. The deed was recorded on February 17, 2010. Petitioners moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the land contract did not contained any language indicating Respondents' intention to except oil and gas rights, any questions of interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grantees. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, finding that when the deed was recorded, the land contract was merged in the deed and any cause of action based upon the contract was extinguished. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract was unambiguous, and Respondents failed to establish any legally sufficient basis for varying its terms; and (2) therefore, Respondents were obligated to convey their title and interest to the property, including their vested oil and gas rights. Remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. View "Spitznogle v. Durbin" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the valuation and corresponding tax assessment of seventy-nine condominium units owned by Pope Properties / Charleston LLC (Pope Properties). The Kanawha Assessor determined that for ad valorem tax purposes for 2011, the seventy-nine units should be valued as follows: $63,700 for each of Pope Properties' sixteen one-bedroom units and $70,000 for each of its sixty-three two-bedroom units. The Board of Equalization and Review upheld the determination. Pope Properties appealed, contending that the units should be valued at $42,000 for each of the one-bedroom units and $49,000 for each of the two-bedroom units. At issue on appeal was the Assessor's use of the market data approach in determining the value of the units rather than the income approach to valuation advocated by Pope Properties. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Assessor did not err in choosing or applying the market data approach in this case. View "Pope Props. / Charleston LLC v. Kanawha County Assessor " on Justia Law

Quicken Loans, Inc., a Michigan corporation and a large national mortgage lender doing business in West Virginia, appealed an order of the circuit court denying post-trial motions for amendment of the circuit court's findings of fact and/or conclusions of law and for offset following a verdict which found it liable for common law fraud and various claims under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act in connection with a subprime loan made to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court, holding (1) the elements of fraud were not met with regard to Quicken's misrepresentation of loan discount points, but the other acts of fraud were proven by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the circuit court correctly found that, given the particular facts of this case, the terms of the loan and the loan product were unconscionable; (3) the circuit court incorrectly cancelled Plaintiff's obligation to repay the loan principal; and (4) because the circuit court's order in punitive damages lacked the necessary analysis and findings, the Court was unable to conduct an adequate review of the punitive damages award. Remanded. View "Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

EQT Production Company was the lessee of an oil and gas lease. Matthew Hamblet was the surface owner of a parcel of property included within EQT's leasehold. EQT filed a permit application with the Office of Oil and Gas of the West Virginia EPA (DEP) for a shallow well targeting a Marcellus formation. The DEP issued the permit requested by EQT. Subsequently, Hamblet filed a petition for appeal of the issuance of the well permit in the circuit court. The DEP and EQT filed motions to dismiss the petition contending that Hamblet did not have the right to appeal the issuance of the permit. The circuit court denied the motions, concluding that Hamblet had the right to appeal the permit, but submitted its ruling to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held (1) upon consideration of the court of appeals' opinion in State ex rel. Lovejoy v. Callaghan and the relevant statutes, a surface owner is not permitted to seek judicial review of the DEP's issuance of a well work permit for a horizontal Marcellus well; and (2) given this fact, the Court had no basis to find Hamblet had a right to appeal the well work permitted issued by the DEP. View "Martin v. Hamblet" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the sale of a residence. The buyers, the plaintiffs below, sought compensatory and punitive damages from the sellers regarding water leakage in a basement storage room of the residence the buyers purchased. The leak was disclosed to the buyers after the signing of a purchase agreement and before the closing of the sale. In the complaint, the buyers also asked the circuit court to direct the sellers to proceed with the closing and deliver a deed to the buyers containing covenants of general warranty as specified in the purchase agreement. In granting partial summary judgment to the sellers, the circuit court concluded that the buyers' claims were without merit because they were on notice of the water leak prior to the closing of the sale. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the sellers were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law based on the purchase agreement; (2) the refusal of the circuit court to allow discovery constituted reversible error; and (3) the circuit court erred in failing to direct the sellers to deliver a deed to the buyers setting forth the language required by the purchase agreement. View "Hinerman v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

This action arose from modifications resulting from landfill activity made to real property that was adjacent to the property of Respondents. Respondents filed a complaint against the Town of Pratt and others, alleging that the modifications allegedly caused a change in the normal water flow on Respondents' property and resulted in property damage. The Town filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment, asserting it was entitled to be dismissed based on sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied the Town's motion as premature, finding that the parties should conduct discovery prior to the court making a determination regarding the Town's immunity arguments. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order denying the Town's motion and granted the Town's requested writ of prohibition, finding that the Town's immunity was purely a question of law and ripe for summary disposition at the circuit court level through a motion to dismiss. View "State ex rel. Town of Pratt v. Circuit Court (Stucky)" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, Petitioners Mountain America, LLC, et al. (hereinafter "Mountain America") appealed from orders entered by the circuit court denying Mountain America's appeals from its ad valorem property tax assessments for tax years 2008 and 2009. In each case, the circuit court ruled that Mountain America's appeal was barred by res judicata because the Supreme Court had previously considered and decided Mountain America I, in which Mountain America unsuccessfully challenged its 2007 ad valorem property tax assessments regarding the same parcels of property as those whose assessments were contested in the 2008 and 2009 litigations. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's rulings in both cases, holding that the Court's decision in Mountain America I did not operate as a res judicata bar to preclude the instant litigation. Remanded for reinstatement of Mountain America's claims for relief from its 2008 and 2009 ad valorem property tax assessments and consideration of the merits thereof. View "Mountain Am., LLC v. Huffman" on Justia Law

In this matter the Supreme Court considered whether a decedent's will that directed "all my just debts be paid as soon as conveniently possible after the date of my death" obligated the decedent's estate to pay the mortgage on two parcels of real property devised to Respondents. The circuit court determined that the "just debts" clause required the decedent's estate to pay the mortgage on the two properties and deliver an unencumbered interest in the two properties to Respondents. Petitioner, the executrix of the will, appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctrine of exoneration was applicable to this case, and under the doctrine, Respondents were entitled to receive an unencumbered interest in the two devised properties.

After the State Tax Commissioner (Tax Department) appraised Century Aluminum of West Virginia's aluminum plant, Century Aluminum objected to the valuations. The Jackson County Commission sitting as a Board of Equalization and Review advised the company that it would not make any adjustment to the Tax Department's valuations. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) upholding the Tax Department's policy of how it considers functional obsolescence and economic obsolescence for categories of assets other than machinery and equipment; and (2) ruling that the Tax Department's policy of artificially limiting its consideration of obsolescence to a fifty percent reduction in the case of machinery and equipment complied with the requirement that property be valued at fair market value.