Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, David and Shirley Finch, appealed from an order entered by the circuit court, which granted summary judgment to Defendant, Inspectech, LLC. The circuit court concluded that, by signing the parties' inspection agreement, which contained a clause entitled "unconditional release and limitation of liability," the Finches had released Inspectech from liability for any defects it failed to report in its inspection of the house the Finches planned to, and ultimately did, purchase. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Inspectech was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the terms of the parties' inspection agreement and the release language therein because anticipatory releases contained in home inspection contracts are void and unenforceable as contrary to the public policy of the State.

In 1974, Amos and Lois Harper purchased property in a subdivision. In 2001, the property was sold at a foreclosure sale to the Bank of New York. Because the property taxes were not paid, the sheriff sold the tax lien on the property in 2007 to Marquis Development. Marquis sold the property to Gavin Smith, who subsequently served an eviction notice on Lois Harper's son, Mike Harper. The Harpers filed this declaratory judgment action against Marquis and Smith, claiming that they were the owners of the subject property. Ultimately, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and declared that Smith was the owner of the subject real estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred to the extent it concluded that Smith was a bona fide purchaser given the fact that he was on notice of a potential defect in the tax deed received by Marquis; but (2) because the Harpers lost title to the property as a result of the foreclosure sale in 2001, the Harpers had no standing to challenge Smith's status as a bona fide purchaser.

The Davises failed to pay the real estate tax for their property, resulting in a statutory tax. The Davises then filed a petition for bankruptcy, which was granted. Subsequently, the sheriff sold the tax lien. After the statutory time period that the Davises could redeem the property had passed and the property remained unredeemed, the tax lien purchaser received a tax deed conveying the Davises' property. The trial court set aside the tax deed, concluding that the tax lien sale should not have been held because the Davises had been in bankruptcy and because the sheriff did not give sufficient notice to the Davises of the tax delinquency, lien, and sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred (1) in considering issues relating to the sufficiency of the sheriff's service of the notices; (2) in considering the sheriff's pre-sale notices to the Davises, as only the post-sale notice to redeem is relevant in a lawsuit to set aside a tax deed; and (3) by granting judgment without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the effect the Davises' bankruptcy had on the tax lien. Remanded.

In two condemnation proceedings, the circuit court entered orders requiring the Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH) to turn over to Defendants, three individuals who owned and leased condemned property, appraisal reports involving several properties condemned by DOH for its South Mineral Wells Project. The DOH filed petitions for writs of prohibition, contending that federal law did not permit the release of appraisal reports from properties not owned or possessed by Defendants. Defendants argued that the court's orders were consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. West Virginia Department of Transportation v. Cookman, which allowed appraisal reports to be discoverable. The Court consolidated the petitions and granted the writs of prohibition, holding (1) the decision in Cookman was expressly overruled in its entirety because it failed to consider controlling federal law; and (2) a real property appraisal report generated in compliance with 42 U.S.C. 4601 and W. Va. Code 54-3-1, et seq., and its accompanying regulations, was not discoverable in a condemnation proceeding by party who did not own or have any legally cognizable possessory interest in such real property.

This was a consolidated appeal of two cases wherein the circuit court dismissed two appeals filed by a corporation, Shenandoah Sales & Services (Shenandoah), disputing the county assessor's valuation of real estate owned by the corporation. The corporation failed to retain a lawyer to prosecute its appeals to the circuit court and instead appeared through its vice-president, David Tabb. The circuit judge ordered the corporation to appear through a lawyer in circuit court and stated that the court would not accept pleadings or motions from the corporation that were not signed by a lawyer. The corporation failed to retain a lawyer and the court dismissed the corporation's appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by ruling that Shenendoah was required to be represented by a lawyer in the circuit court; and (2) W. Va. Code 11-3-25(b) is unconstitutional insofar as the word "agent" allows an applicant's non-lawyer representative to appeal a decision of the board of equalization and review to a circuit court.

Petitioner, a constructor, was sued by several people living in new homes built by Petitioner (Residents). Residents claimed they were injured by radon gas leaking into their homes because of improper construction by Petitioner. Petitioner argued that the agreement to purchase the new homes required Residents to arbitrate their claims, whether they signed the agreement or not. The circuit court found the arbitration provision ambiguous and unconscionable and refused to compel Residents into arbitration. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to compel Residents to arbitrate their claims. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court was within its authority to refuse to enforce the arbitration clause against Residents because the arbitration provision was ambiguous, unconscionable, and unenforceable.

This case involved a dispute regarding developed property. Developer filed a complaint alleging that the project's general contractor (Contractor) and an engineering firm (Firm) had negligently provided recommendations with respect to site preparation. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor Firm on Contractor's cross-claims against Firm that sought recovery of remediation costs incurred by Contractor, concluding (1) some of Contractor's cross-claims were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and (2) W. Va. Code 55-2-21 did not apply to toll any limitations periods because Contractor's claims were independent causes of action as opposed to cross-claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court prematurely found that section 55-2-21 did not apply because it failed to analyze whether the claims arose from the same transaction or occurrence and, thus, constituted cross-claims or independent causes of action; and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed so as to preclude summary judgment if Contractor's claim was an independent cause of action. Remanded.

A parcel of land in Tyler County was split in ninths and bequeathed to the heirs of Robert Amos. Plaintiff and Heir Barbara Renner began to purchase the other heirsâ one-ninths interests. In 2000, Ms. Renner owned six-ninths of the original parcel. Billie Worden, C.W. Anderson and Mary Anderson owned the remaining three-ninths. Ms. Renner brought a partition suit against the Andersons and Ms. Worden. Appellants Edgar and Hazel Bonner owned a tract of land that bordered the Worden/Anderson portion. During the pendency of the partition suit, the Bonners acquired an undivided one-ninthsâ interest in the Worden ninth by virtue of a deed from Ms. Worden. The Bonners said they bought the interest to preserve their right to cross the property in order to access the nearby state highway. The Bonners then intervened in Ms. Rennerâs partition suit. Ms. Renner sued the Bonners, claiming that they interfered with a contract between Ms. Renner and Ms. Worden over the purchase of Ms. Wordenâs parcel. The court granted partial summary judgment to the Bonners, finding that they owned a one-ninth interest in the land. The court also found that Ms. Renner now owned the other eight-ninthsâ interest in the property. Ms. Renner brought a separate suit against her relatives and the Bonners to force the partition so that all could be paid for their respective interests in the land. A hearing was held in the circuit court, and the court appointed three Commissioners to prepare a report as to whether the property could be partitioned. The report acknowledged that all parties were concerned with access to the state highway. The Commissioners recommended that the parcel be split using the right-of-way to the highway as the division line. The Bonners objected because according to the Commissionerâs report, they would get a smaller piece of land. Furthermore, the Bonners argued that if Ms. Renner sold her parcel, the Bonners would be landlocked. The court held a hearing of the partiesâ objections to the Commissionersâ report. Without taking any evidence, the Court held that the parcel should be sold as one parcel at public auction. A judicial sale was held at the front door of the county courthouse, at which the only bidders were Ms. Renner and the Bonners. Ms. Renner was the highest bidder, and bid over $200,000 for the entire parcel. The Supreme Court reversed the actions of the trial court, finding that the lower court should have held an evidentiary hearing on issues presented by the parties regarding partition. The Court found that the lower court and its appointed Commissioners failed to address why the parcel should not have been partitioned: âEvidence on these issues must be taken by the circuit court, and the circuit courtâs ruling on the matter must be supported by a detailed order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.â Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.