Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Wisconsin Supreme Court
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court declaring the Town of Buchanan's transportation utility fee (TUF) to be a property tax subject to the Town's levy limit, holding that funds raised for utility districts under Wis. Stat. 66.0827 are property taxes subject to municipal levy limits.After the circuit court concluded that the money raised for the district fund was subject to the Town's property tax limit Appellants appealed, arguing that the TUF was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Town did not follow the lawful procedures that a municipality must follow for funding public improvements because the imposition of property taxes over the Town's levy limits required the consent of the Town's voters and because nothing in the statutes permitted the Town to bypass those levy limits for the purpose of imposing a TUF on property owners in the municipality. View "Wis. Property Taxpayers, Inc. v. Town of Buchanan" on Justia Law

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In this special assessment appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's dismissal of the Village of Mukwonago as a defendant due to improper service of a notice of appeal, holding that Petitioner's failure to comply with Wis. Stat. 66.0703(12)(a) required dismissal of this action.Petitioner challenged the special assessment district created by the Village in 2019 alleging jurisdiction pursuant to section 66.0703(12). The Village filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or competency to proceed because Greenwald did not serve a written notice of appeal on the Village clerk. The circuit court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 801.14(2) did not apply in this case; and (2) the plain meaning of section 66.0703(12)(a) mandates service of written notice on the Village clerk, and because Greenwald did not accomplish this requirement, dismissal was warranted. View "Greenwald Family Ltd. Partnership v. Village of Mukwonago" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this insurance dispute over damages allegedly caused by the poor construction of an in-ground pool, holding that this Court overrules the portions of Wisconsin Pharmacy Co. v. Nebraska Cultures of California, Inc., 876 N.W.2d 72 (Wis. 2016), stating that "property damages" must be to "other property" for purposes of determining an initial grant of coverage in a commercial general liability (CGL) policy.Due to the damages caused by the cracking of Homeowner's pool, Homeowner was forced to demolish the entire pool structure and construct a new one. Two insurers on appeal had issued CGL policies to the pool's general contractor, and a third insurer issued a CGL policy to the supplier of the pump mix used for the pool's construction. All three insurers sought a declaration that their policies did not provide coverage to Homeowner. The Supreme Court held, under the circumstances of this case, that none of the insurers were entitled to summary judgment and accordingly remanded the cause back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "5 Walworth, LLC v. Engerman Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that rezoning by amending a local government's zoning ordinance is legislative in character, and therefore, due process did not require an impartial decision-maker.Trustee Jan Miller (Trustee Miller), who served on the Village Board of Lyndon Station, cast the deciding vote in favor of an application filed by her daughter and son-in-law to amend the Village's zoning ordinance to rezone their residential property for commercial development. Thomas Miller (Miller), a local business owner, sought certiorari review of the Village's Zoning Board Appeals' decision upholding the Board's vote to amend the zoning ordinance. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Trustee Miller was not a fair and impartial decision-maker, and therefore, her participation in the vote violated due process. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Village Board's action was legislative in nature, and therefore, Miller was not entitled to an impartial decision-maker. View "Miller v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Village of Lyndon Station" on Justia Law

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In this lawsuit stemming from the Wisconsin Department of Transportation's (DOT's) closure of a driveway connecting DEKK Property Development, LLC's property to State Trunk Highway (STH) 50, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court granting DEKK motion for summary judgment, holding that summary judgment should be granted in DOT's favor.DEKK filed an action under Wis. Stat. 32.05(5) challenging DOT's right to remove DEKK's rights of access to STH 50. The circuit court granted summary judgment for DEKK, reasoning that DEKK had "some sort of right of access" to the driveway, entitling it to compensation from the closure. The court of appeals reversed and held for DOT on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DEKK was not permitted to recover damages for the driveway closure under section 32.05(5) because the access rights allegedly lost by DEKK were distinct from the taking described in DOT's jurisdictional offer. View "DEKK Property Development, LLC v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

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Pagoudis owns and is the sole member of both Sead LLC and Kearns LLC. During negotiations to purchase property from the Keidls, Pagoudis received a real estate condition report (RECR) signed by Amy Keidl. Pagoudis then signed the offer to purchase, which states that the contract is between the Keidls and Pagoudis "or assigns." Sead LLC then executed the negotiated contract and took title. Months later, Sead LLC assigned the property to Kearns LLC. After the purchase, defects were discovered that Keidl failed to disclose in the RECR, ranging from water and mildew in the basement, to insect infestations, to an unwanted piano.Pagoudis, Sead, and Kearns sued the Keidls for breach of contract, common law misrepresentation, and statutory misrepresentation. The circuit court dismissed the case, deciding that each of the parties lacked standing to pursue their stated claims; Pagoudis and Kearns were not parties to the original transaction and Sead transferred the property before filing the action and no longer has an interest in the property.The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Pagoudis's and Kearns's claims against Keidl were properly dismissed. Sead's claims, however, were remanded, it was a party to the contract, received representations from the Keidls, and purchased the property. View "Pagoudis v. Keidl" on Justia Law

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In this dispute between the residents of a senior-living facility in a receivership over the proceeds generated by the sale of the facility the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the conclusion of the circuit court that Bondholders' mortgage lien was superior to Residents' entrance fee claims, holding that Bondholders' mortgage lien was superior to Residents' contract claims.After Atrium, the subject senior-living facility, defaulted on debt service payments to Bondholders, it filed a petition for receivership. The receiver sold the assets for more than $4 million in proceeds. Atrium owed Bondholders more than $6 million secured by a valid mortgage lien on the facility's estate, but many of the facility's Residents claimed they were owed reimbursement of the entrance fees they paid to Atrium. The circuit court entered judgment for Bondholders, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bondholders were entitled to first payment from the proceeds of the sale of Atrium's assets. View "Casanova v. Polsky" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court reversing the judgment of the tax appeals commission concluding that the sales tax exemption in Wisconsin Act 185, which expanded an existing sales tax exemption to include the sale of aircraft parts or maintenance, did not apply to Lessees' payments for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Citation Partners, LLC owned an aircraft that it leased to Lessees. Citation Partners charged per-flight-hour rates for aircraft repairs and maintenance as part of the total amount Lessees paid to lease the aircraft, which rates corresponded to the amount Citation Partners spent on repairs and maintenance. Citation Partners argued that this portion of the lease payment was tax exempt because it was a sale of aircraft parts or maintenance. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that the payments were not exempt from sales tax under the plain language of the statutes. View "Citation Partners, LLC v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's determination that the assessments of Lowe's Home Centers, LLC's property for the 2016 and 2017 tax years by the City of Delvan were not excessive, holding that the assessments were properly afforded a presumption of correctness.On appeal, Lowe's argued, among other things, that the City's assessments should not have received a presumption of correctness because they were conducted in violation of the dictates of the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the presumption of correctness attached to the City's assessments; and (2) Lowe's failed to demonstrate that the assessments were excessive. View "Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. City of Delavan" on Justia Law

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In this dispute over the proper compensation for a temporary limited easement (TLE) that Waukesha County acquired over Gregory Backus's property to construct a highway bypass along the Backus property's rear lot line the Supreme Court held that Wis. Stat. 32.09(6g) does not apply to TLEs.Specifically in dispute was whether the County need pay Backus only the rental value of the TLE or whether, under section 32.09(6g), Backus was entitled to severance damages measured by the difference between the fair market value of the entire property before and after the project's completion. The circuit court denied the County's motion for summary judgment, after which the County filed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that compensation for a TLE is not calculated under the methodology of section 32.09(6g). View "Backus v. Waukesha County" on Justia Law