Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court reversing the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) and dismissing Plaintiff's action asserting that DOT's jurisdictional offer to purchase Plaintiff's land was invalid, holding that the jurisdictional offer was valid.In this complaint, Plaintiff argued that the jurisdictional offer was invalid because DOT failed to provide a proper initial appraisal. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of DOT, holding that the jurisdictional offer was valid because it was based upon an initial appraisal of all property proposed to be acquired pursuant to Wis. Stat. 32.05(2)(a)-(b) and (3)(e). View "Christus Lutheran Church of Appleton v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court requiring Polk Properties, LLC and its sole member (collectively, Polk) to pay forfeitures for zoning violations, damages for the Village of Slinger's lost property tax revenue, and fees, holding that Polk did not abandon its nonconforming use.At issue was whether Polk abandoned the legal nonconforming use of the subject property after its zoning classification was changed from agricultural to residential. The circuit court enjoined Polk from using the property for agricultural reasons and imposed forfeitures, a monetary judgment for real estate taxes, and an order authorizing special assessments, special charges, and fees to be levied against Polk. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Polk's use of the property constituted a lawful nonconforming use for which Polk could not be penalized. View "Village of Slinger v. Polk Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order upholding the Town of Newbold's denial of Petitioner's attempt to subdivide his property, holding that the Town ordinance precluding the subdivision was a permissible exercise of the Town's subdivision authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. 236.45.The Town denied Petitioner's proposed subdivision because the two resulting lots would not meet the Town's applicable minimum shoreline frontage requirement, as set forth in the Town ordinance. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the minimum shoreline frontage requirement was unenforceable because it was a shoreline zoning regulation that the Town did not have the authority to enact. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding that the ordinance was a permissible exercise of the Town's subdivision authority, and therefore, the Town proceeded on a correct theory of law when it denied Petitioner's request to subdivide his property. View "Anderson v. Town of Newbold" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a local zoning court of appeals approving homeowners' variance request, holding that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 62.23(7)(e)10., certiorari review of the board's decision is triggered when a written copy of the decision is filed in the board's office.The homeowners in this case petitioned the Village of Williams Bay Extraterritorial Zoning Board of Appeals for a variance request. The Board unanimously approved the variance. Plaintiff, the homeowners' neighbor, filed for a writ of certiorari within thirty days after the Board orally voted to grant the variance but before the Board issued and filed a written copy of its decision. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the court of appeals properly determined what constitutes the "triggering event" for purposes of appealing the Board's decision on a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an aggrieved party's right to certiorari review is triggered when a written copy of a zoning board of appeals' decision is filed in the office of the board; (2) the Board's written decision and approved minutes were properly included in the certiorari record; and (3) the Board acted under the correct theory of law. View "Moreschi v. Village of Williams Bay" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court directing a verdict in favor of Defendant, an insurance agent, on Plaintiff's claim that Defendant was negligent because he procured an insurance policy that did not conform to Plaintiff's requirements, holding that Plaintiff must prove that it would have qualified for an insurance policy with better terms than the policy it actually obtained.Plaintiff sold new and used camper trailers. Plaintiff asked Defendant, an insurance agent, to acquire a policy to cover its camper inventory. Plaintiff thought Defendant had acquired a policy with a deductible for $1,000 per camper in the event of hail damage with a $5,000 aggregate deductible limit, but the policy actually required a $5,000 deductible per camper, with no aggregate limit. After a hailstorm damaged many of the campers on its lot, Plaintiff sued Defendant. The circuit court directed a verdict due to Plaintiff's failure to introduce evidence that an insurer would have insured Plaintiff with the deductible limits it thought it had. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff must not only prove that an insurance policy with the requested deductibles was commercially available but that Plaintiff would actually have qualified for that policy. View "Emer's Camper Corral, LLC v. Western Heritage Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this case involving the Town of Perry's alleged failure to construct a proper road as promised when exercising its power of eminent domain the Supreme Court held that Wis. Stat. 82.50(1) does not impose obligations on the Town that are susceptible to a declaration of rights, nor does it create a private cause of action by which Plaintiff can recover damages under the circumstances.The Town acquired a portion of property belonging to Plaintiff. In exercising it power of eminent domain, the Town committed itself to building a replacement road over part of the acquired property. The Town later brought this action alleging that the Town failed to build the road to the standards required by either the condemnation petition or Wis. Stat. 82.50(1). The circuit court concluded that claim preclusion barred Plaintiff's claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court revered, holding (1) neither the right-to-take case nor the just compensation case barred Plaintiff's claims; and (2) section 82.50(1) does not impose road-building obligations on the Town that are susceptible to a declaration of rights, nor does it create a private cause of action by which Plaintiff can recover damages for the Town's failure to improve the road. View "DSG Evergreen Family Limited Partnership v. Town of Perry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that an annexation of 247 acres of land to the City of Sheboygan satisfied the statutory contingency requirement, the rule of reason, and the procedural requirements of Wis. Stat. 66.0217, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion.This appeal concerned J. Kohler Company's plan to convert 247 acres of land located in the Town of Wilson into a golf course. Kohler petitioned for annexation to the City of Sheboygan, determining that the golf course would not be developed if the land remained in the boundaries of the Town. In response, the Town filed this declaratory judgment action challenging the annexation. The circuit court dismissed the action in full. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the annexation met the statutory contiguity requirement in Wis. Stat. 66.0217(3); (2) the annexation satisfied the rule of reason; and (3) the petition complied with the signature and certification requirements set forth in Wis. Stat. 66.0218(3) and (5)(a). View "Town of Wilson v. City of Sheboygan" on Justia Law

In this case involving a stolen 1938 Talbot Lago automobile the Supreme Court held that a true owner can maintain a replevin action for wrongful detention against a subsequent purchaser of converted property and that a cause of action for replevin based on wrongful detention accrues when the subsequent purchaser obtains the property.In 2001, the Talbot Lago disappeared from a Milwaukee business. In 2015, TL90108, LLC (TL) purchased the vehicle in Europe. In 2018, TL attempted to obtain title in Illinois. When a hit on a stolen vehicle report was triggered, Plaintiffs, who claimed to be the rightful owners, demanded the vehicle's return. TL refused, and Plaintiffs brought an action in replevin. The circuit court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the claim was barred by the six-year statutes of repose in Wis. Stat. 893.35 and 893.51(1). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the wrongful detention claim was triggered when Plaintiffs demanded a return of the vehicle, thus restarting the six-year repose clock. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the replevin action based on TL's alleged wrongful detention of the Talbot Lago accrued when TL obtained - and wrongfully detained - the vehicle, and therefore, Plaintiffs' cause of action for replevin was not barred by the applicable statutes of repose. View "Mueller v. TL90108, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims against the Village of Stetsonville for negligence and private nuisance after wastewater backed up into Plaintiff's basement, holding that the Village was immune from suit for negligence and that, as to Plaintiff's private nuisance claim, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to causation.Specifically, the Court held (1) the court of appeals did not err in determining that the Village was immune from suit for negligence pursuant to Wis. Stat. 893.80(4); and (2) under the facts of this case, the court of appeals did not err in affirming the grant of summary judgment on the private nuisance claim on the grounds that Plaintiff did not present expert testimony with regard to causation. View "Pinter v. Village of Stetsonville" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's denial of the Town of Rib Mountain's action seeking a declaration that Marathon County lacked the authority to establish a rural naming or numbering system in towns, holding that Wis. Stat. 59.54(4) does not restrict a county's authority to "establish a rural naming or numbering system in towns" to only rural areas within towns.In 2016, Marathon County decided to establish a uniform naming and numbering system. The Town of Rib Mountain was one of the towns required to participate in the addressing system. The Town filed this action for declaratory relief alleging that the statute confines counties to implementing naming and numbering systems only within "rural" areas of towns. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the use of the word "rural" unambiguously demonstrated that the legislature intended to restrict a county's naming and numbering authority to "rural" areas. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutory text provides that a county may establish a rural naming or numbering system "in towns"; and (2) accordingly, Marathon County acted within its authority by enacting an ordinance to create a uniform naming and numbering system in towns throughout Marathon County. View "Town of Rib Mountain v. Marathon County" on Justia Law