Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

American Transmission Company and ATC Management, Inc. (collectively, ATC) filed a declaratory judgment action seeking an order from the court declaring that it had a right, under a 1969 easement, to enter the property of Ricardo and Julie Garza and trim and remove trees threatening or endangering the operation of a transmission line. The circuit court granted summary judgment for ATC, concluding (1) under the 1969 easement, ATC was allowed to remove the trees, and they did not trespass on the Garzas’ property in doing so; and (2) the 1969 easement was not invalidated when wood poles were replaced with steel poles. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that ATC had no rights to enter the Garzas’ property because the transmission line upon which the 1969 easement was founded no longer existed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 1969 easement is still in effect, thereby allowing ATC to enter the Garzas’ property; and (2) the 1969 easement grants to ATC the right to make the change from wood poles to steel poles. View "American Transmission Co. v. Garza" on Justia Law

McKee Family I, LLC (McKee) objected to the City of Fitchburg’s rezoning of two lots from a planned development district (PDD) zoning classification to a residential-medium (R-M) zoning classification. McKee sought declaratory judgment, damages, and injunctive relief on the grounds that the rezoning of the lots was unlawful. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. Acknowledging that it did not submit an application for a building permit, McKee appealed, arguing that it had a vested right in developing land under the PDD zoning classification. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that McKee did not have a vested right in the PDD zoning classification when the City rezoned the lots. The court declined to address McKee’s constitutional taking argument, reasoning that it was an undeveloped argument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) McKee did not have a vested right in developing the property under the PDD zoning classification because it did not apply for a building permit and because a PDD zoning classification does not create contractual expectations upon which developers may rely; and (2) because McKee conditioned its takings claim on its claim for vested rights, the Court need not reach McKee’s constitutional takings claim. View "McKee Family I, LLC v. City of Fitchburg" on Justia Law

This case was one of several cases involving litigation between Lands’ End and the City of Dodgeville challenging the City’s property tax assessment of Lands’ End’s headquarters. In 2009, Lands’ End made an offer of settlement, which the City rejected. Eventually, the court of appeals remanded the matter to the circuit court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Lands’ End in the amount of $724,292 plus statutory interest. At issue on remand was whether Lands’ End was entitled to interest at the statutory rate of interest in effect when the offer of settlement was made under Wis. Stat. 807.01(4) or at the statutory rate of interest in effect when Lands’ End recovered the judgment under the amended version of the statute. The circuit court awarded interest at “1 percent plus the prime rate,” the rate in the amended version of the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Lands’ End did not have a vested right in the twelve percent interest rate in effect in section 807.01(4) at the time Lands’ End made its offer of settlement; and (2) awarding interest under the amended version of the statute did not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. View "Lands' End, Inc. v. City of Dodgeville" on Justia Law

In 1997, James Vandenberg and three other individuals (collectively, the intervenors) acquired real estate as tenants-in-common. During the time they owned the property, James accumulated personal debts resulting in encumbrances being filed against the property. In 2011, James and the intervenors contracted to sell their property to Van De Hey Real Estate, LLC on land contract. Prince Corporation subsequently filed a garnishment summons and complaint seeking to garnish Van De Hey’s final payment as partial satisfaction of its judgment against James. The intervenors intervened in the action. The circuit court entitled Prince to garnish 1/4 of the full contract price. The intervenors then impleaded the Department of Revenue (DOR) as an interested party and moved for partition. The circuit court entered an order holding that the Department of Revenue (DOR), rather than Prince, was entitled to garnish 1/4 of the land contract proceeds due to the DOR’s superior tax warrants. The court also denied the interveners’ request to partition the real estate. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the DOR was entitled to garnish from the final land contract payment the amount that James could require be paid to him from that payment; and (2) the circuit court did not err in refusing to partition the property. Remanded. View "Prince Corp. v. Vandenberg" on Justia Law

Abbey Springs Condominium Association, Inc. and Abbey Springs, Inc. (collectively, Abbey Springs) have a policy forbidding both current and subsequent unit owners from utilizing recreational facilities until unpaid condominium assessments are paid in full. Following a foreclosure action and sheriff’s sale of the property to Walworth State Bank, the Bank paid the former owner’s outstanding assessment under protest. The Bank filed suit against Abbey Springs, asserting that the policy violates Wisconsin law by impermissibly reviving a lien on the condominium units that was eliminated by the foreclosure action. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the condominium policy effectively revived the lien against the property that the foreclosure judgment entered against Abbey Springs and the former unit owners had extinguished, and therefore, the policy violates well-established foreclosure law and the foreclosure judgment entered in the underlying foreclosure action. Remanded. View "Walworth State Bank v. Abbey Springs Condo. Ass’n" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation (DOT) eliminated Hoffer Properties, LLC’s direct driveway connections to a controlled-access highway and separately exercised its power of eminent domain to acquire .72 acres of Hoffer’s land to extend Frohling Lane westward so as to connect Hoffer’s property to the highway. Hoffer appealed the amount of compensation, arguing that compensation for the .72 acre must include the diminution of value of the property due to the loss of direct access to the highway. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to DOT, concluding that Hoffer’s direct access to the highway was a noncompensable exercise of the police power and that reasonable access had been given as a matter of law. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that summary judgment was proper because DOT provided alternate access to Hoffer’s property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hoffer was precluded from compensation under Wis. Stat. 32.09(6)(b) because alternate access to the property was provided by the Frohling Lane extension. View "Hoffer Props., LLC v. State" on Justia Law

In 2002, the Wilcoxes purchased property from the Somas. A strip of land separated the Wilcox’s property from a lake. In 2011, the Wilcoxes brought a claim for title by adverse possession against the owners of the lakefront strip. The circuit court dismissed the adverse possession claim after noting that the Somas had specifically disclaimed ownership of the lakefront strip and had sought and received permission to make improvements to the property from an entity the Somas mistakenly believed was its true owner. The court of appeals reversed, holding that evidence of the Somas’ permission to use the lakefront strip came from a non-owner and was therefore irrelevant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court properly considered the Somas’ subjective intent and did not err in concluding that the Wilcoxes failed to establish adverse possession for the requisite statutory period. View "Wilcox v. Estate of Hines" on Justia Law

In 2009, Plaintiff purchased a condominium unit. Before closing, the sellers’ attorney informed Plaintiff that a mortgage from 2001 was mistakenly listed on the title commitment. The information was incorrect, however, and the mortgage, purportedly owed to Defendant, went unsatisfied at the time of closing. Plaintiff sought a declaration that the 2001 mortgage was not an enforceable lien at the time because Defendant was unable to produce documentation indicating that the mortgage was assigned to Defendant at the time of closing in violation of the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant could properly enforce the mortgage at the time Plaintiff purchased the property because the doctrine of equitable assignment, which exempts mortgage assignments from the statute of frauds, applied in this case. The Court then remanded on the issue of whether Defendant had the necessary documents to enforce the note in question. View "Dow Family, LLC v. PHH Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

In 2009, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against, among other defendants, First American Title Insurance Company, with whom Plaintiffs had a title insurance policy for their property, for failing to defend the title to their property. As part of the settlement between Plaintiffs and defendants John and Jane Stevenson, the Stevensons paid Plaintiffs for an assignment of their rights under the title insurance policy, including any claims against First American. The Stevensons subsequently filed a cross-claim against First American for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and bad faith for refusing to defend the title to Plaintiffs’ lot. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Stevensons and awarded the Stevensons compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages to punish First American’s bad faith. The circuit court allowed the bad faith finding and the punitive damages award to stand. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the punitive damages award in this case was excessive and deprived First American of its right to due process, and (2) the appropriate amount of punitive damages in this case was $210,000. View "Kimble v. Land Concepts, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Oshkosh levied special assessments against a corner lot property owned by CED Properties, LLC (“CED”). The City issued two special assessments, one for the portion of CED’s property bordering Jackson Street and one for the portion running alongside Murdock Avenue. CED appealed the special assessments by filing a complaint with the circuit court. CED then filed an amended complaint well past the ninety-day time limit to appeal. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the City, holding that CED failed to appeal the Jackson Street special assessment within the required ninety-day time limit. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) CED’s original complaint, which was filed within the required ninety-day time period, was sufficient to appeal not only the Murdock Avenue special assessment but also the Jackson Street special assessment; and (2) CED’s complaint was sufficient to place the City on notice that CED intended to appeal both the Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue special assessments. View "CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh" on Justia Law