Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Town Assessor valued Taxpayer’s real property at $27,500, classified the property as “productive forest land,” and assessed the property at $27,500. Taxpayer claimed that the Assessor’s classification of his property was erroneous and that the Town Board of Review should change the classification to “undeveloped land,” which would result in an assessment of $13,750. The Board refused to lower the assessment. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the evidence that the Board received, the Board could reasonably conclude that Taxpayer did not demonstrate that the classification was incorrect and that the assessment should be lowered. View "Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Defendant-sellers obtained a policy from American Family Mutual Insurance Company insuring an apartment building. When preparing for the sale of the building, Defendants signed a real estate condition report stating that they were not aware of the presence of asbestos on the premises. After Plaintiff-buyers purchased the building, their contractor discovered asbestos in the building. Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendants for breach of contract/warranty and negligence in failing to adequately disclose defective conditions. The circuit court held that American Family had no duty to defend or indemnify Defendants because an asbestos exclusion in the American Family policy precluded coverage. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the policy precluded coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the asbestos exclusion in the American Family policy precluded coverage for the losses alleged by Plaintiffs. View "Phillips v. Parmelee" on Justia Law

Amjad Tufail leased property to Midwest Hospitality pursuant to a lease agreement. The City Board of Zoning Appeals ultimately approved Midwest's application for a special use permit to operate a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant with a drive-through on the property but placed conditions on the permit. Midwest subsequently notified Tufail that it was no longer responsible for lease payments because Tufail made a false representation to Midwest regarding the terms of the lease. Specifically, Midwest contended that Tufail represented that Midwest may not be prevented from using the property for certain specified purposes. Tufail brought this breach of contract action against Midwest. Midwest counterclaimed for breach of contract, deceptive advertising, and unjust enrichment. The trial court ruled in favor of Tufail. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Midwest's early termination of the lease was justified by Tufail's misrepresentation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Tufail's representation was not false where (1) the representation did not include any use of the property as a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant with a drive-through; and (2) the circuit court found Midwest was not prevented from using the property for the uses specified in the lease. Remanded. View "Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants executed guaranty contracts in order to secure financing to run their business operations. Bank subsequently commenced foreclosure proceedings on the business. Afterwards, Bank commenced an action against Defendants seeking payment under the guaranty contracts. Defendants, in response, alleged several counterclaims and affirmative defenses. Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Defendants' counterclaims and affirmative defenses were derivative of the corporation, and therefore Defendants lacked standing to raise them. Bank also asserted that Defendants' affirmative defenses were barred because they were subject to claim preclusion. The circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment to Bank. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendants' counterclaims and affirmative defenses were derivative and that they lacked standing to raise them in this action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bank was entitled to summary judgment dismissing all of Defendants' counterclaims, as each of the counterclaims was derivative; (2) Defendants' affirmative defenses did not defeat Bank's demand under the guaranties for payment; and (3) the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment to Bank because Defendants failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact showing payment was not due. View "Park Bank v. Westburg" on Justia Law

The circuit court dismissed the inverse condemnation claims of several landowners whose property was close or immediately adjacent to the regional airport. The landowners alleged that an extension of the airports runway by 1500 feet amounted to the compensable taking of an easement because the resulting overflights had adverse effects on their properties. The circuit court acknowledged that the subject properties had been adversely affected but concluded that for a taking to be compensable, the property owner must be deprived of practically all of the beneficial use of the property. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the standard for regulatory takings does not apply to physical occupation cases. At issue on appeal was what standard to apply in airplane overflight cases for determining a taking. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a taking occurs in airplane overflight cases when government action results in aircraft flying over a landowner's property low enough and with sufficient frequency to have a direct and immediate effect on the use and enjoyment of the property. View "Brenner v. City of New Richmond" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this action consisted of Heritage Farms and several other landowners whose properties were damaged as a result of a forest fire. A jury determined the fire was negligently caused by Jeffrey Knaack. Post-verdict, Plaintiffs moved for judgment against Knaack, the campground, and their respective insurers (Defendants) for double damages and attorney fees and costs under Wis. Stat. 26.21(1). The circuit court awarded Heritage Farms its attorney fees and costs but declined to double Heritage Farms' damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to section 26.21(1), if it is determined that the owner's property was injured or destroyed by a forest fire that occurred through willfulness, malice, or negligence, the property owner is entitled to double damages; (2) because the jury determined Heritage Farms' property was damaged by a forest fire caused by Knaack's negligence, Heritage Farms was entitled to double damages; (3) pursuant to Wis. Stat. 841.04(4), Heritage Farms was entitled to twelve percent interest on its double damages award from the date of the jury's verdict and to twelve percent interest on its award of attorney fees and costs from the date of that award; and (4) section 814.04(4) was constitutional.

In this forfeiture action, the State alleged that Defendant Basil Ryan unlawfully placed and maintained a sunken barge on the bed of the Menomonee River in violation of Wis. Stat. Ann. chapter 30. The circuit court concluded that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded Ryan from asserting that he did not own the barge, and it granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erroneously invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel, as two essential elements of the doctrine were not satisfied; and (2) summary judgment is not permitted in forfeiture actions for violations of chapter 30. Remanded.

Pursuant to its power of eminent domain, the Wisconsin DOT acquired the property of 260 North 12th Street, LLC and Basil Ryan (collectively, Ryan). A jury awarded Ryan $2,001,725 as just compensation. Over Ryan's objection, the jury was presented evidence concerning the environmental contamination of Ryan's property and the cost to remediate it. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) evidence of environmental contamination and of remediation costs are admissible in condemnation proceedings subject to the circuit court's discretion; (2) the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion when it admitted at trial testimony by the DOT's appraiser over Ryan's objection that the testimony was speculative; (3) the circuit court did not err when it excluded Ryan's expert witness as a result of Ryan's failure to timely disclose the witnesses in accordance with the court's scheduling order; and (4) the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion when it rejected Ryan's proposed jury instructions in favor of the standard jury instruction on fair market value in the case of a total taking.

In 2005, after the Town of Linwood assessed property owned by Stupar River for property tax purposes, Stupar River filed an objection with the town Board of Review, arguing that the 2005 assessment was significantly higher than its fair market value in violation of Wis. Stat. 70.32(1). The Board affirmed the assessed value. The circuit court remanded the action to the Board with instructions to reassess the subject property. The circuit court then affirmed the Board's determination. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the assessment upheld by the Board was made according to law and was supported by a reasonable view of the evidence.

This case involved litigation expenses under Wis. Stat. 32.28(3)(d) in a condemnation proceeding between defendant and plaintiffs, the condemnees, when defendant initiated condemnation proceedings against the condemnees under Wis. Stat. 32.06 for an easement to construct an electrical transmission line across the condemnees' property. At issue was whether litigation expenses should be awarded when an appeal was taken from a negotiated price recorded in a certificate of compensation. The court held that an owner who accepted the negotiated price under section 32.06(2a), timely appealed that price, and subsequently received an award from the county condemnation commission that exceeded the thresholds under section 32.28, should be awarded litigation expenses. The court also considered, but was not persuaded by various other arguments defendant made criticizing the circuit court's and the court's interpretation of section 32.06(a) and section 32.28(3)(d) that the condemnees in the present case should be awarded litigation expenses.