Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1997, the Courtenay C. Davis Foundation and Amy Davis (together, “Davis Interests”) entered into an agreement with the University of Wyoming Foundation and the Colorado State University Research Foundation (together, “University Foundations”) in which the Davis Interests donated land and other interests to the University Foundations subject to the terms of the agreement. In 2011, the University Foundations decided to sell the gifted property and listed it for sale. In 2012, the Davis Interests filed an action against the University Foundations seeking to enjoin the sale of the property. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the donation from the Davis Interests to the University Foundations was a gift, that the agreement did not create an implied trust, and that only the attorney general had standing to enforce the terms of a charitable gift. View "Courtenay C. & Lucy Patten Davis Found. v. Colo. State Univ. Research Found." on Justia Law

After Appellants purchased vacant property in Laramie they discovered that an apartment building on an adjacent property encroached five feet onto their property. Appellants brought an action against the owners of the apartment building (Appellees) seeking a declaration that they owned the encroaching portion of the apartment building, an order requiring that the building be partitioned and that Appellees be ejected from the building, and an apportionment of rental income earned from the apartment building. Appellees counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that they had an implied easement over portions of Appellants’ parcel occupied by the apartment building and requesting an injunction to enjoin Appellants from interfering with the implied easement. The district court (1) concluded Appellants had no ownership interest in the apartment building and denied the remainder of Appellants’ requests; and (2) ruled that Appellees were entitled to an implied easement on Appellants’ property to accommodate the apartment building and enjoined Appellants from interfering with Appellees’ use of that easement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in ruling that (1) Appellants had no ownership interest in the apartment building; and (2) Appellees held an implied easement on Appellants’ property. View "Miner v. Jesse & Grace, LLC" on Justia Law

Gary Hopkins and Randal Burnett formed a LLC and financed the project with a small business administration (SBA) loan. Bank 1 loaned the remainder of the total project costs. Hopkins secured the SBA portion of the loan with third mortgages on his rental properties. Bank 2 subsequently acquired Bank 1. After Burnett bought Hopkins' membership in the LLC, Bank 2 released Hopkins from his loan. However, an agreement entered into by the parties did not mention the third mortgages on the property held by SBA. Burnett subsequently defaulted on his loan obligations, and Bank foreclosed on the mortgage covering the business property. Because Hopkins' third mortgages on his rental properties were not released by SBA, Hopkins was forced to continue to make the payments on the SBA loan. Hopkins and his wife (Plaintiffs) sued Bank 2, Burnett, and the LLC, arguing that, pursuant to the agreement, Bank 2 was supposed to remove Hopkins' liability and the mortgages held on his property. The district court granted summary judgment for Bank 2. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the terms of the contract between the parties were unambiguous, extrinsic evidence was not required to discern the parties' intent, and Bank 2 had abided by the terms of the contract. View "Hopkins v. Bank of the West" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned property that was conveyed by warranty deed to J.A. Reed. In 1968, Reed conveyed the property to Julianne Biggane, and in 2006, the Biggane Trust transferred the property to Plaintiffs. Prior to Reed's transfer of the property to Biggane, a pole line easement across the property was granted to PacifiCorp's predecessor in interest. Reed, however, signed the easement grant as president of Continental Live Stock Company, rather than in his personal capacity, at a time that the company had no interest in the underlying land. Therefore, the easement was a "wild deed." At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a "wild deed" can be the "root of title" under the Wyoming Marketable Title Act. This case arose when Plaintiffs filed an action seeking to have the easement declared invalid because it emanated from a wild deed. The district court held that the Act validated PacifiCorp's easement across Plaintiffs' property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a wild deed may constitute the root of title under the Act, and a wild deed serving as a root of title that does not bear a defect "on its face" is not an "inherent defect" in the chain of record title under the Act. View "Esterholdt v. PacifiCorp" on Justia Law

Debtor borrowed money to finance a real estate purchase. Debtor signed a promissory note and secured the loan with a mortgage. Bank of America (BANA) became the owner of the note. After the mortgage was recorded, an assignment of the mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) was recorded. MERS subsequently assigned the mortgage to BAC Home Loans Servicing (BAC), which was servicing the loan on behalf of BANA. After Debtor defaulted on her home loan, she and her husband filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy trustee subsequently initiated an adversary proceeding against BAC, seeking to avoid the mortgage for its failure to comply with the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 34-2-122 and -123 (the statutes), notice statutes intended to protect third parties from conflicting claims of a principal and agent. The U.S. bankruptcy court filed a certification order to the Wyoming Supreme Court requesting the Court to answer with the mortgage must comply with the requirements of the statutes. The Supreme Court held that the statutes did not apply in this case because there were no conflicting claims by a principal and an agent from which a third party needed protection. View "Barney v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P." on Justia Law

The parties to the dispute were two rural landowners who owned easements crossing a parcel of ranchland. When Appellant improved the common roadway and asked his neighbor, Appellee, to contribute to the cost of the improvements, Appellee brought suit against Appellant seeking a declaratory judgment as to the parties' respective rights and duties relating to the maintenance and repair of the road. Appellee also sought injunctive relief and damages for Appellant's alleged interference with Appellee's use of the easement. Appellant counterclaimed for equitable contribution from Appellee for the costs he incurred in improving the road. The district court ruled in Appellee's favor. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's denial of Appellant's request for equitable contribution; but (2) reversed its declaration of the parties' rights regarding any future maintenance work and as to the rights of the parties to recover for repair and maintenance they perform. Remanded. View "Koch v. J&J Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

The Thornhocks filed an action against the Esterholdts and others seeking to quiet title to certain lands in Lincoln County. The district court granted summary judgment to the Thornocks as to some of the land but denied summary judgment as to a certain strip of property. After a bench trial, the district court quieted title in the disputed strip of land in the Esterholdts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an appurtenant easement was not created by a deed that granted, in addition to tracts of fee title land, also that "right of way to be used in connection with said land"; and (2) an appurtenant easement was not created by a deed that granted a "right-of-way" described as the land now in question. View "Thornock v. Esterholdt" on Justia Law

In 2006, Teton County voters approved a Teton County Housing Authority (TCHA) sponsored ballot initiative enabling a specific purpose excise tax (SPET) to raise $5 million for TCHA's affordable housing program. In 2007, TCHA purchased a five-acre property on Cheney Lane. Later that year, Plaintiffs, residents of the Cheney Lane neighborhood, initiated a declaratory judgment action against TCHA, alleging violations of SPET limitations, breach of investment duties, and violations of Wyoming statutory limits on public financing. Two weeks after the district court heard arguments on the motion to dismiss, the Village Road Coalition (VRC), a nonprofit corporation consisting of residents of a neighborhood near the Cheney Lane property, filed a motion to intervene. The district court denied the motion. The court subsequently granted TCHA's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because VRC's interests and relief sought were duplicative of those presented by Plaintiffs, the district court did not err in denying the motion to intervene; and (2) the district court properly dismissed TCHA's action for lack of standing, as Plaintiffs failed to allege a tangible interest that had been harmed by the acquisition of the property. View "Village Road Coal. v. Teton County Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

In 2001, Plaintiff offered to purchase a commercial property. Defendant was the real estate agent who prepared the offer. The sellers accepted the offer to purchase and prepared a property disclosure statement in compliance with the contract requirement. Plaintiff became the sole owner of the property in 2004. Two years later, Plaintiff discovered three inches of water in the building basement that had leaked through the west wall of the foundation of the building. In 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging he was negligent in failing to provide the property disclosure statement. The district court dismissed the action on account of the two-year statute of limitations having expired. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in ruling that Defendant had no duty to disclose or provide the property disclosure statement. The Supreme Court dismissed the case due to Plaintiff's failure to challenge the statute of limitations ruling by the district court. The Court also noted that the district court acknowledged that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to deliver the disclosure statement. View "Ferrell v. Knighten" on Justia Law

Greencore Pipeline Company filed an action seeking to condemn easements across property owned by Barlow Ranch for a pipeline to transport carbon dioxide. The parties reached an agreement on the terms of possession and scope of the easements but disputed the amount that would justly compensate Barlow for the partial taking of its property. During trial, Barlow presented evidence of prices paid for other comparable pipeline easements to show the air market value of Greencore's easement. The district court awarded compensation based upon the average of the amounts Greencore had paid other landowners for easements for its carbon dioxide pipeline. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) properly ruled that it could consider evidence of comparable easements in determining just compensation; (2) erred in concluding Barlow's proffered easements were not the result of arms' length transactions or sufficiently comparable, while the other Greencore easements were; (3) erred by concluding annual payments were not allowed under Wyoming law; and (4) correctly ruled that the issue of whether Greencore may abandon the pipeline in place was not properly before the Court. View "Barlow Ranch, LP v. Greencore Pipeline Co., LLC" on Justia Law