Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Decedent executed a pour-over will and a revocable inter vivos trust for the intended purpose of disinheriting her surviving Spouse, and thereby effectively destroying his elective share as to the property transferred to the trust. This appeal involved two consolidated cases. The district court granted summary judgment against Spouse in both matters, concluding (1) in the probate matter, the property transferred and held in the trust was not subject to the elective share; and (2) in the related civil action in which Spouse sought $125,000 from the trust as a creditor for work performed during the marriage on a building owned by Decedent and transferred to the trust, the claim was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly granted summary judgment in the probate matter because the property transferred to the Trust was never legally the property of Decedent's estate, and therefore, there was no legal basis for making the property a part of Decedent's estate for purposes of the elective share; and (2) the district court properly found that the failure of Spouse to file his civil complaint against the Estate deprived the court of jurisdiction.

Ralph and Wayne Platt were two brothers who, together with their siblings, inherited a ranch. Ralph and Wayne jointly owned and operated one half of the ranch, which they placed in the Platt Ranch Trust. After a dispute, Ralph and some siblings (Appellants) filed suit against Wayne and other siblings (Appellees), asserting a breach of trustee's duties and seeking a partition of the ranch. The district court found that Appellants were entitled to part of the estate and appointed three commissioners to make a partition of the property. The district court affirmed the partition of the estate as recommended by the commissioners with two exceptions. Appellants subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend judgment and/or motion for new partition, arguing that the district court did not have the authority to modify the partition recommended by the commissioners. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, the district court was authorized as a matter of law to unilaterally modify the partition made by the commissioners in order to obviate the parties' objections to the report.

When Daniel Gallagher, who purchased property west of land owned by J&T Properties, discovered he did not have access to a nearby public road, Gallagher petitioned the Board of County Commissioners for a private road across J&T's property. The county commissioners concluded that Gallagher had no legally enforceable access and certified the case to district court. The district court granted Gallagher a private road across J&T's property. J&T appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted the law as allowing the condemnation of a private road even though it did not connect directly with a public road and properly refused to require Gallagher to join the owners of land over which he already had easements; and (2) the issue of whether the district court erred by denying J&T reimbursement for the costs of securing and presenting the appraisal used in determining its damages was not properly presented to the district court or the Supreme Court, and therefore, the Court refused to consider the issue.

George Sonnett, Jr. and Wendy Burgers-Sonnett purchased twenty acres of land and improvements from Elk Ridge Lodge, which Elk Ridge conveyed by warranty deed. The Sonnetts financed part of the purchase price by giving Elk Ridge a promissory note secured by a mortgage on the property. After the Sonnetts defaulted on the note, Elk Ridge filed suit against the Sonnetts seeking judgment and foreclosure on the property, and the Sonnetts filed counterclaims alleging breach of warranty. Both parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Elk Ridge on its foreclosure claim and denied Elk Ridge's request for attorneys' fees. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions in both appeals, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Elk Ridge and in denying summary judgment to the Sonnetts on their counterclaim of breach of warranty; (2) the record did not support the applicability of the Sonnetts' equitable defenses of equitable estoppel, waiver, or laches; and (3) the district court reasonably concluded that Elk Ridge was not entitled to attorneys' fees.

After Barbara Magin purchased property in the Solitude subdivision, the Solitude site committee informed her that pre-existing fences and a barn were in violation of the subdivision covenants. Solitude filed a complaint against Magin, alleging violations of the covenants and seeking to recover attorney fees. Attorney Glenn Ford, who practiced in the same firm as the first attorney Magin hired before retaining other counsel, acted as Solitude's counsel. No written waiver of conflict was executed. Magin filed a motion to disqualify Ford from acting as Solitude's counsel due to conflict of interest. The motion was dismissed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Solitude. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Solitude's counsel had a conflict of interest, but the district court did not err by refusing to disqualify the firm because Magin's motion to disqualify was untimely; (2) the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Solitude; and (3) the district court abused its discretion by ordering Magin to pay the attorney fees generated by her former firm because it failed to segregate the non-recoverable fees associated with clearing the conflict.

Joyce Anderson and Jerry Allen were involved in a long-term, non-marital relationship. Upon separation, the parties entered into a settlement agreement stating that each should have ownership of personal property in their respective possession. Allen later claimed some of the items Anderson took were his and filed a motion seeking recovery of those items through enforcement of the terms of the settlement agreement. The district court determined that Allen failed to claim the personal property at issue in a timely fashion and thus effectively abandoned his claim to it. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision that Allen had no claim to the property at issue but did so on separate grounds. The Court concluded that the settlement agreement granted ownership of the real property, including the shed in which the items at issue were located, to Anderson free of any claim or demand of Allen. All personal property on the land therefore was in Anderson's possession and granted to her under the terms of the settlement agreement.

Petitioner entered into a contract with respondent for the construction of a hotel. After seventeen months of work on the project, petitioner terminated the contract with respondent and respondent subsequently filed a lien against the hotel property for amounts it claimed remained owing. Petitioner filed a petition to strike the lien pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-1-311(b), which the district court denied on the ground that petitioner failed to prove respondent knew, when it filed its claim of lien, that the lien was groundless or contained a material misstatement or false claim. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the district court improperly placed the burden of proof on petitioner and that the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous. The court affirmed and held that, although it agreed that the burden of proof under the statute was on the lien claimant, the court found that the district court's ruling was properly based on the evidence presented by the lien claimant, respondent, and on the failure of petitioner to allege proper grounds for relief under the statute.

In consolidated appeals, plaintiff challenged the district court's conclusions that its property was properly included in the South of Laramie Water and Sewer District ("district") and that the district lawfully issued certain general obligation bonds. Plaintiff also challenged the refusal of the Board of County Commissioners of Albany County ("board") to exclude plaintiff's property from the district. The court affirmed Docket No. S-10-0199 and held that plaintiff was barred from challenging the inclusion of its property in the district and found that the district's proposed general obligation bond issue was not unlawful. In Docket No. S-10-0238, the court answered certified questions related to the Wyoming board of county commissioners' power to remove real property from a water and sewer district and the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Claim I under section 12(b)(6) where a motion to dismiss under section 12(b)(6) was an appropriate vehicle in which to raise the issue of the passage of a period of limitations; where Wyo. State. Ann 41-10-107(g) unambiguously forbade any "petition in error [or] other appeal" from a board's resolution establishing a water district, and unambiguously stated that the "organization of the district shall not be directly or collaterally questioned in any suit, action or proceeding" except "an action in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, commenced by the attorney general within thirty (30) days after the resolution..."; and where there was no inherent right to appeal from administrative action.