Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Wilsons purchased and restored the Soda Rock Winery’s century-old building, which backs to the Belle Terre vineyard, with an “avenue” between. Its front entrance is on Highway 128; to enter the winery from the back, users must use Soda Rock Lane, then the avenue. When the Wilsons bought the property they did not know whether they had any right to use the avenue, buts used it for deliveries and heavy equipment. Belle Terre used the avenue for vineyard equipment. Dick, president of Belle Terre, testified he did not complain because he was trying to be neighborly. The avenue was always considered part of Belle Terre, never used by anyone else. When the Wilsons sought permits to complete the renovation, Belle Terre raised concerns. Conditions in the 2004 permit limited access: “Should the applicant choose … access from Soda Rock Lane, an application for modification … shall be required.” Nonetheless, the Wilsons used the avenue. In 2008, Dick complained that a cement truck was generating dust on the avenue, damaging crops. He told the Wilsons to stop trespassing. He later filed suit. The trial court permanently enjoined further trespass, awarded $1 for past trespass, and awarded attorney fees of $117,000. The court of appeal affirmed as to the boundary dispute, future trespass, and nominal damages, but reversed the award of attorney fees. View "Belle Terre Ranch, Inc. v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were a private company that owned property in the town of Rocky Hill and a company overseeing the development of a nursing home on that property. Defendants contracted with the state to provide nursing home services to state prisoners and others in state custody. The town filed an action against Defendants claiming noncompliance with its zoning regulations. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding (1) Defendants were an “arm of the state” entitled to sovereign immunity; and (2) even if Defendants were not shielded by sovereign immunity as an arm of the state, the town’s zoning authority over the project was preempted by Conn. Gen. Stat. 17b-372a, which permits certain state officials to contract for the establishment of nursing home facilities for state prisoners and individuals receiving services from the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants were not immune from suit as an arm of the state; and (2) by enacting section 17b-372a, the legislature did not intend to preempt the application of local zoning laws to facilities established on private land under the authority of that provision. View "Town of Rocky Hill v. SecureCare Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

Pisgah Mountain, LLC applied to the Town of Clifton Planning Board for approval to construct and operate a wind energy project. Peter and Julie Beckford, who own land adjacent to the proposed development site, timely appealed the Board’s decision to the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA). The ZBA denied the appeal. Thereafter, the Beckfords filed a complaint in superior court pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B. Pisgah and the Town moved to dismiss the Beckfords’ complaint on the ground that it was filed outside of the forty-five-day appeal period. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the forty-five-day appeal period started when the ZBA issued its written findings and decision and not on the day the ZBA voted to deny the appeal. The court then vacated the Board’s decision to approve the permit. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the statutory appeal period commenced with the ZBA’s public vote, and therefore, the Beckfords’ Rule 80B appeal was untimely filed. View "Beckford v. Town of Clifton" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, applicants sought to change their use of an absolute water right. Applicants conducted a historical consumptive use (HCU) analysis to determine the amount of water previously used in accordance with its decreed right. Applicants performed the analysis on acreage not contemplated by the original appropriation nor any subsequent decree. The water court rejected the HCU. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether applicant could conduct an HCU on acreage not associated with the relevant water right. After review of the parties' arguments in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that a HCU on acreage beyond its associated water right is impermissible. The Court affirmed the water court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Widefield Water v. Witte" on Justia Law

In 2011, Ted Price, as Trustee of the Price Family Trust, filed an application for the establishment of a private road asserting that his property had no outlet to or connection with a public road. The Crook County Board of Commissioners denied the application on the ground that Price already had access to his property from at least two existing public roads. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board’s decision denying Price’s private road application was supported by substantial evidence, the actions of the Board were not arbitrary or capricious, and the record did not establish the level of inconvenience required to establish necessity; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Price’s request that the final result be set aside due to malfunctioning audio equipment. View "Price v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

After prevailing in a condemnation action, petitioners-landowners moved for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 28-2-510(B)(1) of the Eminent Domain Procedure Act. Contrary to petitioners' view, the circuit court determined attorneys' fees should be awarded based on an hourly rate via a lodestar calculation rather than the contingency fee agreement between Petitioners and their attorney. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court interpreted section 28-2-510 and concluded the General Assembly intended for attorneys' fees to be awarded based on a constellation of factors. Specifically, section 28-2-510(B)(1) mandated that in order for a prevailing landowner to recover reasonable attorneys' fees he or she must submit an application for fees "necessarily incurred." Therefore, by implication, the General Assembly precluded a landowner from recovering attorneys' fees based solely on a contingency fee agreement without regards for section 28-2-510. The Court explained that even though the contingency fee agreement is not the sole element in the calculation, it is still a significant component as it may be used to explain the basis for the fee charged by the landowner's counsel. "Our decision should not be construed as somehow condemning or eliminating an attorney's use of a contingency fee agreement. To the contrary, we recognize that the use of these agreements is a legitimate and well-established practice for attorneys throughout our state. This practice may still be pursued. Yet, it is with the caveat that the terms of the agreement are not controlling. Rather, they constitute one factor in a constellation of factors for the court's consideration in determining an award of reasonable litigation expenses to a prevailing landowner under section 28-2-510(B)(1). The court may, in fact, conclude that the contingency fee agreement yields a reasonable fee. However, the court is not bound by the terms of the agreement. " For this case, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals misapplied case law precedent. Furthermore, the Court concluded the circuit court failed to conduct the correct statutory analysis, and remanded this matter to the circuit court. Petitioners' counsel was instructed to submit an itemized statement in compliance with section 28-2-510(B)(1) as counsel's original affidavit failed to identify the "fee charged" and the actual number of hours expended. View "South Carolina Dept. of Trans. v. Revels" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on the correct application of those statutes and regulations pertinent to an invaluable (environmentally, economically, and socially) stretch of tidelands located on the edge of a spit of land along the South Carolina coast. A landowner and real estate developer sought a permit to construct a bulkhead and revetment stretching over 2,700 feet in length and 40 feet in width over the State's tidelands, thereby permanently altering 111,320 square feet or over 2.5 acres of pristine tidelands. The landowner sought to halt ongoing erosion along that stretch of tidelands in order to facilitate a residential development on the adjacent highland area. The Department of Health and Environmental Control denied the majority of the requested permit and granted a small portion to protect an existing county park. An administrative law court (ALC) disagreed and found a permit should be granted for the entire structure, and this appeal followed. The Supreme Court concluded the ALC committed several errors of law and therefore, it reversed and remanded for further consideration. View "Kiawah Development v. South Carolina Dept. of Health & Env. Ctrl." on Justia Law

The Carmelita aggregate mine and processing plants, proposed for 1,500 acres at the base of the Sierra Nevada foothills near Sanger and Reedley, includes a reclamation plan for creating a usable postmining site. Fresno County prepared and certified an environmental impact report (EIR). The State Mining and Geology Board (SMGB) remanded. The county approved a revised reclamation plan. On second appeal, the SMGB affirmed. While the first SMGB appeal was pending, objectors sued, alleging abuse of discretion under the California Environmental Quality Act, Pub. Resources Code, 21000 (CEQA). The trial court denied the petition. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the matter was not ripe when the trial court ruled because SMGB had granted the first appeal and that the county approved the EIR while the reclamation plan was invalid. The court also rejected CEQA challenges that: the project description was inadequate; conclusions regarding water issues lacked substantial evidence; the county should have required acquisition of agricultural conservation easements to mitigate loss of farmland; the EIR’s discussion of potential air quality, hydrology and noise impacts were inadequate; the final EIR contained new information and erroneous conclusions; and no substantial evidence supported required findings for a conditional use permit. View "Friends of the Kings River v. County of Fresno" on Justia Law

Two landowners owned property served by a regional sewer district. The district had perfected liens against the properties due to the landowners’ failure to pay fees and penalties. The trial court listed the properties to be sold at a tax sale to satisfy obligations for the unpaid sewer bills. The landowners subsequently petitioned the circuit court to remove their properties from the tax sale list. The circuit court granted the petitions, concluding that because the district maintained the only lien, the district was precluded from foreclosing on the parcels pursuant to Ind. Code 13-26-14-4. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the foreclosure prohibition of Ind. Code 13-26-14-4, which governs the collection of regional sewer district sewer liens, does not apply to collection by tax sale; and (2) because the district did not seek collection of the landowners’ unpaid fees and penalties through the lien foreclosure method, but rather employed the tax sale method, the lien foreclosure prohibition clause did not apply. Remanded.View "In re Carroll County 2013 Tax Sale" on Justia Law

In April of 2008, Kane County Utah brought an action under the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. 2409a, to quiet title to five roads or road segments. It later amended its complaint to cover a total of fifteen roads or road segments. The QTA contains a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for the settlement of property claims against the United States. This case centered on a dispute between Kane County (joined by the State of Utah as intervenors) and the United States over the existence and breadth of the County’s rights-of-way on federally owned land in Southern Utah. In 2013, the district court issued two final orders giving rise to the issues presented to the Tenth Circuit on appeal. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred in allowing for unspecified improvements in setting the widths of the rights-of-way on Skutumpah, Swallow Park and North Swag roads. The case was remanded on the question of the scope of the R.S. 2477 rights-of-way on these roads. The County did not explain how it arrived at “disputed title” to Sand Dunes, Hancock or the Cave Lakes roads; the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court and find it had no jurisdiction over the QTA claims to Sand Dunes and Hancock roads and reversed its decision with respect to those roads. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Kane County, Utah v. United States" on Justia Law