Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code 30000) requires a coastal development permit (CDP) for any “development” resulting in a change in the intensity of use of, or access to, land or water in a coastal zone. In December 2018, Los Angeles adopted the Home-Sharing Ordinance, imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals, with mechanisms to enforce those restrictions. Objectors sought to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance in the Venice coastal zone until the city obtains a CDP, claiming the Ordinance constituted a “development” requiring a CDP.The trial court denied relief, finding the petition time-barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009, and that the Ordinance does not create a change in intensity of use and, therefore, is not a “development” requiring a CDP. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the 90-day statute of limitations applies, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The court did not address whether the Ordinance constitutes a “development” subject to the CDP requirements of the Coastal Act. View "Coastal Act Protectors v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court granting Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants, Madison Beach Hotel, LLC and Madison Beach Hotel of Florida, LLC, from hosting a summer concert series at a public park adjacent to the Madison Beach Hotel, holding that there was no error.On appeal, the appellate court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting Plaintiffs' request for an injunction because the concerts did not violate the Madison zoning regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' interpretation of the zoning regulations was untenable and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error. View "Pfister v. Madison Beach Hotel, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Gautier granted David Vindich a permit to build a 1,410 square foot garage/workshop on his .76 acre lot. When the building was almost completed, Vindich’s neighbor, Martin Wheelan, filed a lawsuit arguing the City’s decision was unlawful because Vindich actually sought a variance, which required a public hearing rather than a building permit. Thus, Wheelan said he was denied due process. Wheelan also claimed the City’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that the workshop “completely overwhelm[ed]” the neighborhood and created a nuisance. After a trial, the chancellor dismissed Wheelan’s claims, finding that the City’s interpretation of the applicable ordinance was not manifestly unreasonable. The chancellor also found that the building was not a nuisance. Wheelan appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's dissenting opinion, finding the City erred in its interpretation of the ordinance at issue here. The Court therefore reversed the Court of appeals and the chancery court, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wheelan v. City of Gautier, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Appellants' appeal from the decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Shelton approving an application for a planned development district submitted by Shelter Ridge Associates, LLC, holding that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) contrary to Appellants' argument on appeal, the zoning authority conferred by Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-2 supports the creation of planned development districts; (2) the planned development district proposed by Shelter Ridge did not violate the uniformity requirement contained in section 8-2; and (3) the Commission’s decision did not result in an unlawful subdivision. View "Tillman v. Planning & Zoning Commission of the City of Shelton" on Justia Law

The Army Corps of Engineers denied a permit to build student housing on the Russellville property, next to Arkansas Tech University. The land is bordered by two waterways. Downstream from the tract, the Corps maintains the Russellville Dike and Prairie Creek Pumping Station to protect Russellville from flooding by pumping water into the backwaters of the Arkansas River, away from the city. Upstream from the station is a sump, 730 acres of low-lying land that holds water that then flows toward the pumping station, The Corps purchased flowage easements giving it the right to flood the land subject to those easements to a certain elevation. Part of the tract at issue lies within the sump and is subject to an easement, "that no structures for human habitation shall be constructed." The owner proposed four apartment buildings on land subject to the easement.The Eighth Circuit upheld the denial of a permit. It is unlawful for anyone "in any manner whatever [to] impair the usefulness of any . . . work built by the United States . . . to prevent floods" unless the Corps permits it, 33 U.S.C. 408(a). The proposed construction would impair the usefulness of the Corps's pumping station. The Corps found that the structures would result in water velocities and depths that would be "a significant hazard that can deny escape," and "may threaten the lives and security of the people and property in Russellville.” View "Russellville Legends LLC v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' appeal from a decision of the Madison County Board of Commissioners for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction.At issue in this appeal was the Madison County Board of Commissioners' approval of the Elkhorn Valley Sportsman Club's application for a conditional use permit. Appellants appealed the Board's decision to the district court, which dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the docket fee. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellants' subsequent appeal, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing this appeal from the Board's determination for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Kowalewski v. Madison County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

In 2010, the city certified an environmental impact report (EIR) and approved a specific plan for property located next to San Francisco Bay. CCCR challenged the plan under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000, CEQA). The court identified deficiencies in the EIR. The city prepared a recirculated EIR (REIR) that remedied the deficiency. The REIR found the specific plan could have significant impacts due to the destruction of endangered species habitats and discussed the impacts of climate change and sea-level rise. The city certified the final REIR, readopted the 2010 specific plan, and executed a development agreement. In 2016, the city approved a subdivision map for 386 housing units. In 2019, another subdivision map proposed 469 additional residential lots. The city prepared a checklist comparing the REIR’s analysis of the specific plan with the impacts of the subdivision map and concluded the proposed subdivision would be consistent with the specific plan, and that no changed circumstances or new information required additional environmental review. The city posted the checklist for public comment, responded to comments, then approved the subdivision map.The court of appeal affirmed. The project was exempt from further CEQA review under Government Code 65457 because it implemented and was consistent with the specific plan. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that no project changes, changed circumstances, or new information required additional analysis. The deferral of analysis of potential flood control projects to address sea-level rise in the latter half of this century was proper. View "Citizens' Committee to Complete the Refuge v. City of Newark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the appellate court reversing in part the judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiffs, the town of South Windsor and its zoning enforcement officer and remanding the case for a new trial on count two of the complaint, holding that the appellate court improperly remanded the case.The trial court assessed a fine and imposed injunctive relief for certain zoning violations pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-12. The appellate court remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court had improperly assessed a fine on Defendant for zoning violations for a period of time that she was under lawful orders not to disturb her property because of an ongoing fire investigation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no dispute remained as to Defendant's liability for the zoning violations alleged in count two of Plaintiffs' complaint. View "Town of South Windsor v. Lanata" on Justia Law

Tran applied to the Department of Regional Planning for renewal of the conditional use permit (CUP) for his unincorporated Los Angeles County liquor store. Considering the store’s location and site plan, information from the California Department of Alcohol and Beverage Control, a crime report, and letters from the public, the Department recommended approval of the CUP subject to conditions. Tran objected to conditions limiting the hours of alcohol sales to 6:00 a.m.-10:00 p.m., and that distilled spirits not be sold in small containers. The Commission approved the CUP with the recommended small bottle prohibition but permitting alcohol sales from 6:00 a.m.-2:00 a.m. The County Board of Supervisors voted to review the approval. At the close of an August 1, 2017, hearing the Board voted to indicate its "intent to approve” the CUP, restricting alcohol sales to 10:00 a.m-10:00 p.m. and forbidding small bottle sales. About eight months later, the Board adopted the findings and conditions of approval prepared by county counsel and approved the CUP with the modified conditions.Tran unsuccessfully sought a judicial order to set aside the decision as untimely under the County Code, which provides that review decisions “shall be rendered within 30 days of the close of the hearing” The court of appeal vacated the Board’s decision. The 30-day time limit was mandatory, not directory. The Board failed to render its decision within 30 days. View "Tran v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Landowners own parcels of land adjacent to a 2.45-mile strip of a Union Pacific railroad line in McLennan County, Texas. Union Pacific’s predecessor in interest, Texas Central originally acquired the Line in 1902 through multiple deeds executed by the Landowners’ predecessors in interest. The Landowners sued, seeking compensation based on a theory that their predecessors in interest had conferred only easements to Texas Central, and that the Surface Transportation Board (STB) enforcement of the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1241, by “railbanking” amounted to a “taking” of their property. Railbanking involves the transition of unused railroad corridors into recreational hiking and biking trails, generally by a transfer of an interest in the use of a rail corridor to a third-party entity. The Claims Court interpreted the deeds as having conveyed fee simple estates, not easements.The Federal Circuit affirmed. No takings from the Landowners occurred when the government later authorized conversion of the railroad line to a recreation trail; the granting clauses of the subject deeds unambiguously conveyed fee simple interests in the land and not easements despite contradictory language elsewhere in the deeds. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law