Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Barber owns land adjacent to Mill Pond and the Mill Pond Dam (built 1836) in Springfield Township, Michigan. Parts of her property “run directly into the Mill Pond” and include parts of the pond itself. The Township and the County (Defendants) are jointly responsible for maintaining the Dam. In 2018, Oakland County conducted a study. The Township ultimately recommended removing the Dam. Defendants hired engineering firms and allocated money to the project. A local newspaper article titled “Mill Pond Dam to be Removed Next Year,” ran in March 2021. Barber alleges that removing the Dam, among other things, will decrease her property value, interfere with her riparian rights, deprive her of her right to use and enjoy her land, physically damage her property, “will likely pollute, impair and destroy natural resources, including . . . surface water, wetlands, and wildlife and natural habitat,” and “may cause flooding and property damage.” She sought to enjoin the Dam-removal project, alleging that it would constitute a taking under the federal and Michigan constitutions and a trespass under Michigan law.The district court granted the Defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding Barber’s claims ripe, and that she has standing to sue. She plausibly alleges that she faces a risk of “concrete” and “particularized” injuries. Plaintiffs may sue for injunctive relief even before a physical taking has happened. View "Barber v. Charter Township of Springfield, Michigan" on Justia Law

The Rice family planned to annex their 80-acre farm into the Village of Johnstown and have it zoned for residential development. The Johnstown Planning and Zoning Commission rejected the Rice application at the preliminary stage. The family claimed that Johnstown had unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the Commission, violating its due process rights, and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The district court held that because the farm was not located in Johnstown, but in adjacent Monroe Township, the family lacked standing to bring its claim and granted Johnstown summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Whatever the merits of the claim, the family has standing to bring it. Because the Johnstown ordinance has since been amended, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Only the claim for damages survives. Establishing standing at the summary judgment stage requires “a factual showing of perceptible harm.” The family alleges that because of Johnstown’s unconstitutional delegation to the Commission, its zoning application was subjected to a standardless and conclusive review by allegedly private parties who acted for arbitrary reasons; they have shown a procedural injury. While a procedural right alone is insufficient to create Article III standing, the family’s procedural injury is tied to its economic interest in developing its property. Without the Commission’s approval, their development plans could not proceed; the family is no bystander. View "Rice v. Village of Johnstown, Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's dismissal of this appeal from the decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Bethel denying Plaintiffs' application for a special permit to construct a crematory on their property, holding that the denial was not supported by substantial evidence.Plaintiffs applied for a special permit to construct a crematory on their property. The Commission denied the application. Relying on St. Joseph's High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 170 A.3d 73 (Conn. 2017), the trial court dismissed Plaintiff's ensuing appeal, concluding that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record did not reveal substantial evidence on which the Commission based its decision. View "McLoughlin v. Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

Fraser Township filed a complaint against Harvey and Ruth Ann Haney, seeking a permanent injunction to enforce its zoning ordinance and to prevent defendants from raising on their commercially zoned property, hogs or other animals that would violate the zoning ordinance, to remove an allegedly nonconforming fence, and to plow and coat the ground with nontoxic material. Defendants brought a hog onto their property as early as 2006, and defendants maintained hogs on their property through the time this lawsuit was filed in 2016. Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred by the six-year statutory period of limitations in MCL 600.5813. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that because the case was an action in rem, the statute of limitations did not apply. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the statute of limitations applied. Finding that the appellate court erred in concluding the statute of limitations applied, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Township of Fraser v. Haney" on Justia Law

In 2011, Lafferty sought to develop 76 homes on a 31.7-acre Garaventa Hills site in Livermore. A 2012 draft environmental impact report recognized that any alterations to existing drainage patterns may affect the quantity, timing, and quality of precipitation needed to maintain a functioning ecosystem. There was considerable opposition to Lafferty’s proposal. Lafferty reduced the number of residential units to 47, eliminated a vehicular bridge over Altamont Creek, and preserved a large rock outcropping. The final environmental impact report (FEIR) was released in 2014. The planning commission recommended that the city reject Lafferty’s second proposal. The city council declined to certify the FEIR. In 2017, Lafferty proposed a smaller-scale project with 44 new residences. According to the reissued FEIR (RFEIR), the project would result in the permanent removal of 31.78 acres of grasslands with an additional 1.18 acres being temporarily disturbed for construction; various mitigation measures were proposed, including the acquisition of an 85-acre compensatory mitigation site. The city certified the RFEIR and approved the Project.Opponents filed suit under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 2100). The court of appeal reversed and remanded. Opponents raised a challenge to the adequacy of the RFEIR’s analysis of the “no project” alternative that is both preserved for appeal and meritorious. View "Save the Hill Group v. City of Livermore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' petition for review of a decision of the Board of County Commissioners, Lincoln County under Wyo. R. App. P. 12 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. 16-3-114, holding that the district court abused its discretion by sanctioning Appellants with dismissal of their petition for review.The district court dismissed Appellants' petition, determining that Wyo. R. App. P. 2.06 required a transcript to be filed within sixty days of the filing of the petition for review of agency action and that no transcript was filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court misstated and misapplied Rule 2.06; (2) the Board failed to transmit the record as required by Rule 12.07; and (3) because the Board, not Appellants, had the responsibility to transmit the entire record to the district court, the court abused its discretion by dismissing the action. View "Depiero v. Board of County Commissioners, Lincoln County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the action of the Deuel County Board of Adjustment (Board) unanimously approving the application filed by Crowned Ridge Wind II, LLC for a special exception permit (SEP) to construct and operate a wind energy system (WES) in Deuel County, holding that there was no error.In 2004, the Deuel County Board of County Commissioners adopted the Deuel County Zoning Ordinance, which created the Board and authorized it to decide requests for "special exceptions" from zoning standards. In 2018, Crowned Ridge sought an SEP from the Board for the construction and operation of a WES with up to sixty-eight wind turbines to be build on property zoned for agricultural use. The Board granted the SEP, and the circuit court upheld the decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ordinance complied with the statuary requirements of S.D. Codified Laws 11-2-17.3, and therefore, the Board acted within its jurisdiction by considering crowned Ridge's application for an SEP; (2) the Board acted within the requirements of the ordinance and S.D. Codified Laws chapter 11-2; and (3) as to Appellants, landowners in Deuel County, the Board did not illegally grant an easement over Appellants' property, nor did the ordinance violate due process. View "Ehlebracht v. Deuel County Planning Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this litigation related to the expansion of an agricultural zoning district through citizen initiative to include the area where Montana Artesian Water Company had been developing a large-scale water bottling plant, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.At issue on appeal was whether Montana Artesian's water bottling facility was a valid nonconforming use under the Egan Slough Zoning District Regulations. Montana Artesian raised numerous issues on cross appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly denied Montana Artesian's motion for summary judgment on the validity of the ballot initiative process; (2) did not err in affirming the conclusion that Montana Artesian's facility was a legal nonconforming use; and (3) did not err in concluding that the initiative was not unconstitutional or illegal reverse spot zoning. View "Egan Slough Community, Yes! v. Flathead County Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Five adjacent Burtonsville, Maryland parcels are restricted from receiving sewer service. Several previous attempts to obtain approval of water and sewer category change requests were unsuccessful. The owners' alternative plan was to sell to a religious organization. They believed that land-use regulations must submit to “[c]hurch use [which] cannot be denied.” They entered into a contract with Canaan, contingent on the approval of the extension of a public sewer line for a new church. Such an extension required amendment of the Comprehensive Ten-Year Water Supply and Sewerage Systems Plan, which involves the Montgomery County Planning Board, the County Executive, the County Council, public hearings, and the Maryland Department of the Environment.Following denial of their requests, the owners sued under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claims. The land has been bound by decades of regulations restricting development for both religious and non-religious purposes. The parties were aware of the difficulties in developing the property when they entered into the contract; they could not have a reasonable expectation of religious land use. The restrictions are rationally related to the government’s interest in protecting the region’s watershed. View "Canaan Christian Church v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

New Harvest challenged a Salinas ordinance prohibiting religious and other assemblies from operating on the ground floor of buildings facing Main Street within the downtown area. The ordinance prohibited it from hosting worship services on the ground floor of its newly-purchased building. New Harvest claimed the ordinance substantially burdened its religious exercise and treated New Harvest on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The district court granted the city summary judgment. New Harvest sold the building; the Ninth Circuit treated claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as moot.Addressing claims for damages, the court reversed in part. The ordinance facially violated RLUIPA's equal terms provision. Other nonreligious assemblies, such as theatres, are permitted to operate on the first floor of the Restricted Area and are similarly situated to religious assemblies with respect to the provision’s stated purpose and criterion. New Harvest failed to demonstrate a substantial burden on its religious exercise; it could have conducted services on the second floor or by reconfiguring the first floor and was not precluded from using other available sites within Salinas. When it purchased the building, New Harvest was on notice that the ordinance prohibited services on the first floor. View "New Harvest Christian Fellowship v. City of Salinas" on Justia Law