Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Schmier converted Berkley apartment units into condominiums. Berkeley ordinances then required that he record Affordable Housing Fee liens based on a formula. Schmier's lien agreements that provided, “Execution of this document shall not prejudice the right of the undersigned to challenge the validity of the Affordable Housing Fee. In the event that the Affordable Housing Fee is ... rescinded … this lien shall be void.” Schmier alleged that in 2008, Berkeley rescinded that ordinance. The new section includes a different formula. In 2019, Schmier advised Berkeley of the sale of the property. Berkeley requested an affordable housing fee of $147,202.66, calculated under the rescinded ordinance. Under the current ordinance, the fee would have been less than half of what was requested.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of the suit, as barred by a 90-day statute of limitations (Subdivision Map Act, Gov. Code, 66499.37). Schmier did not challenge the requirement that he execute a lien agreement, nor did he challenge the adoption of the former ordinance, its alleged recission, or adoption of a new section; Schmier’s complaint is not subject to the Map Act’s limitations period. Even assuming the 90-day period applied, it could not have begun to run until Berkeley rejected Schmier’s assertion that the lien agreement was no longer operative when the city rescinded the former ordinance. The language of the lien agreements is ambiguous, rendering both asserted constructions arguably reasonable. View "Schmier v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Spink County Board of Adjustment (Board) to deny the application filed by Arrow Farms RE, LLC for a conditional use permit (CUP) for a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO), holding that there was no error.Preston Miles, who owned the land where Arrow Farms planned to build the CAFO, petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Board's decision was arbitrary and that several Board members were biased or held an unreasonable risk of bias. The circuit court affirmed the denial of the CUP, determining that none of the Board members had a disqualifying interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Miles was not entitled to relief on his allegations. View "Miles v. Spink County Board of Adjustment" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court sustaining Plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the Board of Representatives of the City of Stamford rejecting a zoning amendment approved by the Zoning Board of the City of Stamford, holding that the board of representatives did not have the authority to determine the validity of the petition.Local property owners filed a protest petition opposing the amendment. After determining that the protest petition was valid, the board of representatives considered and rejected the amendment. The trial court sustained Plaintiff's appeal, concluding that the board of representatives did not have the authority to consider whether the petition was valid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in concluding that the board of representatives did not have the authority to determine the validity of the protest petition; but (2) the petition was valid because it contained the requisite number of signatures. View "High Ridge Real Estate Owner, LLC v. Board of Representatives" on Justia Law

The Army Corps of Engineers designed a stormwater diversion system for Pond Creek, which drains into a large watershed in the Louisville area. It included Pond Creek’s tributary, Fishpool Creek, and a nearby basin, Vulcan Quarry. The Corps suggested connecting the two through a spillway. The Corps partnered with Metro Sewer District (MSD). MSD filed an eminent domain action. The court awarded MSD only an easement over the quarry and refused to impose water treatment obligations on the easement. MSD’s stream construction permit from the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet did not require treatment of the water or cleaning up any pollutants.In 2000, the project was completed. South Side bought Vulcan Quarry in 2012 and claimed that MSD had exceeded its easement by diverting all of Fishpool Creek. In 2018, South Side sent MSD notice of its intent to sue for violations of the Clean Water Act’s (CWA) “prohibition on the dumping of pollutants into U.S. waters,” the easement, and Kentucky-issued permits. The district court dismissed certain claims as time-barred and others because the notice failed to identify sewage as a pollutant, provide dates the pollution took place, and describe the source of the pollution.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MSD did not need a CWA discharge permit when it built the spillway and does not need one now. The waters of Fishpool Creek and Vulcan Quarry are not meaningfully distinct; the spillway is the kind of water transfer that is exempt from the permitting process. View "South Side Quarry, LLC v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District" on Justia Law

This appeal presented a question of first impression in Mississippi as to whether short-term rentals of private homes through online services such as Airbnb, VRBO, and HomeAway were residential uses of property for the purposes of a restrictive covenant. The trial court’s finding that Clyde Esplin’s use of his property was residential and that short-term rentals were allowed under the covenants was affirmed as was the trial court's finding that the amended bylaws restricting property rentals were invalid. View "Lake Serene Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Esplin" on Justia Law

The Okay Public Works Authority (OPWA) appealed a jury verdict in an inverse condemnation lawsuit. The jury found that a taking occurred when OPWA installed wastewater sewer lines in a mobile home community. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the district court's judgment holding OPWA did not possess the power of eminent domain over the installation of wastewater sewer lines. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari, and held that the Legislature granted eminent domain power to OPWA for the transportation, delivery, treatment, and furnishing of water for domestic purposes, which included the power to install wastewater sewer lines in the mobile home community. View "Barnett v. Okay Public Works Authority" on Justia Law

Stephan Byrd and Erika Mullins jointly filed an application for an encroachment permit with the Idaho Department of Lands to add boat lifts to their existing two-family dock on Priest Lake. Neighbors Cal Larson and Steven Coffey objected the application, arguing that Coffey owned a strip of land between the ordinary high water mark of Priest Lake and the waterward boundary lines of the Appellants’ properties. Following an administrative hearing, the Department of Lands denied the encroachment permit upon concluding that the record failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Byrd and Mullins were littoral property owners with corresponding littoral rights (a key requirement to build or enlarge encroachments on the lake under Idaho’s Lake Protection Act). Finding no reversible error in that finding, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the Department's order. View "Byrd v. Idaho State Brd. of Land Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order entered by the superior court affirming the decision of the Town of Old Orchard Beach to deny Appellant's application to build a greenhouse in the front yard of her residential property, holding that Appellant was not prevented from building a greenhouse in her front yard.The Town's code enforcement officer denied Appellant's application because "an accessory structure cannot be located in the front yard." The Town's Zoning Board of Appeals upheld the denial, concluding that a particular provision of the Town's Zoning Ordinance prohibited Appellant from building the structure in her front yard. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order below, holding that the provision at issue did not prevent Appellant from building a greenhouse in her front yard. View "Zappia v. Town of Old Orchard Beach" on Justia Law

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code 30000) requires a coastal development permit (CDP) for any “development” resulting in a change in the intensity of use of, or access to, land or water in a coastal zone. In December 2018, Los Angeles adopted the Home-Sharing Ordinance, imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals, with mechanisms to enforce those restrictions. Objectors sought to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance in the Venice coastal zone until the city obtains a CDP, claiming the Ordinance constituted a “development” requiring a CDP.The trial court denied relief, finding the petition time-barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009, and that the Ordinance does not create a change in intensity of use and, therefore, is not a “development” requiring a CDP. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the 90-day statute of limitations applies, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The court did not address whether the Ordinance constitutes a “development” subject to the CDP requirements of the Coastal Act. View "Coastal Act Protectors v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court granting Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants, Madison Beach Hotel, LLC and Madison Beach Hotel of Florida, LLC, from hosting a summer concert series at a public park adjacent to the Madison Beach Hotel, holding that there was no error.On appeal, the appellate court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting Plaintiffs' request for an injunction because the concerts did not violate the Madison zoning regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' interpretation of the zoning regulations was untenable and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error. View "Pfister v. Madison Beach Hotel, LLC" on Justia Law