Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' appeal from a decision of the Madison County Board of Commissioners for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction.At issue in this appeal was the Madison County Board of Commissioners' approval of the Elkhorn Valley Sportsman Club's application for a conditional use permit. Appellants appealed the Board's decision to the district court, which dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the docket fee. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellants' subsequent appeal, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing this appeal from the Board's determination for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Kowalewski v. Madison County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

In 2010, the city certified an environmental impact report (EIR) and approved a specific plan for property located next to San Francisco Bay. CCCR challenged the plan under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000, CEQA). The court identified deficiencies in the EIR. The city prepared a recirculated EIR (REIR) that remedied the deficiency. The REIR found the specific plan could have significant impacts due to the destruction of endangered species habitats and discussed the impacts of climate change and sea-level rise. The city certified the final REIR, readopted the 2010 specific plan, and executed a development agreement. In 2016, the city approved a subdivision map for 386 housing units. In 2019, another subdivision map proposed 469 additional residential lots. The city prepared a checklist comparing the REIR’s analysis of the specific plan with the impacts of the subdivision map and concluded the proposed subdivision would be consistent with the specific plan, and that no changed circumstances or new information required additional environmental review. The city posted the checklist for public comment, responded to comments, then approved the subdivision map.The court of appeal affirmed. The project was exempt from further CEQA review under Government Code 65457 because it implemented and was consistent with the specific plan. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that no project changes, changed circumstances, or new information required additional analysis. The deferral of analysis of potential flood control projects to address sea-level rise in the latter half of this century was proper. View "Citizens' Committee to Complete the Refuge v. City of Newark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the appellate court reversing in part the judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiffs, the town of South Windsor and its zoning enforcement officer and remanding the case for a new trial on count two of the complaint, holding that the appellate court improperly remanded the case.The trial court assessed a fine and imposed injunctive relief for certain zoning violations pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-12. The appellate court remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court had improperly assessed a fine on Defendant for zoning violations for a period of time that she was under lawful orders not to disturb her property because of an ongoing fire investigation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no dispute remained as to Defendant's liability for the zoning violations alleged in count two of Plaintiffs' complaint. View "Town of South Windsor v. Lanata" on Justia Law

Tran applied to the Department of Regional Planning for renewal of the conditional use permit (CUP) for his unincorporated Los Angeles County liquor store. Considering the store’s location and site plan, information from the California Department of Alcohol and Beverage Control, a crime report, and letters from the public, the Department recommended approval of the CUP subject to conditions. Tran objected to conditions limiting the hours of alcohol sales to 6:00 a.m.-10:00 p.m., and that distilled spirits not be sold in small containers. The Commission approved the CUP with the recommended small bottle prohibition but permitting alcohol sales from 6:00 a.m.-2:00 a.m. The County Board of Supervisors voted to review the approval. At the close of an August 1, 2017, hearing the Board voted to indicate its "intent to approve” the CUP, restricting alcohol sales to 10:00 a.m-10:00 p.m. and forbidding small bottle sales. About eight months later, the Board adopted the findings and conditions of approval prepared by county counsel and approved the CUP with the modified conditions.Tran unsuccessfully sought a judicial order to set aside the decision as untimely under the County Code, which provides that review decisions “shall be rendered within 30 days of the close of the hearing” The court of appeal vacated the Board’s decision. The 30-day time limit was mandatory, not directory. The Board failed to render its decision within 30 days. View "Tran v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Landowners own parcels of land adjacent to a 2.45-mile strip of a Union Pacific railroad line in McLennan County, Texas. Union Pacific’s predecessor in interest, Texas Central originally acquired the Line in 1902 through multiple deeds executed by the Landowners’ predecessors in interest. The Landowners sued, seeking compensation based on a theory that their predecessors in interest had conferred only easements to Texas Central, and that the Surface Transportation Board (STB) enforcement of the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1241, by “railbanking” amounted to a “taking” of their property. Railbanking involves the transition of unused railroad corridors into recreational hiking and biking trails, generally by a transfer of an interest in the use of a rail corridor to a third-party entity. The Claims Court interpreted the deeds as having conveyed fee simple estates, not easements.The Federal Circuit affirmed. No takings from the Landowners occurred when the government later authorized conversion of the railroad line to a recreation trail; the granting clauses of the subject deeds unambiguously conveyed fee simple interests in the land and not easements despite contradictory language elsewhere in the deeds. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law

Landowner Daniel Banyai appealed an Environmental Division decision upholding a notice of violation, granting a permanent injunction, and assessing $46,600 in fines, relating to alleged zoning violations and the construction of a firearms training facility in the Town of Pawlet. Banyai argued he had a valid permit, certain exhibits were improperly admitted at the merits hearing, and the fines were excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Main St Properties LLC's (MSP) complaint seeking to enjoin a zoning ordinance adopted by the city council for the City of Bellevue, holding that the court erred in dismissing MSP's complaint.After MSP received a notice of zoning violation MSP appealed to the board of adjustment, which upheld the zoning violation. While MSP's appeal was pending, the city council approved an ordinance to rezone MSP's property. MSP then filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss, concluding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because MSP failed to file a petition in error. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings, holding that the complaint was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Main St Properties LLC v. City of Bellevue" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that Public Resources Code section 30610.8 requires payment of an in-lieu public access fee for each coastal development permit (CDP) applicable to Hollister Ranch. In this case, after the California Coastal Commission denied a CDP request from Jack Wall and the Wall Family Trust to build a pool and spa on their Hollister Ranch property, plaintiffs challenged the Commission's denial in a petition for writ of administrative mandate.The court concluded that plaintiffs have not shown that the Commission required public access to their property; the trial court correctly concluded that the California Coastal Act of 1976 requires payment of an in-lieu public access fee for approval of plaintiffs' CDP; and plaintiffs' alternative contention -- that even if the Coastal Act requires them to pay a $5,000 in-lieu public access fee for their CDP, imposing that requirement would be unconstitutional -- is waived. View "Wall v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

Dennis and Sherrilyn Munden (the Mundens) and their limited liability company, Coyote Creek Ranch, LLC, purchased property in Bannock County, Idaho in 2012 (the Upper Property), and acquired adjoining property (the Lower Property) in 2014. The Mundens’ ranch was accessible by a gravel road (the Road) which left a paved public road before crossing the Lower Property. It then traversed a neighbor’s parcel to the Upper Property, before exiting to the north. The Mundens began ranching on the Lower Property in 2013 and started construction of a barn and living quarters on the Upper Property in 2015 after obtaining a three-year building permit. In 2017, the Mundens were informed by the Bannock County Commissioners that, pursuant to a 2006 county ordinance, the Road had been designated by the Commissioners for “snowmobile use only” between December 15 and April 15. All other vehicular use was prohibited during this timeframe. In January 2019, Bannock County passed an ordinance which gave discretion to the Bannock County Public Works Director (the Director) to determine when snowmobile trails would be closed to all but snowmobile use. Subsequently, the Director decided to close the Road for the 2018–19 winter season. The Mundens filed a complaint in district court against Bannock County, bringing several claims involving the Road, and obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) to prohibit enforcement of the 2019 ordinance. The County moved to dissolve the TRO, which the district court granted. The district court then awarded attorney fees to the County. The Mundens amended their complaint to add their ranching operation, Coyote Creek Ranch, LLC, as a plaintiff, to which the County responded with an answer and counterclaim, alleging that the Road was a public right-of-way with no winter maintenance that had been designated as a snowmobile trail by the 2006 ordinance. The County then moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted this motion, concluding that because the claims turned on a legal determination of the Road’s status, the Mundens were required by Idaho Code section 40-208(7) to first petition for validation or abandonment proceedings with the Board of County Commissioners before they could bring a lawsuit. The district court accordingly entered a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ amended complaint in its entirety. Ultimately, the district court entered a judgment certified under IRCP 54(b)(1) authorizing an immediate appeal, and the Mundens timely appealed. The only error the Idaho Supreme Court found in review of this case was that the district court erred in issuing a writ of execution before there was a final appealable judgment. Judgement was affirmed in all other respects. View "Munden v. Bannock County" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals filed by Greenville County, South Carolina, the issue central to the cases involved a zoning dispute between the County and Greenville Bistro, LLC, d/b/a Bucks Racks & Ribs. Greenville Bistro filed suit against the County to enjoin the County from enforcing an ordinance to deny Greenville Bistro's desired method of operating Bucks Racks & Ribs. Citing other ordinances, the County counterclaimed and moved to enjoin Greenville Bistro from operating Bucks as a sexually oriented business. Both appeals concerned the legality of Greenville Bistro operating Bucks as a restaurant with the added feature of scantily clad exotic dancers. The circuit court granted Greenville Bistro's motion for a temporary injunction, and the County appealed. While the County's appeal was pending, another circuit court denied the County's motion for temporary injunctive relief, ruling that in light of the County's appeal it did not have jurisdiction to consider the County's motion. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed both rulings, dissolved the injunction granted to Greenville Bistro, and held the County was entitled to injunctive relief. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Greenville Bistro, LLC. v. Greenville County" on Justia Law