Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed three orders of the district court that directed Southwest Montana Building Industry Association (SWMBIA) to transfer funds from the impact fee payer class refund account (refund account) to the City of Bozeman, to submit an accounting of the refund account, and for contempt of court. The Court held (1) the district court did not exceed its authority when it ordered SWMBIA to transfer the funds remaining in the refund account to Bozeman; (2) the district court’s order regarding the transfer of the remaining refund account funds was enforceable; (3) the district court did not err when it did not dispose of the remaining refund account funds in accordance with Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(i)(3); (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered SWMBIA to provide an accounting of the refund account; and (5) SWMBIA cannot obtain relief from the district court’s contempt order. View "Southwest Montana Building Industry Ass’n v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction to stay the enforcement of a homeowner's association resolution banning short term rentals (STR ban) in Oxnard Shores. Plaintiffs alleged that the STR ban violates the California Coastal Act, which requires a coastal development permit for any "development" that results in a change in the intensity of use of or access to land in a coastal zone. The Act provides that any person may maintain an action for declaratory and equitable relief to restrain any violation of this division. The Act further states that, on a prima facie showing of a violation of this division, preliminary equitable relief shall be issued to restrain any further violation of this division. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and held that a prima facie showing has been made to issue a preliminary injunction staying enforcement of the STR ban until trial. The court explained that the decision to ban or regulate STRs must be made by the City and Coastal Commission, not a homeowner's association. View "Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores Community Assn." on Justia Law

Thorncreek, a Park Forest townhouse complex, applied to the Village for a permit to use a vacant townhouse as a business office but began to conduct its business from the townhouse without a permit. The Village cited it for zoning violations and operating without the required permit. The Village later filed suit to halt the zoning and operating violations and to redress certain building-code violations. Thorncreek counterclaimed against the Village and 10 officials, claiming civil-rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 and the Illinois Civil Rights Act. Two Thorncreek "areas" went into foreclosure. Thorncreek blamed the Village’s regulatory overreach in denying a business license, interfering with business operations, refusing to grant a conditional use permit, failing to issue a certificate of occupancy, and unequally enforcing a building-code provision requiring electrical upgrades, based on irrational animus against Clapper, the owner, and racial bias against its black residents. A jury found the Village and Village Manager Mick liable for a class-of-one equal-protection violation; found Mick and Kerestes, the director of community development, liable for conspiracy (section 1985(3)); otherwise rejected the claims, and awarded $2,014,000 in compensatory damages. Because the jury rejected the race-based equal-protection claim, the judge struck the verdict against Kerestes. The judge awarded $430,999.25 in fees and $44,844.33 in costs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the judgment against Mick, the admission of evidence concerning Clapper’s wealth, and the admission of Thorncreek’s financial records. View "Thorncreek Apartments I, LLC v. Village of Park Forest" on Justia Law

SV Care has operated a medical marijuana collective in a San Jose commercial zoning district since 2010. The municipal code did not then list marijuana-specific uses in its table of permitted uses. That table stated that all uses not listed were not permitted, but listed “medical offices” as permitted. After the collective opened, voters passed a local measure adding a marijuana business tax, which is described as “solely for the purpose of obtaining revenue.” The tax certificate specifies that it does not indicate zoning compliance. In 2014, the city determined that a medical marijuana collective was not an authorized use and ordered the collective to close. SV appealed the denial of its petition for writ of administrative mandate, arguing that the collective was a legal nonconforming use and that the city should be equitably estopped from forcing it to close. The court of appeal affirmed. Giving due deference to the city’s interpretation of its code, the medical office category does not include medical marijuana collectives. Because plaintiffs’ collective was not permitted when it opened, it cannot be a legal nonconforming use. In light of the express disclaimers, reliance on paying required business taxes as authorization to operate a medical marijuana collective is unreasonable as a matter of law. View "J. Arthur Properties, II, LLC v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

The United States Bureau of Land Management leased 2,500 acres of geothermal mineral rights in Hidalgo County, New Mexico to Plaintiff Lightning Dock Geothermal HI-01, LLC (LDG), a Delaware company. LDG developed and owned a geothermal power generating project in Hidalgo County. LDG also developed a geothermal well field on the subject tract as part of its project. Defendant AmeriCulture, a New Mexico corporation under the direction of Defendant Damon Seawright, a New Mexico resident, later purchased a surface estate of approximately fifteen acres overlying LDG’s mineral lease, ostensibly to develop and operate a tilapia fish farm. Because AmeriCulture wished to utilize LDG’s geothermal resources for its farm, AmeriCulture and LDG (more accurately its predecessor) entered into a Joint Facility Operating Agreement (JFOA). The purpose of the JFOA, from LDG’s perspective, was to allow AmeriCulture to utilize some of the land’s geothermal resources without interfering or competing with LDG’s development of its federal lease. Plaintiff Los Lobos Renewable Power LLC (LLRP), also a Delaware company, was the sole member of LDG and a third-party beneficiary of the JFOA. The parties eventually began to quarrel over their contractual rights and obligations. Invoking federal diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiffs LDG and LLRP sued Defendants Americulture and Seawright in federal court for alleged infractions of New Mexico state law. AmeriCulture filed a special motion to dismiss the suit under New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute. The district court, however, refused to consider that motion, holding the statute authorizing it inapplicable in federal court. After review of the briefs, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed. View "Los Lobos Renewable Power v. Americulture" on Justia Law

A showing of strict compliance with a corporate entity’s internal bylaws and governance procedures is not necessary for that entity to invoke the jurisdiction of the General Court of Justice.Plaintiffs, non-profit corporations representing homeowners in certain residential communities located in the City of Charlotte, instituted this litigation challenging the validity of a zoning ordinance enacted by the City. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims because they failed to comply with various provisions in their corporate bylaws when they initiated this litigation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, despite Plaintiffs’ failure to comply strictly with their respective bylaws and internal governance procedures in deciding to initiate this suit, they possessed a “sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy” to confer jurisdiction on the trial court to adjudicate this legal dispute. View "Willowmere Community Ass'n v. City of Charlotte" on Justia Law

Alabama Power initiated condemnation proceedings in the probate court seeking to obtain easements across three parcels of property in St. Clair County Alabama for the purpose of erecting new power-transmission lines. Alabama Power Company petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the St. Clair Circuit Court to dismiss an appeal filed by the property owners who challenged the condemnation proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the probate court's July 5, 2017 transfer order notified the property owners that it found their notice of appeal to be vague or in some way deficient instead of ordering a transfer of the action. Because the probate court understood the property owners' notice of appeal to encompass an order of condemnation, no such notice of deficiency was given, and the property owners instead reasonably relied on the probate court's representation that their notice of appeal was effective and that the action had been transferred to the circuit court. The Supreme Court held it would have been unjust in these circumstances for the Supreme Court to declare that the property owners' notice of appeal was in some way deficient so as to render it ineffective. Therefore, the Supreme Court determined the circuit court properly denied Alabama Power's motion to dismiss, and Alabama Power was not entitled to the relief it sought. Accordingly, the petition for the writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Alabama Power Company." on Justia Law

Springfield’s zoning code allows “family care residence[s],” defined as: A single dwelling unit occupied on a relatively permanent basis in a family-like environment by a group of no more than six unrelated persons with disabilities, plus paid professional support staff provided by a sponsoring agency either living with the residents on a 24-hour basis or present whenever residents with disabilities are present. Such residences must be “located upon a zoning lot which is more than 600 feet from the property line of any other such facility.” IAG is a non-profit organization that provides services in Community Integrated Living Arrangements in residences rented by disabled clients. The Noble home, in a Springfield residential district that allows family care residences, resembles other neighborhood dwellings. After its owners completed significant renovations, three disabled individuals moved into the Noble home. Unbeknownst to the owners, IAG, or its clients, Sparc had been operating a family care residence across the street for 12 years. The property lines are separated by 157 feet. The city notified the owners that the Noble residents would be evicted unless they obtained a Conditional Permitted Use. Their application was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the entry of a preliminary injunction to prevent eviction, finding that plaintiffs possessed a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits in their suit under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601–31, Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–213, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a). View "Valencia v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

NDSC Industrial Park, LLC (“NDSC”) appealed a district court order dismissing its “Consent Decree Order Motion.” In the late 1990s, the United States and the State of Colorado each filed complaints against Colorado & Eastern Railroad Company (“C & E”) under CERCLA. These complaints sought reimbursement of response costs associated “with the release or threatened release of hazardous substances at the Sand Creek Industrial Site located in Commerce City and Denver, Colorado.” In an effort to avoid protracted litigation, the parties entered into a partial consent decree (the “Consent Decree”) on April 13, 1999. Pursuant to the Consent Decree, C & E agreed to sell two parcels of land, the OU3/6 Property and the OU1/5 Property (collectively the “Properties”), and pay the net proceeds of the sales to the United States and Colorado. In 2002, the remediated OU1/5 and OU3/6 Properties were put up for auction by the United States pursuant to the Consent Decree. NDSC was the winning bidder. Prior to closing on the purchase of the Properties, NDSC was made aware that C & E had already conveyed its fee interest in a right-of-way. In 2014, NDSC filed suit in Colorado state court to quiet title to the railroad right-of-way against C & E, and other interested parties in the Properties. The district court dismissed the motion because NDSC lacked standing to enforce the terms of the consent decree. On appeal, NDSC claimed the district court erred in concluding it: (1) was attempting to enforce the consent decree, as opposed to seeking a limited declaration regarding the meaning of the consent decree; and (2) did not have standing to seek a declaration that a conveyance of property violated the terms of the consent decree. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s dismissal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co" on Justia Law

Parcel 27 (22 acres) was proposed for development with 44 single-family homes, 7.9 acres of public parkland, a bike path, and dog park. The planning commission recommended and the city council adopted an amendment to Parcel 27's general plan designation from Administrative Professional Office (APO) to Low-Density Single Family Residential, R-20. After the amendment could no longer be challenged, the council changed Parcel 27's zoning designation from APO to R-20. Opponents filed a referendum challenging the rezoning. The city clerk notified them that the referendum met the requirements of the Elections Code. The city attorney prepared a staff report, indicating that once a referendum petition is certified, the ordinance is suspended and the city council must reconsider the ordinance, but advised that “a referendum seeking to repeal a zoning amendment which would result in a zoning ordinance that is inconsistent with a general plan is a legally invalid referendum.” The council voted to refuse to repeal the ordinance or to place the issue on the ballot because repeal would result in reversion to APO zoning and create an inconsistency between the zoning and the general plan. The court of appeal held that the referendum was not invalid and the issue must be placed on the ballot. View "Save Lafayette v. City of Lafayette" on Justia Law