Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Dynamic Development, LLC (Dynamic) sought to build a new retail store (Project) in Joshua Tree. Residents of Joshua Tree opposed the Project, arguing that it would have clashed with the town's artistic, independent, and rural character; they also argued that it would cause various adverse environmental impacts, including urban decay. Nevertheless, the County of San Bernardino (County) found that an environmental impact report (EIR) was not required and approved the Project. The Joshua Tree Downtown Business Alliance (Alliance) then filed this mandate proceeding challenging the County's approval of the Project. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the Alliance failed to establish any grounds for a writ of mandate, and reversed the trial court's conclusion that there was evidence to support the Alliance's contention that the Project would cause urban decay (thereby setting aside approval of the Project). View "Joshua Tree Downtown Bus. Alliance v. Co. of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

Appellant, a farmer, owned Dunaway Farm and Rehfeld Farm, both of which were located within the jurisdiction of the Lower Elkhorn Natural Resources District. Beginning in 2010, Appellant used the well on Rehfeld Farm to irrigate Dunaway Farm, which was previously not irrigated. In 2013, the District ordered Appellant to cease and desist irrigating Dunaway Farm because the District’s rules prohibited use of ground water for new irrigated acres within the District’s management area without a variance. Appellant appealed using the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and also filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of several of the District’s rules related to irrigation. The district court affirmed the District’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) on the APA appeal, there were no errors in the district court’s judicial review of the District’s order; and (2) because the District’s rules are constitutional, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to Appellant’s request for a declaratory judgment. View "Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn Natural Res. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of property owners, sought compensation from the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, alleging flooding on their properties caused by the District’s diversion of stormwater into nearby creeks. The District cited a 1948 Illinois Supreme Court decision, Pratt, as holding that a temporary flooding cannot constitute a taking under the Illinois Constitution. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss and certified a question based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 holding that temporary flooding can constitute a taking under the federal constitution, Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States. The appellate court held that Arkansas Game overruled Pratt. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The Illinois takings clause provides greater protection for property owners than its federal counterpart, in providing a remedy for property that is damaged, but, what constitutes a taking is the same under both clauses. The holding in Arkansas Game is relevant to the determination of whether government-induced temporary flooding is a taking under the Illinois Constitution. That holding, however, does not conflict with Pratt. Pratt did not hold that temporary flooding can never constitute a taking, but only that the flooding, in that case, did not amount to a taking. Similarly, the facts alleged by plaintiffs are not sufficient to allege a taking. The complaint does not allege that the flooding “radically interfered” with use and enjoyment of the properties. The parties did not address whether the properties were "damaged." View "Hampton v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist." on Justia Law

Jesse Lipschuetz lived next door to Open Door Ministries. Lipschuetz filed claims against the City of Denver and Open Door looking to revoke a rooming and boarding permit the City granted to Open Door. The trial court concluded the City should not have issued the permit, but stayed revocation until Open Door's cross-claims were resolved. Several months later, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Open Door on those cross-claims. On appeal, Lipscheutz argued Open Door's cross-claims against the City were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act because they "could lie in tort." Therefore, Lipscheutz argued, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the cross-claims. The court of appeals agreed with that reasoning, and reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act did not apply to Open Door's request for prospective relief to prevent future injury. Because Open Door had not suffered an injury before it filed its cross-claims, the Act did not bar those claims seeking prospective relief from future injury. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction over those cross-claims. View "Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz" on Justia Law

The court of appeal previously remanded the suit, concerning the rights to groundwater contained in the Santa Maria Valley Groundwater Basin. The parties are landowners who extract groundwater for agricultural use and public water producers that pump groundwater for municipal and industrial use. The court of appeal directed the trial court to quiet title to the landlowners’ overlying rights to native groundwater by declaring that these rights have priority over all appropriators, less the amount that the public producers are entitled to pursuant to their prescriptive rights. The trial court amended its judgment to hold that the city had established a total prescriptive right of 5100 acre feet per year and Golden State Water Company had established a total prescriptive right of 1900 acre feet per year, both perfected against the Basin aquifer as a whole, so only a proportionate amount of the prescriptive right could be exercised against the landowners’ overlying rights. The court did not quantify the proportionate prescriptive rights nor reconsider its prevailing party determination or allocation of costs. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court properly quieted title and did not err when it declined to reconsider the prevailing party determination. View "City of Santa Maria v. Adam" on Justia Law

Gloria and Thomas Shakespeare, GLOCO, LC, and Atlas Tower, LLC (collectively, Shakespeares) applied for permission from the Board of Trustees of the Fort Pierce Industrial Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Association (Association) to construct a cell phone tower on a lot located along River Road in the Fort Pierce Industrial Park (industrial park). The Association denied the application. When the Shakespeares proceeded to construct the cell phone tower, the Association brought suit, alleging that the Shakespeares breached the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) of the industrial park. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Board did not have the right to limit the number of cell phone towers in the industrial park. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in strictly construing the CC&Rs in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property rather than applying neutral principles of contract construction; and (2) the Board had sufficient authority under the CC&Rs to deny the Shakespeares’ application. View "Fort Pierce Ind. Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Ass’n v. Shakespeare" on Justia Law

An East Providence zoning officer issued a notice of violation, finding violations of a use variance that was granted in 1998 to the owner and operator of a construction and demolition debris processing facility known as Pond View Recycling. The East Providence Zoning Board of Review upheld the notice of violation. The owner and operator of Pond View appealed. The superior court reversed, concluding that the zoning board’s decision was “clearly erroneous and made upon unlawful procedure.” The City of East Providence and the zoning board sought review. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment for the City, holding that the zoning board’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and therefore, the trial justice erred by reversing the decision of the zoning board. View "Kenlin Props., LLC v. City of East Providence" on Justia Law

In 2011, Costco sought a use permit and rezoning for 15.33 acres in southeast Ukiah. In 2013, the city released an environmental impact report (EIR), pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, 21050), describing the project as a 148,000-square-foot retail facility with a bakery, pharmacy, optical center, hearing aid center, food court, photo center, tire center, 16-pump gas station, and 608 customer parking spots. The EIR included mitigation measures to reduce the impact, including modifications to impacted intersections, but due to uncertainty of timing and funding of those measures, concluded that the traffic impacts cannot be mitigated to a level that is less than significant. The EIR also concluded that the increase in traffic volumes would result in higher noise levels along local roadways but that traffic noise associated with the project would be less than significant. The city certified the EIR, adopted a statement of overriding considerations, and adopted the rezoning legislation. Opponents unsuccessfully challenged the rezoning and the sufficiency of the EIR. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing that the EIR failed to sufficiently analyze potential energy impacts and that the adoption of an EIR addendum after approval of the EIR and of the project violated CEQA. View "Ukiah Citizens for Safety First v. City of Ukiah" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner and occupant of certain property. Defendant, the owner of a parcel of land abutting Plaintiff’s property, planned to build a residence on the property and applied for a building permit. The town building commissioner determined that the property had grandfathered status as a nonconforming lot. Plaintiff’s wife applied for a hearing. The zoning board of appeals of Westminster upheld the building commissioner’s determination. Plaintiff, as the personal representative of his wife’s estate, commenced this action claiming injury to his private easement right. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing, concluding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the construction proposed by Defendant would cause him any injury within the scope and concern of the Zoning Act. The appeals court reversed and concluded that Defendant’s property did not enjoy grandfathered status under the Westminster zoning by-law. The Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review and affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that Plaintiff’s injuries to his private easement rights were not within the scope and concern of the Zoning Act. View "Picard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Westminster" on Justia Law

The Water Court is adjudicating the existing water right claims of all appropriators in the Teton River Basin and issued a temporary preliminary decree for Basin 41O. Eldorado, which distributes water to shareholders from the Teton River northwest of Choteau, owns water rights that historically have been administered under the 1908 Perry Decree by a water commissioner (MCA 85-5-101). In 2014, the Water Court addressed objections to Eldorado’s existing water right claims as established under the temporary preliminary decree. The Montana Supreme Court, in Eldorado I, upheld the Water Court’s determinations that Eldorado’s claims required a volume quantification and that Eldorado historically put to beneficial use 15,000 acre-feet of water under its existing rights. The Joint Objectors later informed the water commissioner that Eldorado was approaching the volumetric quantification established by that order and requested that he cap the distribution of Eldorado’s water. Eldorado petitioned the Water Court to stay the volume quantification order pending the Eldorado I appeal. The Water Court denied Eldorado’s request and the commissioner ceased delivering water to Eldorado. Eldorado filed a dissatisfied water user complaint (MCA 85-5-301). The Montana Supreme Court affirmed denial of that complaint. Eldorado participated in every step of the process that resulted in the establishment of its rights under the modified temporary preliminary decree. View "Eldorado Coop Canal Co. v. Hoge" on Justia Law