Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A county code compliance investigator issued Appellant a notice of violation regarding her property. The county zoning administrator then determined that Appellant had committed a violation. The Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) upheld that violation determination. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari to seek judicial review of the BZA’s final decision. Appellant, however, did not name the Board of Supervisors or any other party. The circuit court granted the zoning administrator’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Appellant failed to add the Board of Supervisors as a party to the proceeding within the thirty-day statutory period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that compliance with the styling requirement in Va. Code 15.2-2314 is required to trigger the circuit court’s active jurisdiction, and no waiver to the thirty-day filing requirement occurred in this case. View "Frace v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Roca Solida, a non-profit religious organization, purchased a 40-acre Nevada parcel. A desert stream flowed across the property, the water rights to which Roca also purchased. The water supplied a recreational pond, used for baptisms. Roca’s property is situated within a national wildlife refuge, managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. An FWS water restoration project completed in 2010 “restored [the] stream to its natural channel,” the effect of which was to divert the stream away from Roca Solida’s property, depriving it of water it would have otherwise enjoyed. In federal district court in Nevada, Roca sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief on the basis of alleged violations under the First and Fifth Amendment and “at least $86,639.00 in damage[s]” under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671–80. It also sued in the Claims Court, seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages on the basis that the diversion project constituted an unlawful taking and asserting FWS negligently executed the water diversion project, causing $86,639 in damages to “land, structures, and animals.” The Claims Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in light of the pending district court action under 28 U.S.C. 1500. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Ministerio Roca Solida v. United States" on Justia Law

Munoz replaced the carpeting in his upstairs condominium unit with hardwood flooring because of his wife’s allergies The Homeowners Association (HOA) obtained a preliminary injunction requiring Munoz to remedy the unauthorized modification of the flooring to reduce the transmission of noise to the unit below. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the superior court improperly balanced the prospective harm to each party and erroneously concluded that plaintiff would prevail at trial. View "Ryland Mews Homeowners Ass'n v. Munoz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied to the Town Planning Board for the Town of Hopkinton for a preliminary plan approval of a minor subdivision. The Town Planner stated that he would certify the subdivision application as complete once Plaintiff submitted proof that it had paid certain outstanding personal property taxes. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Town Planner to certify its subdivision application as complete (the mandamus count) and amended its complaint to add a count seeking a declaration that the requirement for an applicants such as Plaintiff to pay “property taxes” refers only to real property taxes (the declaratory judgment count). The trial justice dismissed the mandamus count but for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies but summarily ruled that the declaratory judgment count survived. The trial justice subsequently denied, sua sponte, Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the trial justice abused his discretion when he sua sponte invoked the administrative exhaustion doctrine in the course of denying Plaintiff declaratory relief where neither party had briefed or argued that doctrine. View "Bruce Brayman Builders, Inc. v. Lamphere" on Justia Law

In the early 1980s, the cities of Harwood and Reiles Acres entered a series of agreements to address common waste water treatment problems. In June 1985, they agreed in writing to construct and operate the Harwood Lagoon near the municipalities. Under that agreement, Harwood was responsible for 68 percent and Reiles Acres for 32 percent of the acquisition and construction costs of the Harwood Lagoon. Each municipality was responsible for maintenance and operational costs of their own collection system, and Harwood was responsible for administering and managing the operation of the facility. Their agreement allocated 68 percent of the maintenance costs for the facility to Harwood and 32 percent of those costs to Reiles Acres and also allotted 68 percent of the facility's capacity to Harwood's customers and users and 32 percent of the facility's capacity to Reiles Acres' customers and users. The agreement ultimately resulted in Harwood owning an undivided 68 percent interest and Reiles Acres owning an undivided 32 percent interest in the Harwood Lagoon. In July 1985, Lake Shure Properties purchased from Reiles Acres the right to use 50 percent of Reiles Acres' volumetric capacity in the lagoon, which constituted 16 percent of the total capacity of the lagoon. The agreement between Lake Shure Properties and Reiles Acres permitted each party to buy, sell, or otherwise deal with their respective share of the facility's volume. In 1993, Lake Shure Properties transferred 56.5 percent of its interest in the volumetric capacity in the Harwood Lagoon to Lake Shure Estates, Inc., a North Dakota nonprofit corporation consisting of homeowners residing in the Lake Shure Estates' subdivision near Harwood and Reiles Acres. The transfer resulted in Lake Shure Estates obtaining 9.04 percent of the total waste water treatment capacity of the Harwood Lagoon. Harwood's state certified operator for the lagoon testified that the facility was designed to provide waste water treatment services for approximately 500 people, and the population growth of Harwood and Reiles Acres made it difficult for the municipalities to continue to provide the required 180 days of winter storage capacity for the facility. In 1998, Reiles Acres contracted with Fargo for treatment of Reiles Acres' waste water, and since that time, it has not used the Harwood Lagoon for waste water treatment services. In 2009, Harwood contracted with Fargo for waste water treatment services, and in 2010, Lake Shure Estates contracted with Fargo for waste water treatment services. Neither Harwood nor Lake Shure Estates has used the Harwood Lagoon for municipal waste water treatment services since they contracted with Fargo for those services. Harwood and Lake Shure Estates sued Reiles Acres and all other persons unknown claiming any interest in the Harwood Lagoon, seeking a declaration of the parties' interests and obligations under their contracts and a partition of the Harwood Lagoon property. Reiles Acres appealed the judgment entered after a bench trial declaring the contractual obligations of Reiles Acres and the City of Harwood under the 1985 contract for construction and operation Harwood Lagoon were discharged by frustration of purpose and the order confirming a partition by public sale of the land encompassing the Harwood Lagoon. Reiles Acres argues the district court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment nullifying the parties' contractual obligations and to order a partition sale of the land. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the court had jurisdiction to construe contracts in the declaratory judgment action and the court did not err in construing a 1985 contract between Harwood and Reiles Acres and determining the principal purpose of the contract was frustrated. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court did not err in ordering partition by public sale of the land. View "City of Harwood v. City of Reiles Acres" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was two adjacent beachfront lots - lot 113 and lot 114. In 1989, as a result of a merger clause in a zoning ordnance, the lots were merged into a single, nonconforming, grandfathered lot. Despite the merger clause’s prohibition of any separation of a merged lot that would result in an area that did not meet minimum lot-size requirements, the owner separated the lots and conveyed them to two different individuals. Carol Reece acquired lot 113. In 2013, Plaintiff, who owned property abutting lot 113, sought a declaratory judgment that lot 113 was not a grandfathered nonconforming lot. Reece subsequently acquired lot 114. The superior court granted summary judgment for Reece. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Reece’s recombination of lots 113 and 114 did not effect a resurrection of the grandfathered status that the lots had when they were previously merged. View "Day v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law

Ordinance No. 611 of the City of Valley, Nebraska authorized the annexation of land near Valley’s corporate border, some of which included Sanitary and Improvement District No. 196 (SID 196). SID 196 filed a complaint seeking to declare the ordinance invalid and seeking to enjoin Valley from enforcing the ordinance. Valley filed a motion for summary judgment, and both parties presented evidence from expert witnesses. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment for Valley and declared the ordinance valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that ordinance No. 611 is valid and in therefore granting summary judgment. View "Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 196 v. City of Valley" on Justia Law

In May 2010, the Bar Harbor Appeals Board issued two decisions requiring the Bar Harbor Planning Board to approve a site plan for construction of a hotel on land abutting land owned by the Witham Family Limited Partnership in Bar Harbor. Witham filed a complaint challenging both decisions. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s judgment dismissing the complaint and remanded. Also in May 2010, on remand from the Appeals Board, the Planning Board issued a decision containing new findings and approving of the proposed site plan. No appeal was taken from this decision. In May 2012, the Planning Board approved of an amended site plan. Witham did not appeal from the May 2012 decision or the issuance of any building permits or other permits. In October 2013, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Business and Consumer Docket justice affirmed the Planning Board’s determinations. Witham appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot because Witham did not appeal from the Planning Board’s May 2010 decision approving the proposed site plan or the Planning Board’s May 2012 approval of an amended site plan and because the hotel was now fully operational. View "Witham Family Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

In 1989, the Poksays built their Novato home, including a 150-foot long driveway within the 30-foot wide easement running to the site, which was hidden from the street. The easement was over property then owned by the Schaefers and was for access and utility purposes only. The Poksays hired a landscaper, who dug holes, added plants and trees along both sides of the driveway, and installed a drip irrigation system with a line under the driveway. Water fixtures were installed along the driveway for fire safety. The Poksays added lighting, regularly tended to the landscaping, and paid maintenance, water, and other costs. Respondents purchased the property from the Poksays in 2000. The landscaping was mature. Appellants purchased the Schaefer property in 2004. In 2010, without notice, appellant cut the irrigation and electrical lines on both sides of the driveway, including those irrigating respondents’ own property and sent a letter demanding removal of all landscaping and supporting systems from the easement. Respondents filed suit. The court granted respondents an irrevocable parol license. The court of appeal agreed that it would be inequitable to deny respondents an irrevocable license given the substantial investment of time and money and years of acquiescence. View "Richardson v. Franc" on Justia Law

In the late 1990s, the Township of Ocean began a comprehensive planning process in anticipation of population growth and increased development. In April 2007, plaintiffs, who owned a significant amount of land in the Township, filed a complaint against the Township, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), and the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs (DCA) challenging the validity of three ordinances affecting their property. They alleged that they were arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, and illegal and that the rezoning constituted inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs lived in a single-family residence on the eastern portion of one of several lots they owned; the remainder of the property consisted of undeveloped woodlands. When plaintiffs acquired the property, it was subject to mixed zoning. As a result of the Planning Commission s endorsement of the Township s Petition, all but one of plaintiffs lots were converted to PA-5 Environmentally Sensitive Planning Areas. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the circumstances under which municipal zoning ordinances represent a legitimate exercise of a municipality s power to zone property consistent with its Master Plan and Land Use Law (MLUL) goals. Upon review, the Court concluded that the ordinances represented a legitimate exercise of the municipality's power to zone property consistent with its MLUL goals, and held that plaintiffs did not overcome the ordinances presumption of validity. The inclusion of plaintiffs property in the EC district rationally related to the municipality's comprehensive smart growth development plan, which concentrated development in a town center surrounded by a green-zone buffer. The Court declined to invalidate ordinances that fulfill MLUL goals and other legitimate land-use planning objectives through plaintiffs as-applied challenge. "Rather, we reassert the importance of exhausting administrative remedies and conclude that plaintiffs claim for redress for the downzoning of their property is better addressed through their inverse condemnation claim, which, as the trial court held, plaintiffs may pursue if they are denied a variance." View "Griepenburg v. Township of Ocean" on Justia Law