Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Charlie’s Win, LLC, a property owner within the Gallatin West Ranch Subdivision, filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that the restrictive covenants governing the subdivision had expired. The original Declaration of Protective Covenants, recorded in 1992, stated that the covenants would be in effect for 25 years and could be extended by a two-thirds majority vote of the owners. In 2015, Gallatin West Ranch Homeowners’ Association attempted to adopt a Fourth Amended Declaration, which included changes such as allowing metal roofs and backyard chicken coops. Of the 24 owners, 15 voted in favor, one voted against, and eight abstained.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, granted summary judgment in favor of Charlie’s Win, concluding that the covenants had expired on October 22, 2017, as the Fourth Amended Declaration did not receive the required two-thirds majority vote of all owners. Gallatin West appealed, arguing that the 2015 vote either properly adopted the Fourth Amended Declaration, modified the covenants, or that the covenants were ambiguous and required an analysis of the parties' conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Court held that the plain language of the covenants required a two-thirds majority vote of all owners to extend the covenants, which was not achieved in the 2015 vote. The Court rejected Gallatin West’s arguments, stating that the renewal and modification clauses had different voting standards and that the covenants were not ambiguous. Consequently, the Third Amended Declaration expired by its own terms, and Gallatin West could not enforce the Fourth Amended Declaration against Charlie’s Win. View "Charlie's Win, LLC v. Gallatin West Ranch Homeowners' Association" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Michael R. and Christine O. McElroy, claimed an express or implied easement to access Seaweed Beach in Narragansett, Rhode Island, and to traverse certain private properties to reach the beach. The private properties in question are owned by Marilyn O. Stephens, Paul G. and Nancy L. Anthony, and Vivian H. Lacroix. The dispute arose when the Stephenses blocked access to their driveway, which the McElroys used to reach Seaweed Beach.In the Superior Court, the McElroys sought to quiet title to the easement, a declaration of their rights, and injunctive relief. The court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the McElroys, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated this judgment, citing unresolved factual issues. Upon remand, a bench trial was conducted, and the trial justice found that the McElroys had an express easement upon Seaweed Beach and an implied easement over the Stephens property. However, the court ruled that the McElroys did not have easements over the Anthony or Lacroix properties.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial justice's findings. The court held that the 1986 warranty deed clearly incorporated the 1929 express easement upon Seaweed Beach. The court also upheld the trial justice's determination that the McElroys had an implied easement over the Stephens property, as it was necessary for the enjoyment of their express easement on Seaweed Beach. The court found no error in the trial justice's admission of the 1986 purchase and sales agreement as extrinsic evidence to establish the implied easement. Finally, the court concluded that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion to amend the judgment, as the alleged inconsistencies did not constitute a manifest error of law. View "McElroy v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Juanita and Stephen Clark, Linda and Cliff Trebilcock, and Dan Gurney reside on Fuller Mountain Road in the Town of Phippsburg. Gurney has operated a firewood business from his property for thirty years. In September 2020, the Clarks and the Trebilcocks complained to the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) that Gurney’s business was a nuisance under the Town’s Land Use Ordinance (LUO). The CEO found no violation, but the Clarks and the Trebilcocks appealed to the Board of Appeals (BOA), which found the business to be a nuisance. The Board of Selectmen (BOS) later found that Gurney had abated the nuisance.The Clarks and the Trebilcocks challenged the BOS’s decision in the Superior Court (Sagadahoc County), arguing that the BOS lacked authority to conduct a de novo review and that there were due process violations. The Superior Court affirmed the BOS’s decision, leading to the Clarks’ appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the BOA’s findings were outside the scope of the current appeal but found that the BOS exceeded its authority and violated due process in its review. The Court held that the BOS did not have the authority to review the CEO’s decision and that the BOS’s role was limited to deciding whether a consent agreement could be achieved or if court action was necessary. The Court also found procedural due process violations due to the conduct of BOS Chair Julia House, who exhibited bias and engaged in ex parte communications.The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to remand to the BOS for new proceedings without the participation of Chair Julia House. View "Clark v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law

Kafi, Inc. ("Kafi") owns a residential property in League City, Texas, which it purchased from Joe and Kelly Richardson in September 2020. The Richardsons had financed the property with a loan from Sand Canyon Corporation in 2006, secured by an Adjustable Rate Note and a Deed of Trust. Sand Canyon transferred its interest in the loan to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") in October 2006. Kafi challenged Wells Fargo's right to foreclose on the property, claiming the assignment of the Deed of Trust was forged. Kafi also sought equitable redemption, arguing it should be allowed to pay off any valid liens before foreclosure.The case was initially filed in Texas state court and then removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed Kafi's claims against Sand Canyon and Nationwide Title Clearing, Inc., and dismissed Kafi's standalone forgery claim and claim for exemplary damages. The court allowed Kafi's claims for declaratory relief, quiet title, and equitable redemption to proceed. Wells Fargo and PHH Mortgage Corporation filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted, dismissing Kafi's remaining claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that Wells Fargo, as the holder of the Note, had standing to foreclose on the property under Texas law, regardless of the alleged forgery in the assignment of the Deed of Trust. The court also upheld the dismissal of Kafi's equitable redemption claim, noting that Kafi failed to provide sufficient evidence that it was ready, willing, and able to pay the redemption amount. The court emphasized that Kafi's declaration, which stated it was ready, able, or willing to redeem the property, was insufficient to meet the conjunctive requirement of being ready, willing, and able. Thus, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. View "Kafi, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Clifford Osborne and Deborah Olsen sued their former landlord, Kevin Belton, for disability discrimination and retaliation under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Louisiana Equal Housing Opportunity Act (LEHOA). The dispute arose when Belton, who initially allowed the plaintiffs to keep a dog temporarily, later prohibited the dog and threatened eviction. Despite Osborne providing a letter from his physician stating the need for a service dog due to mental health issues, Belton refused to accept it and proceeded with eviction, which was granted by a Louisiana justice of the peace court.In early 2020, Osborne and Olsen filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. They moved for summary judgment, which Belton did not oppose, leading the district court to grant the motion in August 2022. Belton subsequently filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment nearly a year later, which the district court denied. He then filed a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion, which was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to review only the order denying Belton’s Rule 60(b) motion, as the notice of appeal was timely for this order but not for the underlying summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion, as Belton failed to establish grounds for relief such as excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or a void judgment. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Belton’s Rule 60(b) motion. View "Osborne v. Belton" on Justia Law

Charles Bich and the Bruno Bich Trust made a series of loans to WW3 LLC, owned by Curt Waldvogel, for constructing an oil-processing facility in North Dakota. Waldvogel assured the Bichs that their investment would be secured by real and personal property. However, the project failed, and the Bichs did not recover their investment, leading them to sue for breach of contract.The Eastern District of Wisconsin court found that Waldvogel's promise to secure the loans with property was a "special promise" under Wisconsin law, requiring compliance with the statute of frauds. Since there was no written agreement meeting the statute's requirements, the court ruled the loan agreement unenforceable. The court also determined that the promise would have constituted a mortgage, which also needed to satisfy the statute of frauds. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the breach of contract claim but allowed the unjust enrichment claim to proceed to trial. The jury awarded the Bichs $200,000 for unjust enrichment, and the court held Waldvogel and WW3 jointly and severally liable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the promise to secure the loans with property was a mortgage under Wisconsin law and required a written agreement to be enforceable. The court found that the emails exchanged between the parties did not constitute a final agreement and did not meet the statute of frauds' requirements. Consequently, the breach of contract claim failed, and the unjust enrichment award remained the only compensation for the Bichs. View "Bich v WW3 LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Thomas Ghelf, Tricia Hansen, Constance and Thomas Klein, Maureen Sommerfeld, and Mississippi Sports and Recreation, Inc. (MSR), own abutting properties in the Town of Wheatland, Vernon County, Wisconsin. They alleged that the Town, its officials, Vernon County, the County Treasurer, and unknown agents and employees engaged in a harassment campaign against them. This included coordinated complaints about their businesses, unlawful arrests, failures to respond to emergency services, excessive property tax assessments, a foreclosure action, and the designation of a private driveway as a public road.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed the plaintiffs' tax assessment and road claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, abstained from exercising jurisdiction over the foreclosure claims, and dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim. The court held that the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity barred the tax assessment and foreclosure claims. It also found that the plaintiffs' claims related to events before September 15, 2016, were time-barred by the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the tax assessment and foreclosure claims, agreeing that the Tax Injunction Act and comity principles deprived the district court of jurisdiction. The appellate court also upheld the dismissal of claims related to events before September 15, 2016, as time-barred. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' road claims, finding that these claims were not barred by claim or issue preclusion. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the road claims, and the court held that Town Chairman Jayne Ballwahn should not be dismissed from the suit at this stage. View "Ghelf v Town of Wheatland" on Justia Law

From 2009 to 2015, Clarence Roland engaged in a scheme to defraud mortgage lenders and title insurance companies by using aliases, fake businesses, and fraudulent documents. He promised homeowners facing foreclosure that he could help them eliminate their mortgages. Instead, he transferred property ownership to his shell entities, created fake mortgages, and sold the properties to unsuspecting buyers. Roland used fraudulent notary stamps and signatures to make these transactions appear legitimate.A jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas convicted Roland of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and engaging in monetary transactions over $10,000 derived from unlawful activity. He was sentenced to ten years in prison, ordered to pay restitution of over $3 million, forfeit nearly $2 million, and assessed a $1,000 special assessment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Roland's appeal, where he raised several issues. He argued that the district court erred by admitting evidence of his and his co-conspirator’s prior convictions, limiting his good-faith defense, and denying his request for expert-witness funding. He also claimed that his conduct was not criminal and highlighted a clerical error regarding the special assessment.The Fifth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court's evidentiary rulings, determining that the admission of prior convictions was not plain error and that the limitations on Roland's good-faith defense were either appropriate or harmless. The court also upheld the denial of expert-witness funding, noting Roland's failure to make a formal request. The court agreed with Roland on the clerical error and modified the judgment to remove the $1,000 special assessment. In all other respects, Roland's conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Roland" on Justia Law

Austin Properties, LLC, submitted an application to the Shawnee City Council to build a multi-unit residential complex. The city council denied the application, leading Austin Properties to petition the district court to reverse the denial. The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Austin Properties then appealed to the Supreme Court of Kansas.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that the City had followed the necessary procedures under the Shawnee Municipal Code (SMC) § 17.92.030. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, but based its reasoning on K.S.A. 12-757, a Kansas statute that dictates similar procedures for zoning amendments. Both courts found that the City had complied with the required procedures.The Supreme Court of Kansas reviewed the case and determined that both the SMC and K.S.A. 12-757 were applicable. The Court found that the City failed to comply with K.S.A. 12-757(d) when it did not vote on denial or return the application to the planning commission with an explanation after failing to approve the application with a 3/4 majority vote, as required by K.S.A. 12-757(f) due to a valid protest petition. The Court held that the procedures in K.S.A. 12-757(d) are still applicable even in the face of a valid protest petition under K.S.A. 12-757(f).The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the district court. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to rule in favor of Austin Properties and return the application to the City for action consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Austin Properties v. City of Shawnee " on Justia Law

Clyde and Nancy Straatmeyer purchased a lot within a subdivision governed by a restrictive covenant. They began constructing a house with a large three-car garage, prompting their neighbors to sue to stop the construction, claiming it violated the covenant. The Straatmeyers counterclaimed, seeking to have the covenant declared void. The circuit court held a bench trial and ultimately declared the covenant null and void.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Meade County, South Dakota, found that the restrictive covenant had been routinely violated by numerous property owners within the subdivision without any enforcement action taken since its inception in 1976. The court determined that enforcing the covenant against the Straatmeyers while allowing other violations to persist would be inequitable. The court also found that the covenant's terms, such as the three-car garage limit and the prohibition on business activities, had been violated by several plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declaring the covenant void. The court noted that the widespread, unchallenged violations of the covenant undermined its purpose and that enforcing it selectively would be unjust. The Supreme Court agreed that it would be impractical and harmful to require all properties to comply with the covenant and that voiding the covenant was an appropriate equitable remedy. View "Hood v. Straatmeyer" on Justia Law