Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A black-owned construction company was not invited to bid as general contractor on a major Boston public housing redevelopment project after participating in pre-construction work. Years earlier, the developer had called the company’s president to discuss possible involvement, but the parties disputed what promises, if any, were made during that conversation. The construction company performed pre-construction work and was later selected as general contractor for the first phase (Camden), but after performance and communication issues arose during that project, the developer chose a different, white-owned company for the second phase (Lenox). The construction company did not protest at the time but later sued, alleging breach of contract, quasi-contract, violation of Massachusetts consumer protection law, and racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.The matter was first brought in Massachusetts state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts based on federal question jurisdiction. After discovery, the developer moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the developer, finding no enforceable contract or promise had been made regarding the Lenox phase, that the quasi-contract and Chapter 93A claims failed as derivative, and that there was insufficient evidence of racial discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The First Circuit held that the summary judgment record did not contain evidence from which a reasonable jury could find an enforceable implied-in-fact contract or a promise sufficient for promissory estoppel. It further held that the plaintiff failed to create a triable issue of fact regarding pretext or discriminatory intent under § 1981, given the legitimate business reasons cited for the company’s exclusion. Thus, summary judgment on all claims was proper. View "John B. Cruz Construction Co. v. Beacon Communities Corp." on Justia Law

Two individuals entered into a loan agreement and mortgage with a bank in Puerto Rico, using their home as collateral. After a decade, they faced financial difficulties and stopped making payments. The bank denied a request to modify the loan but proposed a short sale. The bank then initiated foreclosure proceedings in Puerto Rico’s Court of First Instance, resulting in a judgment against the borrowers. Multiple short sale offers were rejected until one was conditionally accepted, but the sale did not close in time and the home was foreclosed. Subsequently, the bank garnished funds from the borrowers, who then filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico confirmed the borrowers’ Chapter 13 plan, noting their intent to pursue claims against the bank. The borrowers filed an adversary proceeding seeking damages and other relief. The bank moved to dismiss the adversary complaint, but the bankruptcy court denied this motion, allowing the case to proceed. The borrowers later filed a similar complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico and moved to withdraw the adversary proceeding to the district court. The district court denied the withdrawal as untimely and dismissed the separate federal case. After the borrowers completed their bankruptcy plan and received a discharge, the bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the bankruptcy court erred in finding it automatically lost jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding post-discharge. The appellate court vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower courts to reassess jurisdiction and properly address the borrowers’ motion for withdrawal and their jury trial request. View "Guallini-Indij v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on neighboring parcels of land in Moultonborough, New Hampshire, near Lake Winnipesaukee. The plaintiff owns Lot 3, which abuts Park Lane, and the defendant is a nonprofit club that owns nearby roadways, paths, and a lakefront beach area reserved for its members. Both parties’ properties originated from a 1959 subdivision, with subsequent conveyances and subdivisions altering the land’s configuration. The plaintiff asserted that Lot 3 retained rights to use the defendant’s roadways and beach area, either through implied or prescriptive easement, based on prior deeds and historical use by Lot 3’s owners.The Superior Court for Carroll County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. It determined that Lot 3 was not part of a common scheme of development that would entitle it to membership benefits in the club, including the use of the roadways and beach. The trial court found no express or implied easements in the relevant chain of title for Lot 3 and concluded that the plaintiff had not shown twenty years of adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted use necessary to establish a prescriptive easement. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and applied de novo review to the legal questions. The court held that Lot 3, by virtue of the deed referencing the 1972 subdivision plan showing Park Lane and Far Echo Road as boundaries, has an implied easement as a matter of law to use those roadways. However, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding claims to use other roadways and the Lot 200 beach area, finding no implied or prescriptive easement rights for Lot 3. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Martin v. Far Echo Harbor Club" on Justia Law

The City sought to annex two undeveloped tracts of land adjacent to its existing boundaries in DeSoto County, Mississippi. One tract, owned by the Bridgforth family, had previously been split between city and county lines after an earlier annexation. The other tract, owned in part by the Bridgforths and in part by the Funderburk family, was near a highway interchange and had been considered for commercial development, including a potential truck stop, though no firm plans were underway. Both tracts were vacant and uninhabited, and landowners petitioned for annexation primarily to obtain municipal services for future development.The DeSoto County Chancery Court previously excluded these tracts from a major 2021 annexation. After the City enacted an ordinance and filed a new petition to annex the tracts, the Chancery Court held a trial with testimony from landowners, city officials, and experts. The court found the annexation unreasonable, citing speculative development plans, potential for jurisdictional confusion, the possibility of annexation being used to bypass county zoning restrictions, and the recent exclusion of these tracts in the 2021 annexation. The court relied on statutory factors, including the City’s need to expand, the adequacy of current county services, and the absence of population in the proposed area.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed whether the chancery court’s denial of annexation was supported by substantial evidence and applied the correct legal standard. The Supreme Court held that the chancery court’s findings were not manifestly wrong and were supported by credible evidence, including the lack of demonstrated need for expansion and the adequacy of existing services. The Court affirmed the chancery court’s judgment, upholding the denial of annexation. View "In The Matter of The Enlarging, Extending and Defining The Corporate Limits and Boundaries of The City of Olive Branch, DeSoto County, Mississippi v. Dobbins" on Justia Law

Egger Enterprises, LLC acquired a ranch in Humboldt County, Nevada, which had previously shifted from flood to center pivot irrigation systems. This conversion left portions of water rights unused, and Egger sought to use the leftover water by acquiring adjacent public land through federal Desert Land Entry applications. Administrative delays between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Nevada’s Division of Water Resources (NDWR) prolonged this process. Meanwhile, a nonparty challenged Egger’s applications, asserting that Egger had not used portions of its water rights for over 16 years, and thus, those rights were forfeited.The State Engineer found, by clear and convincing evidence, that certain water rights had not been put to beneficial use for five or more consecutive years and declared them forfeited. Egger petitioned for judicial review in the Sixth Judicial District Court, which initially reversed and remanded for lack of proper notice. Once proper notice was sent and Egger requested extensions of time, the State Engineer granted one extension but denied a subsequent request, ultimately issuing a declaration of forfeiture. Egger again sought judicial review, but the district court denied relief, finding the State Engineer’s decision supported by substantial evidence and holding that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of Egger’s petition. The court held that the State Engineer is not required to make findings on every statutory factor when considering an extension request under NRS 534.090(3)—only those relevant to the case. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the forfeiture decision and that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief, as there was no beneficial use of the water within the statutory period, nor any estoppel or error by the State Engineer. View "EGGER ENTER., LLC VS. STATE ENGINEER" on Justia Law

H.A.T., LLC entered into a bond-for-deed contract with Greenleaf Apartments, LLC to purchase three buildings in Portland for $1 million, with a down payment and monthly installments. H.A.T. took possession but would not receive title until the note was fully paid, and the parties executed additional agreements to address Greenleaf's concerns and clarify remedies for default. Over time, H.A.T. became delinquent in its payments, and Greenleaf lent additional funds to cover repairs after a series of casualty events. Despite proposals to consolidate debts and efforts to sell the property, H.A.T. remained in default. Greenleaf ultimately exercised its right under a memorandum agreement to terminate the contract without notice upon default, retaking possession of the property.H.A.T. then filed suit in the Maine Business and Consumer Docket, alleging various claims, including breach of contract and entitlement to insurance proceeds, while Greenleaf counterclaimed for breach of contract. The court dismissed claims against Greenleaf's counsel and, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of Greenleaf on all claims. The court found that H.A.T. had defaulted on payment obligations, that Greenleaf was justified in terminating the contract, and that H.A.T. was not entitled to insurance proceeds or a setoff. The final judgment awarded Greenleaf costs and attorney fees.On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the judgment. The Court held that H.A.T. breached the contract by missing payments, Greenleaf had no obligation to provide H.A.T. with insurance proceeds, and H.A.T. was not entitled to notice of a right to cure because the statutory notice provision for foreclosures did not apply to commercial purchasers like H.A.T. The court concluded the statute was intended to protect homeowners, not commercial investors. Judgment was affirmed. View "H.A.T., LLC v. Greenleaf Apartmetns, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after a tenant leased a residential property from a management company in West Fargo, North Dakota. After a disagreement involving a pet-related charge, the tenant failed to pay October rent. The management company served a notice to vacate and subsequently obtained a judgment of eviction, which included an early termination fee as specified in the lease. The tenant vacated the property before the end of the lease term and returned the keys. Later, the landlord sent an itemized list of damages and sought recovery for property repairs, as well as rent for the months following the tenant’s departure, despite having received the early termination fee.Upon commencement of a small claims action by the landlord for damages, the tenant removed the case to the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. The tenant sought summary judgment, arguing that the landlord could not recover both an early termination fee and additional rent, and also contended that the landlord’s failure to timely provide the itemized list of damages should bar recovery. The district court denied summary judgment, held a bench trial, and ultimately ruled that the landlord could not recover both the early termination fee and post-eviction rent. However, the court allowed recovery for property damage, finding that the landlord had reasonable justification to withhold the security deposit despite the untimely itemization, since damages exceeded the deposit. The court awarded damages for repairs as well as attorney’s fees, as the tenant had removed the case from small claims court.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the landlord’s failure to timely provide an itemized statement of damages did not bar recovery, as the tenant was not prejudiced. The court also concluded that the tenant’s arguments regarding unconscionability and attorney’s fees were not properly preserved for appeal. The case was remanded solely for determination of additional attorney’s fees on appeal. View "Meridian Property Management v. Cordie" on Justia Law

The case concerns a failed sale of a bar and restaurant in Bismarck, North Dakota. Neil Galpin, as assignee of Galpin Entertainment, sought to recover a $100,000 earnest money deposit after Cantina Holdings, LLC and Clay Butte Holdings, LLC (the buyers) did not complete the purchase. The parties had executed a confidential offer letter, which required the deposit and stated it would become non-refundable after the buyer’s due diligence period expired, unless the buyer notified the seller of its intent not to proceed before that date. Later, the parties signed a standard form purchase agreement that both incorporated the confidential letter and included a conflicting, pre-printed provision stating that if financing failed after a certain date, the earnest money would be returned to the buyer. The transaction never closed, and Galpin Entertainment ultimately sold the property to someone else.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, heard the case in a bench trial. The court concluded that the specially drafted provision in the confidential letter, rather than the standard form language in the purchase agreement, controlled the disposition of the earnest money. It found that the buyers did not properly exercise their right to terminate before the due diligence deadline and that Galpin did not breach the contract by failing to negotiate the contract for deed in good faith. Judgment was entered in favor of Neil Galpin for the earnest money, and the buyers’ counterclaims were denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that, when conflicting contract provisions exist, specially drafted terms control over standard form language, especially where the parties who caused the uncertainty seek to benefit from it. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s finding that Galpin negotiated in good faith. View "Galpin v. Cantina Holdings" on Justia Law

A tenant and her adult son rented a house in Arlington, Virginia, for a year. Several months into the lease, they noticed water leaking through a skylight and informed the landlord. The landlord and a contractor inspected the skylight and confirmed it was leaking, but no repairs were made. After a period of snow and rain, the tenant slipped on water that had accumulated from the leak, suffering significant injuries. She then sued the landlord, alleging breach of contract for failing to complete repairs as required by the lease and state law, and common-law negligence in failing to take steps to prevent injury from the leak.The landlord removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which treated the landlord’s demurrer as a motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed the negligence claim, finding the complaint did not allege that the landlord or contractor undertook repairs or performed any negligent acts—only that they inspected and confirmed the leak. The court concluded Virginia law does not impose a tort duty on landlords for failing to repair, but only for negligent acts in the course of repair. The breach of contract claim survived the motion to dismiss, but the parties later stipulated to voluntarily dismiss it to allow an immediate appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first determined it had appellate jurisdiction, accepting the tenant's binding representation that she was abandoning the contract claim with prejudice. The court then affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the negligence claim. It held that, under Virginia law, a landlord is not liable in tort for failing to make repairs unless the landlord undertakes repairs and does so negligently. Because the complaint did not allege any negligent repair or positive act, only nonfeasance, the negligence claim failed as a matter of law. View "Metz v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

A group of cities in Idaho, each holding junior ground water rights within the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer, became subject to curtailment proceedings initiated by senior surface water users represented by the Surface Water Coalition. The Coalition argued that pumping by junior ground water rights holders diminished water available to senior rights holders drawing from the Snake River. In response, the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources has periodically updated the methodology used to determine whether material injury to the senior rights has occurred, issuing a series of orders—the most recent being a Sixth Methodology Order.Following the issuance of a Fifth Methodology Order and an associated Post-Hearing Order, the cities challenged those orders in the Snake River Basin Adjudication district court, raising several concerns about the Director’s factual determinations and legal standards. During the administrative process, the Director simultaneously issued a Sixth Methodology Order that expressly superseded all prior methodology orders. The cities, however, did not include a direct challenge to the Sixth Methodology Order in their petition for judicial review. The district court affirmed the Director’s Post-Hearing Order, supporting the agency’s methodology and factual findings.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the cities failed to petition for review of the operative Sixth Methodology Order in the district court, as required under Idaho administrative law. As a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and declined to address the substantive claims raised by the cities. The court also denied requests for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-117(1), finding the statute inapplicable, but awarded costs to the prevailing parties. View "City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law